Huemer v. Santa Cruz County Animal Shelter Foundation

[2] 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [5] 6 ARIANA HUEMER, et al., Case No. 21-cv-07372-SVK 7 Plaintiffs, ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 8 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 9 SANTA CRUZ COUNTY ANIMAL SHELTER FOUNDATION, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 93, 102 [10] Defendants. [11] 12 Plaintiff Ariana Huemer (“Huemer”) is the founder and president of an animal rescue and 13 rehabilitation organization, Plaintiff Eeyore’s Hen Harbor (“Hen Harbor”), located in the Santa 14 Cruz Mountains. This case involves the seizure by Defendant Santa Cruz Animal Shelter 15 Foundation (“Shelter”), an agency of the County of Santa Cruz, of over 300 chickens and other 16 birds in two searches of Hen Harbor in an investigation concerning suspected animal welfare 17 violations. Ultimately, the County did not institute charges against Huemer, but several dozen 18 birds were never returned to Plaintiffs. After Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed several claims and 19 defendants, Plaintiffs’ remaining claims against the Shelter and various Shelter employees are a 20 claim under the Fourth Amendment for unreasonable seizure and state law claims for violation of 21 the Bane Act and conversion. 22 Now before the Court are the Parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment or partial 23 summary judgment. Dkt. 93 (“Defendants’ MSJ”); Dkt. 102 (“Plaintiffs’ MSJ”). All Parties have 24 consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. Dkt. 9, 18, 33, 72. The Court held an in25 person hearing on May 28, 2024. After considering the Parties’ briefs and their arguments at the 26 hearing and for the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN 27 PART Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for summary I. BACKGROUND [1] Plaintiff Ariana Huemer (“Huemer”) founded Plaintiff Eeyore’s Hen Harbor (“Hen [2] Harbor”) in 2012, and she is the president, director, and principal employee of the organization. [3] Dkt. 58 (Third Amended Complaint) ¶¶ 4, 5, 17. Hen Harbor, a nonprofit corporation located in [4] Felton, California, rescues, rehabilitates, and provides long-term housing for abused and neglected [5] chickens, other birds, and occasionally other animals. Id. ¶¶ 5, 17. [6] Defendant Santa Cruz Animal Shelter (the “Agency”) is an agency of the County of Santa [7] Cruz. Id. ¶ 6. Defendant Melanie Sobel (“Sobel”) is the General Manager of the Agency. Id. ¶ 7. [8] Sobel is the direct supervisor of Defendant Todd Stosuy (“Stosuy”), who is Field Service Manager [9] of the Agency. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. Defendant Carlos Montes (“Montes”) works for the Agency as Animal [10] Control Officer II. Id. ¶ 9. Sobel, Stosuy, and Montes are referred to as the “Individual [11] Defendants.” Three other Defendants named in the Third Amended Complaint—Dana Gleason [12] DVM, Hillary Stern DVM, and Anne Terry DVM—have been dismissed. Id. ¶¶ 10-12; Dkt. 88, [13] 116. [14] According to Plaintiffs, since at least 2011, Huemer has frequently and publicly criticized [15] multiple policies and actions of the Agency and its employees. Dkt. 58 ¶¶ 18, 39-47. During the [16] August 2020 CZU fire, which burned tens of thousands of acres in Santa Cruz County, Huemer [17] allegedly warned the public not to take their animals to the Agency because it had a policy or [18] propensity to kill healthy animals, and she warned that the Agency would not attempt to rescue [19] animals Id. ¶¶ 35, 46. Huemer offered to do what she could to rescue animals the Agency refused [20] to help, and she claims to have rescued approximately 100 chickens during the fire by bringing [21] them to Hen Harbor until their owners could reclaim them after forced evacuations were lifted. Id. [22] On September 9, 2020, Stosuy received an email from Daphna Nachminovitch, a Senior [23] Vice President in the Cruelty Investigations Department of People for the Ethical Treatment of [24] Animals (PETA), that relayed concerns about Hen Harbor, including a potential hoarding [25] situation. Dkt. 99 ¶¶ 2-3; Dkt. 99-1. Between September 10 and 12, 2020, Montes investigated [26] the matter by speaking and/or emailing with at least nine people. Dkt. 96 ¶¶ 2-11; Dkt. 96-1 to 9627 9. 1 On September 21, 2024, after consulting with a Santa Cruz County Assistant District 2 Attorney, Montes submitted an application for a search warrant, including a probable cause 3 affidavit. Dkt. 96-14. The affidavit described reports from several individuals concerning 4 conditions at Hen Harbor. See, e.g., id. at ECF pp. 4-16. The affidavit also described Montes’s 5 own visit to the property on August 24, 2020 in connection with evacuations of the surrounding 6 area. Id. at ECF pp. 8-9. Plaintiffs’ counsel explained at the hearing that Huemer was not present 7 during Montes’s August visit to the property. 8 On or about September 21, 2020, a Santa Cruz County Superior Court judge signed the 9 search warrant. Dkt. 96-15. The search warrant commanded the search of “[a]ll buildings on the 10 property, and/or the curtilage of the property known as Hen Harbor at 7331 West Zayante Road in 11 Felton California 95018, where animals may be located as well as articles of personal property 12 tending to establish the identity of the person in control of the premises, attics, basements.” Id. at 13 ECF p. 2. The search warrant authorized the seizure of “all animals (alive or dead),” among other 14 items. Id. 15 On September 21, 2020, Defendants executed the search warrant at Hen Harbor and seized 16 240 fowl, as well as two goats and various other items. Dkts. 96-16, 96-18. 17 Defendants were not able to seize all the birds at Hen Harbor during the September search. 18 See Dkt. 96-20 at ECF p. 6. On or about September 30, 2020, after again consulting with an 19 Assistant District Attorney, Montes submitted an application for a second search warrant, along 20 with a probable cause affidavit. Dkt. 96-20. A Superior Court judge issued the warrant on 21 October 1, 2020. Id. 22 Defendants executed the second search warrant on October 2, 2020 and seized 80 birds at 23 Hen Harbor. Dkt. 96-22. 