Kaufman v. Pacific Maritime Association

[3] 4 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [6] 7 RONNIE KAUFMAN, Case No. 23-cv-06694-MMC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 9 v. MOTION TO DISMISS; AFFORDING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND; 10 PACIFIC MARITIME ASSOCIATION, et CONTINUING CASE MANAGEMENT al., CONFERENCE [11] Defendants. [12] 13 Before the Court is defendants Pacific Maritime Association ("PMA") and 14 International Longshore and Warehouse Union's ("ILWU") Motion, filed March 27, 2024, 15 "to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint." Plaintiff Ronnie Kaufman ("Kaufman"), who proceeds 16 pro se, has not filed opposition.1 Having read and considered the papers filed in support 17 of the motion, the Court rules as follows.2 18 BACKGROUND 19 In his Complaint, Kaufman alleges that "all longshoremen and marine clerks 20 employed in ports on the West Coast" presently work under a "single coastwide collective 21 bargaining agreement" ("CBA"), titled "Pacific Coast Longshore and Clerk's Agreement" 22 (see Compl. at 5), and that PMA, an "employer," and ILWU, a union, are parties to the 23 CBA (see Compl. at 3, 7). The CBA was signed by PMA and ILWU on June 29, 2023, 24 and is effective from July 1, 2022, through July 1, 2028. (See Defs.' Req. for Judicial [26] 1Pursuant to the Civil Local Rules of this District, any opposition was due "not more than 14 days after the motion was filed." See Civil L. R. 7-3(a). [27] 1 Notice Ex. 1.)3 2 Kaufman alleges that, on March 3, 2015, more than seven years prior to the 3 effective date of the existing CBA, PMA and ILWU Local 34 had entered into a Letter of 4 Understanding ("LOU"), titled "San Francisco Bay Area (Local 34) Clerks Steady 5 Employment and Equalization," which pertained to the manner in which clerks would be 6 hired "in the San Francisco Bay Area." (See Compl. at 3, Ex. 1.) According to Kaufman, 7 the membership of ILWU Local 43, on October 21, 2021, voted to "terminate" the LOU 8 (see Compl. at 4, Ex. 2), which termination was effective July 1, 2022 (see Compl. Ex. 2), 9 i.e., the date the existing CBA became effective. Kaufman further alleges that on 10 January 19, 2023, the membership of ILWU Local 43 voted to "reject" a "proposal" PMA 11 made to "amend" the LOU. (See Compl. at 4, Ex. 4). According to Kaufman, PMA and 12 ILWU Local 34 nonetheless are "working under" the LOU (see Compl. at 1), which 13 activity, Kaufman asserts, constitutes a breach of the CBA by PMA (see Compl. at 5), on 14 the ground the LOU "is in conflict with the [CBA]" (see Compl. at 8). Additionally, 15 Kaufman alleges, ILWU has "breach[ed] the duty of fair representation" by not requiring 16 PMA to "adhere" to the CBA. (See Compl. at 5.) 17 Based thereon, Kaufman asserts a claim against both defendants under Section 18 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185 , and a claim 19 against the Union under Section 501 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 501 . 20 LEGAL STANDARD 21 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "can be 22 based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged 23 under a cognizable legal theory." See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696 , 24 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Rule 8(a)(2), however, "requires only 'a short and plain statement of [26] 3 The Court grants defendants' request for judicial notice of the CBA. See Densmore v. Mission Linen Supply, 164 F. Supp. 3d 1180, 1187 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (taking [27] judicial notice of contents of CBA for purposes of evaluating motion to dismiss claims 1 the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 2 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Consequently, "a 3 complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual 4 allegations." See id. Nonetheless, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his 5 entitlement to relief requires more than . . . a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 6 cause of action." See id. (internal quotation, citation, and alteration omitted). 7 In analyzing a motion to dismiss, a district court must accept as true all material 8 allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the 9 nonmoving party. See NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). "To 10 survive a motion to dismiss," however, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual 11 material, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft 12 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 ). "Factual 13 allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," 14 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 , and courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion 15 couched as a factual allegation," see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation and 16 citation omitted). 17 DISCUSSION 18 By the instant motion, defendants argue the Complaint is subject to dismissal in its 19 entirety. As set forth below, the Court agrees. 20 First, the Complaint includes no facts to support a finding that Kaufman has been 21 injured by PMA's alleged breach of the CBA and/or by ILWU's alleged failure to require 22 PMA to adhere to the CBA. For a district court to have subject matter jurisdiction over an 23 action, the plaintiff must have incurred "an injury in fact," see Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 24 U.S. 330, 338 (2016), meaning that the defendant's asserted conduct "caused [the 25 plaintiff] to suffer some harm," see Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 26 2017) (internal quotation, alteration, and citation omitted). Here, Kaufman alleges no 27 facts to suggest he has suffered some type of harm by reason of defendant's adherence 1 plaintiff, at pleading stage, "must clearly allege facts demonstrating" existence of injury in 2 fact) (internal quotation, ellipses, and citation omitted). Consequently, the Complaint is 3 subject to dismissal for failure to allege an injury in fact. 4 Next, the Complaint includes no facts to support a finding that defendants have 5 violated § 301, namely, that PMA has breached the CBA and that ILWU has breached a 6 fiduciary duty owed to Kaufman with respect to enforcement of the CBA. See 7 DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983) 8 (holding § 301 claim, when asserted against employer and union, is cognizable only 9 where employer has violated CBA and union has breached fiduciary duty owed to union 10 member). Although the Complaint alleges the LOU is "in conflict with the [CBA]" (see 11 Compl. at 8) and that ILWU engaged in "an official act [that] is patently unreasonable and 12 taken in bad faith" (see Compl. at 9), the Complaint includes no factual allegations to 13 support such conclusory assertions. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (holding "conclusory 14 statements" fail to state cognizable claim). Consequently, the § 301 claim is subject to 15 dismissal for failure to allege facts to assert a cognizable § 301 claim.4 16 Lastly, a § 501 claim cannot be brought against a union, see 29 U.S.C. § 501 (b) 17 (providing § 501 claim may only be brought against an "officer, agent, shop steward, or 18 other representative of [a] labor organization"), and, where circumstances exist to support 19 bringing a § 501 claim, the claim may only be filed "upon leave of court obtained upon 20 verified application and for good cause shown," see id., which leave Kaufman has not 21 sought, let alone obtained. Consequently, the § 501 claim is subject to dismissal for 22 failure to state a cognizable claim and for failure to obtain the requisite leave of court to 23 file it. [24] 4 Although defendants also argue the § 301 claim is barred by the applicable [25] statute of limitations, the Court does not consider such argument at this time, as, in the absence of any factual allegations identifying the nature of the alleged breach, it is [26] premature to determine when such claim accrued. See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding statute of limitations defense "may be raised by a [27] motion to dismiss . . . [i]f the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons stated above: 3 1. The motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and the Complaint is hereby 4 || DISMISSED. 5 2. Should plaintiff wish to file a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") for purposes of 6 || curing any or all of the above-referenced deficiencies, plaintiff shall file such FAC no later 7 || than June 7, 2024. 8 3. In light of the above, the Case Management Conference is hereby CONTNUED 9 || from June 14, 2024, to September 13, 2024, at 10:30 a.m. A Joint Case Management 10 || Statement shall be filed no later than September 6, 2024. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. [12] . 13 || Dated: May 16, 2024 . MAXINE M. CHESNEY 14 United States District Judge