24 In October 2020, Huemer obtained a post-seizure hearing concerning each seizure pursuant 25 to California Penal Code § 597.1. See Dkt. 107-2, 107-3. After each hearing, the hearing officer 26 ordered that the seized animals be returned to Huemer as soon as practicable. Id. 27 Defendants acknowledge that some birds died while in Defendants’ possession and that of 1 Dkt. 93 at 9, 12, 24. Defendants do not dispute that other animals were never returned to 2 Plaintiffs. See id. 3 Huemer filed this lawsuit on September 22, 2021, asserting causes of action for violations 4 of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments; Monell liability; liability under the California 5 Unruh Act, Bane Act, and unfair competition statutes; trespass to land; conversion; and strict 6 liability. Dkt. 1 (corrected at Dkt. 13). After the Court granted two motions to dismiss with leave 7 to amend (Dkt. 34, 40), Plaintiff filed the Third Amended Complaint. Dkt. 58. Three causes of 8 action in the Third Amended Complaint are no longer at issue: Plaintiffs dismissed their first 9 (First Amendment retaliation) and sixth (trespass) causes of action (Dkt. 90), and they have 10 dismissed all Defendants named in the third cause of action (Fourteenth Amendment – due 11 process) (Dkt. 88, 116). 12 Defendants now seek summary judgment, or in the alternative partial summary judgment, 13 on all of Plaintiffs’ remaining causes of action: the second cause of action (unreasonable seizure 14 in violation of the Fourth Amendment – against the Individual Defendants); third cause of action 15 (violation of the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. C. § 52.1 – against all Defendants); and fifth cause of action 16 (conversion – against all Defendants), as well as Plaintiffs’ claims for emotional distress damages 17 and punitive damages. Dkt. 93. 18 In Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment, they seek summary judgment on 19 the issues of the validity of the September and October search warrants and the lawfulness of the 20 seizures pursuant to the two warrants. Dkt. 102. [21] 22 II. LEGAL STANDARD 23 A party may move for summary judgment on any claim or defense, or for partial summary 24 judgment on part of a claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate 25 if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the party is 26 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. A fact is material if it may affect the outcome of the 27 case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1985). A genuine dispute of material 1 party. Id. 2 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of 3 the basis for the motion and identifying portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to 4 interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material 5 fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 6 Where the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of persuasion at trial, such 7 as where the moving party seeks summary judgment on its own claims or defenses, the moving 8 party must establish “beyond controversy every essential element of its [claim].” So. Cal. Gas Co. 9 v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885 , 888 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Where the moving 10 party seeks summary judgment on a claim or defense on which the opposing party bears the 11 burden of persuasion at trial, “the moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential 12 element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not 13 have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” 14 Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the 15 moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce 16 evidence supporting its claims or defenses. Id. at 1103 . If the nonmoving party does not produce 17 evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to summary 18 judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 . 19 “The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw 20 all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor.” City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 21 F.3d 1036 , 1049 (9th Cir. 2014). However, the party opposing summary judgment must direct the 22 court’s attention to “specific, triable facts.” So. Cal. Gas, 336 F.3d at 889. “[T]he mere existence 23 of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position” is insufficient to defeat a motion for 24 summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 . “Where the record taken as a whole could not 25 lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” 26 City of Pomona, 750 F.3d at 1049-50 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio 27 Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JU`DGMENT OR PARTIAL 1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 2 A. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 3 In Defendants’ reply in support of their motion for summary judgment, they object to the 4 following statement in Plaintiffs’ opposition brief: “Disregarding the overwhelming numbers of 5 healthy chickens, on the first day, Defendants chased, captured, and thus stressed the entire flock.” 6 Dkt. 106 at 1 (citing Dkt. 101 at 3:5-6). In support of this statement in their brief, Plaintiffs cite 7 this passage in the transcript of Defendant Montes’s deposition: 8 Q: How many birds did you capture that first day? 9 A: From what I can remember, 200 – between 250 and 260. 10 Q: The numbers I’ve seen were 240; does that accurate (sic)? 11 A: It was approximately 240. 12 Dkt. 101 at 3:5-6 (citing Dkt. 107-1 at 131:4-9). 13 According to Defendants, the assertion in Plaintiffs’ opposition brief violates Civil Local 14 Rule 7-5(a), which requires that “[f]actual contentions made in support of or in opposition to any 15 motion must be supported by an affidavit or declaration and by appropriate references to the 16 record.” Dkt. 106 at 1. Defendants request that the Court disregard Plaintiffs’ assertion. Dkt. 106 17 at 1. 18 Defendants are correct that the cited deposition testimony does not support the assertion in 19 Plaintiffs’ brief and therefore the Court disregards that assertion in deciding the present motions. 20 B. FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIM 21 Plaintiffs’ second cause of action alleges that the Individual Defendants unreasonably 22 seized animals in the first and second searches of Hen Harbor, in violation of the Fourth 23 Amendment. Dkt. 58 ¶¶ 118-121. Plaintiffs’ original opposition to Defendants’ motion for 24 summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim focused primarily on the alleged lack of 25 probable cause for the September and October search warrants and was premised on Plaintiffs’ 26 mistaken assumption that Defendants had not submitted an affidavit of probable cause in support 27 of the applications for those search warrants. See Dkt. 101 at 6-10. After briefing on Defendants’ 1 stipulated for purposes of that motion that “Defendant Carlos Montes (‘Officer Montes’) did 2 submit a Statement of Probable Cause in support of the September 21 Warrant (referenced therein 3 as ‘September Application’) and October 1 Warrant (referenced therein as ‘October Application’) 4 to the two magistrates who subsequently issued the September Warrant and October Warrant.” 5 Dkt 117 at 2 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, as reflected in the briefs and as confirmed at the 6 hearing, Plaintiffs’ only remaining argument with respect to their Fourth Amendment claim is that 7 the September and October warrants were overbroad. See Dkt. 101 at 10-13. Defendants respond 8 by arguing that the warrants were not overbroad and that in any event, they are entitled to qualified 9 immunity with respect to the warrants. See Dkt. 93 at 14-21; Dkt. 106 at 1-11. 10 1. Overbreadth 11 Plaintiffs argue that by permitting the seizure of “all animals (alive or dead)”—regardless 12 of whether the animals were healthy or sick—the warrants were overbroad because “nothing in the 13 Warrants tied the seizures to animals that could provide evidence in any way of a crime.” Id. at 14 10-11. The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures” and 15 provides that no warrants shall issue without “particularly describing … the persons or things to be 16 seized.” “To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant must not be 17 overbroad; its breadth must be limited to the scope of the probable cause on which the warrant was 18 based.” Blight v. City of Manteca, 944 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing In re Grand Jury 19 Subpoenas, 926 F.2d 847, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1991)). This inquiry involves determining “whether 20 the issuing judge had a substantial basis to conclude that the affidavit supporting the search 21 warrant established probable cause,” which “is not a high bar.” Blight, 944 F.3d at 1066 (citations 22 omitted). Accordingly, the issue of whether a search warrant is overbroad is tied closely to the 23 question of whether probable cause supported issuance of the warrant. 24 As noted above, Plaintiffs have belatedly admitted that Defendant Montes submitted sworn 25 statements of probable cause in applying for the September and October Warrants, and they have 26 acknowledged that “[t]his effectively withdraws Plaintiffs’ arguments ‘The September Warrant is 27 not supported by probable cause” … and ‘The October Warrant is not submitted by probable 1 largely, if not entirely, abandoned their argument that the warrants were not supported by probable 2 cause. Plaintiffs nevertheless continue to assert that the search warrants were overbroad because 3 they authorized the seizure of healthy animals which, according to Plaintiff, are not evidence of 4 any suspected crime. See Dkt. 101 at 15-16. 5 Plaintiffs’ argument misses the main point under Blight, which is whether the scope of the 6 warrant is tied to the showing of probable cause upon which the warrant was based. See Blight, [7] 944 F.3d at 1066 . Plaintiffs in essence argue that there was no probable cause to allow the seizure 8 of healthy animals. To evaluate this argument, “[t]he superordinate and controlling issue here is 9 thus whether there was probable cause” to seize healthy animals. See id. As the Montes probable 10 cause affidavits make clear, Defendants sought the search warrants as part of their investigation of 11 possible violations of California Penal Code §§ 597(b) and 597.1(a)(1). See Dkt. 93-14 at ECF 12 pp. 3-4; Dkt. 93-20 at ECF pp. 3-4. Penal Code § 597(b), entitled “Cruelty to animals,” provides: [13] Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (a) or (c), a person who overdrives, 14 overloads, drives when overloaded, overworks, tortures, torments, deprives of necessary sustenance, drink, or shelter, cruelly beats, mutilates, or cruelly 15 kills an animal, or causes or procures an animal to be so overdriven, overloaded, driven when overloaded, overworked, tortured, tormented, deprived of necessary 16 sustenance, drink, shelter, or to be cruelly beaten, mutilated, or cruelly killed; and whoever, having the charge or custody of an animal, either as owner or otherwise, [17] subjects an animal to needless suffering, or inflicts unnecessary cruelty upon the 18 animal, or in any manner abuses an animal, or fails to provide the animal with proper food, drink, or shelter, or protection from the weather, or who drives, rides, 19 or otherwise uses the animal when unfit for labor, is, for each offense, guilty of a crime punishable pursuant to subdivision (d). [20] 21 Penal Code § 597.1(a)(1), which concerns “Failure to care for animals,” provides: [22] Every owner, driver, or keeper of any animal who permits the animal to be in any 23 building, enclosure, lane, street, square, or lot of any city, county, city and county, or judicial district without proper care and attention is guilty of a misdemeanor. Any 24 peace officer, humane society officer, or animal control officer shall take possession of the stray or abandoned animal and shall provide care and treatment for the animal 25 until the animal is deemed to be in suitable condition to be returned to the owner. When the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that very prompt action is [26] required to protect the health or safety of the animal or the health or safety of others, 27 the officer shall immediately seize the animal and comply with subdivision (f). In all other cases, the officer shall comply with the provisions of subdivision (g). The full pursuant to a search warrant shall constitute a lien on the animal and the animal shall [1] not be returned to its owner until the charges are paid, if the seizure is upheld 2 pursuant to this section. Both code sections capture a wide range of animal mistreatment, including deficient [3] environments for the keeping of animals, and do not hinge on the binary question of whether an [4] animal is healthy or sick. For example, section 597(b) extends liability to one who “fails to [5] provide [an] animal with proper food, drink, or shelter, or protection from the weather.” The [6] probable cause affidavits submitted in connection with the search warrant applications detailed not [7] only reports of sick and deceased chickens, but also chickens caged in overcrowded conditions, [8] food for the chickens and turkeys in open containers with chickens sitting in them and rats nearby, [9] and broken and dilapidated chicken coops. See, e.g., Dkt. 96-14 at ECF pp. 6-7; Dkt. 96-20 at 510 6.1 By allowing the seizure of “all animals (alive or dead),” the search warrants were sufficiently [11] tied to the showing of probable cause on which the warrants were based and therefore are not [12] overbroad. [13] 14 2. Qualified immunity The Individual Defendants argue that even if Plaintiffs had identified a triable issue of fact [15] that would preclude summary judgment on their Fourth Amendment claim, the Individual [16] Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Dkt. 93 at 18-21. “The doctrine of qualified [17] immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct [18] does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person [19] would have known.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (internal quotation [20] marks and citations omitted). “Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to [21] make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those [22] who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[W]hether [23] an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful [26] 1 For similar reasons, Plaintiffs’ argument regarding the actual number of sick animals seized during the searches fails. See, e.g., Dkt. 101 at 5 (arguing that “the vast majority of animals [27] captured for the first seizure were totally healthy – according to Defendants’ own assessments, at 1 official action generally turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light 2 of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.” Id. (internal quotation 3 marks and citations omitted). 4 In Messerschmidt, the Supreme Court stated that “[w]here the alleged Fourth Amendment 5 violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has 6 issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable 7 manner or, as we have sometimes put it, in ‘objective good faith.’” Id. (quoting United States v. 8 Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 922–923 (1984)). Nonetheless, issuance of a warrant “does not end the 9 inquiry into objective reasonableness,” and an exception to qualified immunity exists when “it is 10 obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue.” 11 Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 547 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). In explaining 12 this exception, the Supreme Court cited a situation “where the warrant was based on an affidavit 13 so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 14 unreasonable.” Id. (citation omitted). However, the Supreme Court also explained that “the 15 threshold for establishing this exception is a high one, and it should be,” and “[i]n the ordinary 16 case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause determination” 17 because “[i]t is the magistrate's responsibility to determine whether the officer's allegations 18 establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of 19 the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The plaintiffs in 20 Messerschmidt argued that the case fell into the narrow exception to qualified immunity because 21 the officers who sought the search warrant “failed to provide any facts or circumstances from 22 which a magistrate could properly conclude that there was probable cause to seize the broad 23 classes of items being sought,” and “[n]o reasonable officer could have presumed that such a 24 warrant was valid. Id. at 548 . The Supreme Court rejected that argument. Id. 25 In their opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs argued that 26 Messerschmidt differs from this case on the “key point” that “[t]wo affidavits accompanied 27 Messerschmidt’s warrant applications” whereas “[n]o sworn statements were submitted here by 1 admission that Montes did, in fact, submit sworn affidavits in support of the applications for the 2 September and October warrants (see Dkt. 117) eliminates this argument for why qualified 3 immunity should not apply. The Montes probable cause affidavit for the September search 4 warrant, which Plaintiffs now acknowledge, also eliminates Plaintiffs’ argument that Montes 5 “entirely concealed the August 24, 2020 search he made with no warrant” because the affidavit 6 discusses Montes’s August visit to Hen Harbor. See Dkt. 93-4 at ECF pp. 8-9. 7 Plaintiffs’ additional argument that the warrants were “facially deficient … in failing to 8 particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized” (Dkt. 101 at 15) also falls short 9 because as discussed in section III.B.1. above, the warrants in this case satisfy the particularity 10 standard. 11 As Defendants note and Plaintiffs effectively concede, it was Montes and not the other 12 Individual Defendants (Sobel and Stosuy) who applied for the warrant. Plaintiffs’ arguments as to 13 why Sobel and Stosuy are not entitled to qualified immunity assume that Montes is not entitled to 14 immunity and argue that Sobel and Stosuy must also face suit because of their role in Montes’s 15 decision to seize animals and their supervision of Montes. Dkt. 101 at 15-16. The foregoing 16 analysis in this section explains why Montes is entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs have 17 offered no facts regarding the roles played by Sobel and Stosuy that would deprive them of 18 qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim. 19 Accordingly, all three Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on 20 Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, and are therefore entitled to summary judgment on that 21 claim. 22 3. Collateral estoppel 23 Having already concluded that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 24 Fourth Amendment claim, the Court need not reach Defendants’ additional argument that 25 Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from relitigating the legality of the October search because that 26 issue was already decided in a state administrative hearing. See Dkt. 93 at 13-14. [27] 4. Conclusion on Fourth Amendment Claim [1] For the foregoing reasons, the Individual Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on [2] the Fourth Amendment claim is GRANTED. [3] C. STATE LAW CLAIMS [4] 1. Bane Act [5] The Bane Act provides a private cause of action where “a person or persons, whether or [6] not acting under color of law, interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to [7] interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or [8] individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights [9] secured by the Constitution or laws of this state.” Cal. Civ. C. § 52.1(b)(c). The necessary [10] elements for a Bane Act claim are “(1) intentional interference or attempted interference with a [11] state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) the interference or attempted interference was [12] by threats, intimidation or coercion.” Lawrence v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, [13] 258 F. Supp. 3d 977, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (citing Allen v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 14 41, 67 (2015)); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 (b)-(c). “The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the [15] defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., ‘threats, intimidation or coercion’), tried to or did [16] prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force [17] the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law.” Johnson v. City [18] of San Jose, 591 F. Supp. 3d 649 , 668–69 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (quoting Simmons v. Superior Ct., 7 19 Cal. App. 5th 1113, 1125 (2016)). “A Bane Act claim requires a showing of specific intent to [20] violate protected rights, which can be satisfied by reckless disregard of the right at issue. 21 Johnson, 591 F. Supp. 3d at 669 (citing Cornell v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 17 Cal. App. 5th 22 766, 800 (2017)). [23] On the first element of a Bane Act claim, for the reasons discussed in section III.B. above, [24] the Court concludes that Defendants did not actually interfere with Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment [25] rights; nevertheless, under the terms of the Bane Act, an “attempt[] to interfere” with a plaintiff’s [26] constitutional rights is sufficient. See Cal. Civ. C. § 52.1(b)(c). At the hearing, Defendants [27] acknowledged that a Bane Act claim does not rely on a finding of a Fourth Amendment violation. 1 The remaining question is whether Plaintiffs have established a genuine issue of material 2 fact as to whether the second element of a Bane Act claim is satisfied, i.e., whether Defendants 3 attempted to deprive Plaintiffs of constitutional rights through “threats, intimidation or coercion.” 4 At the hearing, Plaintiffs conceded that there was no evidence of a threat by Defendants. 5 However, that leaves open the issue of whether there is a triable issue of fact concerning whether 6 Defendants engaged in the requisite intimidation or coercion. 7 To prove intimidation, the test is “whether a reasonable person, standing in the shoes of the 8 plaintiff, would have been intimidated by the actions of the defendants and have perceived a threat 9 of violence.” Richardson v. City of Antioch, 722 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 10 A Bane Act claim that relies on a theory of coercion requires allegations of “such force, either 11 physical or moral, as to constrain [the plaintiff] to do against his will something he would not 12 otherwise have done.” Herrera v. AllianceOne Receivable Mgmt., Inc., 170 F. Supp. 3d 1282 , 13 1288 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (citations omitted). 14 Many of the arguments in Plaintiffs’ opposition brief as to why Defendants are not entitled 15 to summary judgment on the Bane Act claim are fatally undercut by Plaintiffs’ later admission that 16 the September and October 2020 warrant applications were each accompanied by a probable cause 17 affidavit executed by Montes. See, e.g., Dkt. 101 at 18-20 (pointing to “Defendants’ execution of 18 a facially invalid search warrant,” “Officer Montes’s unexplained failure to include his statements 19 of probable cause in the September Application or October Application,” and Montes’s “fail[ure] 20 to include the manufactured statement of probable cause in either warrant application.”). That 21 leaves Plaintiffs’ other arguments, which focus on the “totality” of the circumstances, most 22 significantly Montes’s August 2020 visit to Hen Harbor while Huemer was not present, and which 23 Plaintiffs contend amount to intimidation or coercion. Specifically, Plaintiffs question the 24 circumstances of Montes’s August 2020 visit and argue that because Plaintiffs run an animal 25 shelter, it is intimidating and coercive for animal control to come onto Plaintiffs property, even if 26 Huemer did not learn about it until later, especially in light of Plaintiffs’ allegation that the Shelter 27 had been thwarted in previous attempts to enter the property. Plaintiffs also point to the Shelter’s 1 In essence, Plaintiffs argue that from these disparate facts, a reasonable factfinder could 2 infer that Defendants intimidated or coerced Plaintiffs. On a motion for summary judgment, 3 “inferences may be drawn from a nonmoving party’s direct and circumstantial evidence to 4 establish a genuine issue of material fact.” Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.2d 1216 , 5 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). However, the direct and circumstantial evidence must be “of sufficient 6 quantum or quality” to support such an inference. Id.; see also Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. 7 Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987) (summary judgment inquiry “focuses on 8 whether the nonmoving party has come forward with sufficiently specific facts from which to 9 draw reasonable inferences about other material facts that are necessary elements of the 10 nonmoving party’s claim). Here, Plaintiffs have offered little explanation, much less evidence, of 11 why it would be reasonable to infer that they were intimidated or coerced by Defendants’ actions. 12 Even if the evidence before the Court was of sufficient quantum or quality to support an 13 inference that Defendants’ conduct intimidated or coerced Plaintiffs, however, the “essence” of 14 Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim is still missing because they have not shown that Defendants’ purported 15 intimidation or coercion “tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had 16 the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not 17 required to do under the law.” Johnson, 591 F. Supp. 3d at 668–69 (emphasis); see also Est. of 18 Crawley v. Kings Cnty., No. 1:13-CV-02042-LJO, 2014 WL 2174848 , at *14 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 19 2014), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:13-CV-02042-LJO, 2014 WL 2801046 20 (E.D. Cal. June 19, 2014) (“the type of conduct the Bane Act was intended to prevent” is that 21 which “force[s] [plaintiff] to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law”). 22 This is not a situation where Defendants, for example, coerced or intimidated Huemer into 23 allowing them to search Hen Harbor without a warrant. See, e.g., Freeman v. Mata, No. EDCV 24 22-1732 JGB (KKx), 2023 WL 4291850 , at *16 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2023) (on motion to dismiss, 25 holding that plaintiff had plausibly stated a Bane Act violation by alleging that a search of his 26 backpack was facilitated by intimidation and/or coercion where several armed police stopped him 27 for no reason and asked to “check” him); Est. of Crawley, 2014 WL 2174848 , at *14 (on motion to 1 home despite plaintiff’s lack of consent). Here, Plaintiffs do not identify any action they took, or 2 were prevented from taking, as a result of Defendants’ allegedly intimidating or coercive conduct. 3 Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim is 4 GRANTED. 5 2. Conversion 6 Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action for conversion is based on Defendants’ failure to return 7 dozens of Plaintiffs’ birds seized in the September and October 2020 searches of Hen Harbor. 8 See Dkt. 58 ¶¶ 131-134. Defendants admit that at least 318 birds were seized from Plaintiffs (240 9 birds in the first search and 78 birds in the second search).2 Defendants also acknowledge that 10 some birds died while in Defendants’ possession and that “[n]o less than 267 birds were returned 11 to Ms. Huemer.” Dkt. 93 at 9, 12, 24. Thus, despite Defendants’ careful wording, it appears that 12 at least 51 birds were seized but not returned. 13 The elements of a claim for conversion under California law are: “(a) plaintiff’s ownership 14 or right to possession of personal property, (b) defendant’s disposition of property in a manner 15 inconsistent with plaintiff’s property rights, and (c) resulting damages.” Voris v. Lampert, 7 Cal. 16 5th 1141, 1150 (2019) (citations omitted). Defendants challenge the merits of Plaintiffs’ 17 conversion claim on several grounds. 18 a. Ownership or possession 19 In their opening summary judgment brief, Defendants argue that “Ms. Huemer cannot 20 demonstrate ownership over all of the at-issue property.” Dkt. 93 at 24. In support of their 21 argument, Defendants cite Huemer’s deposition testimony in which she stated that not all of the 22 birds at Hen Harbor belonged to her. Id. (citing Dkt. 94-4 at 35:19-37:13; 40:16-41:3). Plaintiffs 23 counter this argument by correctly pointing out that they do not need to prove ownership, only the 24 right to possession of the property at issue. Dkt. 101 at 20-21 (citing Lee v. Hanley, 61 Cal. 4th 25 1225, 1240 (2015) and Plummer v. Day/Eisenberg, LLP, 84 Cal. App. 4th 38, 45 (2010)). 26 Defendants’ reply brief does not further address the ownership/possession issue and appears to [27] 1 abandon this argument, but nevertheless the Court finds that Plaintiffs have offered sufficient 2 evidence that they had a right to possess the birds seized by Defendants to give rise to a genuine 3 issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment on this issue. Specifically, Huemer 4 testified that Hen Harbor is in part a rescue organization, individuals or organizations bring 5 animals there, sometimes birds stay at Hen Harbor and sometimes they go back to the individual 6 or organization that brought them there, and that in the August 2020 time frame she took in 7 animals from multiple sources, including animals whose owners were evacuated during the CZU 8 wildfire in the Santa Cruz mountains. Dkt. 94-4 at 35:19-37:24. 9 b. Intent 10 Defendants next argue that there is no evidence that they had the intent or purpose to 11 convert Plaintiffs’ property. See Dkt. 93 at 24. According to Defendants, “not every failure to 12 deliver property to the rightful owner constitutes a conversion” and “[t]o establish a conversion, it 13 is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show an intention or purpose to convert the goods and to 14 exercise ownership over them, or to prevent the owner from taking possession of the property.” [15] Id. (citing Spates v. Dameron Hosp. Assn., 114 Cal. App. 4th 208, 222 (2003) and cases cited 16 therein). Defendants assert that “[t]he foundation for a conversion claim ‘rests upon the 17 unwarranted interference by defendant with the dominion over the property of the plaintiff from 18 which injury to the latter results.” Dkt. 93 at 24 (quoting Spates, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 222 ); see 19 also Vorhis, 7 Cal. 5th at 1150 (“[t]oday, the tort of conversion is understood more generally as 20 ‘the wrongful exercise of dominion over personal property of another’”). 21 However, as Plaintiffs note (Dkt. 101 at 21), the California Supreme Court’s 2019 Vorhis 22 decision stated that “conversion is a strict liability tort” that “does not require bad faith, 23 knowledge, or even negligence; it requires only that the defendant have intentionally done the act 24 depriving the plaintiff of his or her rightful possession.” Vorhis, 7 Cal. 5th at 1158. Defendants 25 emphasize that the animals were “seized on a temporary basis, for the purpose of the warrant.” 26 Dkt. 93 at 24; see also Dkt. 106 at 13-14 (“The Opposition provides no evidence that Defendants 27 knowingly or intentionally sought to prevent Ms. Huemer from taking possession of any of the 1 However, Defendants also admit that following the intended “temporary” seizure, dozens of seized 2 animals were never returned to Plaintiffs. Dkt. 93 at 24 (“At least 267 of the 323 seized animals 3 were returned. Some animals died.”). Defendants’ lawful seizure of the animals does not entitle 4 them to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ conversion claim when Defendants ultimately deprived 5 Plaintiffs of recovering dozens of animals. 6 c. Conclusion on conversion claim 7 Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiffs’ 8 conversion claim is DENIED. [9] 10 3. Immunity 11 Defendants argue that regardless of the merits of Plaintiffs’ Bane Act and conversion 12 claims, Defendants are immune from liability. Dkt. 93 at 21-23. 13 a. Immunity of Individual Defendants 14 The Individual Defendants claim immunity for the searches and seizures under California 15 Code of Civil Procedure § 262.1, which states: “A sheriff or other ministerial officer is justified in 16 the execution of, and shall execute, all process and orders regular on their face and issued by 17 competent authority, whatever may be the defect in the proceedings upon which they were 18 issued.”3 According to Defendants, this immunity applies “because the two searches and seizures 19 were being carried out via search warrant.” Dkt. 93 at 21. “In deciding whether process is regular 20 on its face, it is sufficient if it appears valid to an ordinarily intelligent and informed layman [and] 21 [t]he ministerial officer does not have to search out legal niceties of procedure.” George v. County 22 of San Luis Obispo, 78 Cal. App. 4th 1048, 1051 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations 23 omitted). Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are not entitled to immunity under section 262.1 24 because “both search warrants contained no indicia of probable cause and were plainly 25 overbroad.” Dkt. 101 at 17. However, Plaintiffs’ “no indicia of probable cause” argument is 26 based on their incorrect, and later withdrawn, assumption that there were no probable cause [27] 1 affidavits submitted with the search warrant applications. See Dkt. 117. In addition, as discussed 2 in section III.B.1. above, the warrants were not overbroad. Accordingly, insofar as Plaintiffs’ state 3 law claims are based on the manner in which the September and October search warrants were 4 executed, the Individual Defendants are immune from such claims under Code of Civil Procedure 5 § 262.1. 6 Each Individual Defendant also argues for immunity for any claims in connection to his or 7 her individual involvement in the decision to apply for search warrants pursuant to California 8 Government Code § 820.2, which provides: “Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public 9 employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission 10 was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be 11 abused.” Defendants argue that the decision to apply for the search warrants was “the epitome of 12 a considered, deliberate policy choice.” Dkt. 93 at 22. “[D]eciding whether to seize animals 13 under [California Penal Code] § 597.1(a)(1) clearly represents an exercise of discretion.” Recchia 14 v. City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Animal Servs., 889 F.3d 553, 564 (9th Cir. 2018). Plaintiffs’ 15 arguments why this immunity does not apply (see Dkt. 101 at 17) are the same as those discussed 16 in the preceding paragraph (absence of probable cause and overbreadth) and fail for the same 17 reasons. Accordingly, insofar as Plaintiffs’ state law claims are based on the decision to apply for 18 the September and October search warrants, the Individual Defendants are immune from such 19 claims under Government Code § 820.2. 20 However, as discussed in section III.C.2. above, Plaintiffs’ conversion claim depends at 21 least in part on events that occurred after Defendants obtained search warrants and seized animals 22 from Plaintiffs. Defendants do not identify any statute or other authority that would immunize 23 their post-seizure conduct. See Dkt. 93 at 21-22. 24 In earlier cases, some courts afforded immunity under a statute granting prosecutorial 25 immunity, California Government Code § 821.6, to state officials in connection with state law 26 claims for damage to property seized pursuant to search warrant. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles 27 v. Sup. Ct., 181 Cal. App. 4th 218, 232 (2010) (holding that trial court should have granted 1 seized property grew out of a search and seizure pursuant to search warrant and the investigation 2 was part of the prosecution process, even though no charges were filed). However, the California 3 Supreme Court has recently clarified that this immunity does not extend to investigatory actions 4 taken prior to initiation of a judicial proceeding. See Leon v. Cnty. of Riverside, 14 Cal.5th 910 , [5] 309 Cal.Rptr.3d 682 , 530 P.3d 1093 , 1101 (2023); see also Agro Dynamics, LLC v. United States, 6 --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2023 WL 6130813 , at *8 (S.D. Cal. 2023). Appropriately, Defendants’ 7 summary judgment motion in this case does not seek immunity based on section 821.6. 8 In summary, the Individual Defendants are immune on Plaintiffs’ state law claims insofar 9 as those claims are based on those Defendants’ conduct in obtaining and executing the September 10 and October warrants, but they are not immune from Plaintiffs’ conversion claim insofar as it 11 arises from the Individual Defendants’ post-seizure conduct. 12 b. Immunity of Shelter 13 Defendants argue that “to the extent it is deemed involved and/or responsible for the 14 actions of its employees, the Shelter is equally immune.” Dkt. 93 at 22 (citing Cal. Gov’t C. 15 § 815.2(b)). Under section 815.2(b) and the foregoing analysis of the Individual Defendants’ 16 immunity, the Shelter is immune from Plaintiffs’ state law claims relating to obtaining and 17 executing the two search warrants but is not immune from the Plaintiffs’ conversion claim insofar 18 as it arises from post-seizure conduct. 19 With respect to the conversion claim, Defendants also argue that regardless of the merits of 20 that claim against the Individual Defendants, California Government Code § 815(a) immunizes the 21 Shelter, as a public entity, from liability for the common law tort of conversion. Dkt. 93 at 23. 22 Section 815(a) provides that except as otherwise provided by statute, “[a] public entity is not liable 23 for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public 24 employee or any other person.” However, Defendants acknowledge that Government Code 25 § 815.2(a) provides for liability of a public entity “for injury proximately caused by an act or 26 omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or 27 omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee 1 summary judgment on the conversion claim based on the substance of section 815.2(a); instead, 2 the Shelter argues that Plaintiffs cannot hold the agency liable for conversion vis-à-vis Shelter 3 employees under section 815.2(a) because that statutory section “appears nowhere in the operative 4 Third Amended Complaint” and therefore “it is not part of the case.” Id.; see also Dkt. 106 at 13 5 (“Plaintiffs’ failure to plead Gov. Code § 815.2 is fatal to their conversion claim against the 6 Shelter.”). Plaintiffs disagree that they are required to expressly plead section 815.2. Dkt. 101 at 7 20. 8 The cases cited by Defendants (see Dkt. 93 at 23) stand for the proposition that the party 9 moving for summary judgment need only address theories alleged in the complaint, but none of 10 the cases address section 815.2(a) at all, much less impose a requirement that a complaint 11 specifically cite that statute before the plaintiff may seek to impose liability on a public entity for 12 torts committed by its employees. In any event, “[i]t is well-settled that the Federal Rules of Civil 13 Procedure apply in federal court irrespective of the source of the subject matter jurisdiction, and 14 irrespective of whether the substantive law at issue is state or federal.” Zaragoza-Rios v. City of 15 Concord, No. 18-cv-06803-JCS, 2019 WL 2247856 , at *5 (quoting Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., [16] 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009)). Plaintiffs therefore “need only satisfy the pleading standard 17 of Rule 8—as interpreted by Twombly, Iqbal, and other relevant precedent—under which a 18 complaint need not identify the statutory or constitutional source of the claim raise in order to 19 survive a motion to dismiss.” Zaragoza-Rios, 2019 WL 2247856 , at *5 (denying motion to 20 dismiss claims for excessive force and battery against city where complaint did not identify 21 section 815.2). Defendants have not shown the Court must impose a different pleading standard at 22 the summary judgment stage, or how that would work as a practical matter. 23 Both a public entity’s immunity for liability for common law torts under section 815(a) 24 and the entity’s vicarious liability under section 815.2(a) are provided by statute. See generally 25 D.V. v. City of Sunnyvale, 65 F. Supp. 3d 782, 785 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Specifically, “Section 815(a) 26 immunizes public entities from liability for injuries arising from [their] acts or omissions except as 27 provided by statute” and “Section 815.2 is one such statute.” Whooley v. Tamalpais Union High 1 815.2(a) a public entity is vicariously liable for injuries proximately caused by conversion 2 committed by an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment. Here, the 3 Third Amended Complaint pleads that the Individual Defendants committed conversion and 4 alleges that in so doing they were acting within the course and scope of their employment. 5 Dkt. 58 ¶¶ 7-9, 131-134. The Third Amended Complaint also alleges more broadly that 6 “[w]henever in this Complaint an act or omission of a government, corporation or business entity 7 is alleged, said allegation shall be deemed to mean and include an allegation that the government, 8 corporation or business entity acted or omitted to act through its authorized officers, directors, 9 agents, servants and/or employees, acting within the course and scope of their duties, that the act 10 or omission was authorized by managerial officers or directors, and that the act or omission was 11 ratified by the government, corporation or business entity.” Id. ¶ 15. These allegations provide 12 sufficient notice that whether the Shelter is vicariously liable for the Individual Defendants’ 13 conversion is at issue in this case, see Whooley, 399 F. Supp. 3d at 1000, and therefore the Shelter 14 is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ conversion claim. [15] 16 D. DAMAGES CLAIMS 17 1. Emotional distress damages 18 Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for animal-related emotional 19 distress damages on the grounds that “California law only permits animal-related emotional 20 distress for intentional acts,” arguing that the only claims that would support such an award— 21 Plaintiffs’ Bane Act and conversion claims—fail. Dkt. 93 at 24-25 (citing McMahon v. Craig, 176 22 Cal. App. 4th 1502, 1514-15 (2009), as modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 31, 2009) and Plotnik v. 23 Meihaus, 208 Cal. App. 4th 1590, 1605-07 (2012)); see also Dkt. 106 at 14 (“Plaintiffs’ prayer for 24 animal-related emotional distress damages fail because their Bane Act and conversion claims 25 fail”). However, as discussed in section III.C.2. above, Defendants are not entitled to summary 26 judgment on Plaintiffs’ conversion claim. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary 27 judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for emotional distress damages is DENIED. 2. Punitive damages [1] The Individual Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive [2] damages. Dkt. 93 at 25. They acknowledge that punitive damages are available on: (1) a section [3] 1983 claim where the defendant’s conduct is “shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or [4] where it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others” (id. [5] (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)); and (2) a state law claim where it is proven [6] “by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or [7] malice” (id. (quoting Cal. Civ. C. § 3294)). [8] For the reasons discussed above, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on [9] Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim and the Bane Act claim, and therefore Plaintiffs are not [10] entitled to recover punitive damages in connection with those claims. However, as also discussed [11] above, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for conversion. [12] Pursuant to California Civil Code § 3294, Plaintiffs may recover punitive damages where there is [13] clear and convincing evidence that a defendant has acted with “oppression, fraud, or malice.” [14] Malice is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or [15] despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of [16] the rights or safety of others.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 (c)(1). Oppression means “despicable [17] conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's [18] rights.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 (c)(2). Fraud is “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or [19] concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the [20] defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing [21] injury.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 (c)(3). [22] The Individual Defendants argue there is no evidence that they acted in such a manner. [23] Dkt. 93 at 25. However, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Defendants gave a turkey that was [24] seized from Plaintiffs to a third party (see Dkt. 107-8 at 190:15-21) and that a veterinarian [25] consulted by the Shelter recommended euthanasia of 3 to 5 of the chickens that were seized (see [26] Dkt. 107-5 ¶ 8). It is undisputed that several dozen birds seized by the Shelter were never returned [27] to Plaintiffs. The Court finds there is an issue for the trier of fact regarding whether Defendants 1 acted with the requisite oppression, fraud, or malice in connection with their failure to return or 2 account for all of the animals seized from Plaintiffs, though it remains to be seen whether 3 Plaintiffs can support such a claim with clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the 4 Individual Defendants motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages is 5 DENIED. [6] 7 IV. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 8 Plaintiffs seek partial summary judgment on the following issues: 9 1. Whether the September search warrant was invalid as a matter of law; 10 2. Whether the October search warrant was invalid as a matter of law; and 11 3. Whether the seizures pursuant to the two warrants were lawful. 12 Dkt. 102 at 1. Plaintiffs base their summary judgment motion largely on an argument concerning 13 the purported lack of a probable cause affidavit in support of each warrant (see id. at 4-8), but as 14 discussed above Plaintiffs have now conceded that probable cause affidavits were submitted in 15 support of each warrant application. Dkt. 117. Plaintiffs also argue that the search warrants were 16 overbroad because they allowed seizure of “all animals (alive or dead)” (see Dkt. 102 at 8-10), but 17 as discussed in section III.B.1 above, the Court rejects that argument. Accordingly. Plaintiffs’ 18 motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED. [19] 20 V. CONCLUSION 21 For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows: 22 1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to 23 Plaintiffs’ claims for violations of the Fourth Amendment (second cause of action) 24 and the Bane Act (fourth cause of action). 25 2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs’ 26 claim for conversion (fifth cause of action). 27 3. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for emotional 1 4. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive 2 damages is DENIED. 3 5. Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED in its entirety. 4 SO ORDERED. 5 Dated: June 13, 2024 [6] Seessen val SUSAN VAN KEULEN 8 United States Magistrate Judge [11] a 12 [16] it 4 18