Spikes v. Shockley

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 KAREL SPIKES, Case No.: 19-CV-523 DMS (JLB) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 13 v. DEFAULT JUDGMENT 14 KUM CHA SHOCKLEY, et al., 15 Defendants. [16] 17 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against 18 Defendant Kum Cha Shockley. The motion is unopposed. Upon consideration of the 19 pleadings, the motion, and Defendant’s lack of appearance in this case or opposition to the 20 motion, the Court grants the motion. The Clerk of Court shall enter the judgment in favor 21 of Plaintiff in the amount of $9,046.35. 22 I. 23 BACKGROUND 24 On March 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint on behalf of himself as a person with 25 a disability to enforce the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et 26 seq., and California Civil Code § 52 (the “Unruh Act”). Plaintiff is an amputee who uses 27 a wheelchair for mobility. (P’s Mot. For Def. Judg. At 2). Although Plaintiff included 28 additional claims in his original complaint, he is seeking default judgment based only on 1 the ADA and Unruh Act claims. (See P’s Mot. For Def. Judg. At 2). Plaintiff’s claims 2 arise from his alleged attempt to patronize the marijuana dispensary and retail store, “The 3 Dank House,” (d.b.a. Green Dreams, LLC.), on February 4, 2019. There, Plaintiff alleges 4 he encountered difficulties because the facility lacked designated accessible parking spaces 5 and the wheelchair access ramp was steep and in need of repair. (Compl. at ¶¶ 13—16). 6 Plaintiff alleges this establishment is located on property owned by Defendant Shockley. 7 (Id. at ¶ 6). Defendant was served on April 30, 2019. (Dkt. No. 3). Defendant did not 8 respond to Plaintiff’s complaint. On June 7, 2019, Plaintiff requested the Clerk’s entry of 9 default of Defendant. (Req. for Entr. Of Def. at ¶ 6). The Clerk entered default on June 10 10, 2019, and on June 27, 2019, Plaintiff filed the present motion for default judgment. 11 (P’s Mot. For Def. Judg. at 1). 12 II. 13 DISCUSSION 14 Plaintiff requests entry of default judgment against Defendant, seeking injunctive 15 relief under the ADA, actual damages of $4,000, statutory treble damages of $12,000, and 16 attorney’s fees and costs. (P’s Mot. For Def. Judg. at 1). In the alternative, Plaintiff 17 contends he is entitled to “no less than the statutory minimum amount of $4,000 in 18 damages” under the Unruh Act. (Id. at 9.) 19 A. Default Judgment 20 The Clerk of the Court is required to enter default “when a party against whom a 21 judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that 22 failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Federal Rule of Civil 23 Procedure 55(b)(2) allows for entry of default judgment by the court. However, “[a] 24 plaintiff does not receive default judgment as a matter of right; rather, a court has discretion 25 as to whether it should be granted.” United States v. Boyce, 148 F. Supp. 2d. 1069, 1093 26 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (citations omitted). 27 In exercising that discretion, courts consider the following factors: [28] 1 “(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake [2] in the action[,] (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts[,] (6) whether 3 the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.” [4] 5 Id. (quoting Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470 , 1471—72 (9th Cir. 1986)). Consistent with 6 the last factor of the strong public policy in favor of decisions on the merits, “any doubts 7 as to the propriety of a default are usually resolved against the party seeking a default 8 judgment.” VonGrabe v. Spring PCS, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1318 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (citing 9 Pena v. Seguros La Comercial, S.A., 220 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1985)). In general, 10 however, “upon default[,] the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to 11 the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” TeleVideo Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 12 F.2d 915 , 917—18 (9th Cir. 1987). 13 1. Possibility of Prejudice to the Plaintiff 14 The first Eitel factor considers the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff if a default 15 judgment is not entered. See 782 F.2d at 1471—72. Plaintiff contends that the architectural 16 barriers located on Defendant’s property do not comply with the ADA and Unruh Act, and 17 thus constitute discrimination and denial of equal access. Here, Defendant has failed to 18 appear and has not remedied these barriers to access. If a default judgment is not entered, 19 Plaintiff will likely have no recourse against Defendant. Plaintiff has therefore made a 20 sufficient showing to meet this factor. 21 2. Merits of Plaintiff’s Substantive Claims and Sufficiency of the Complaint 22 The second and third Eitel factors are the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim and 23 the sufficiency of the complaint. See id. These factors “require that a plaintiff state a claim 24 on which it may recover.” Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 25 2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff seeks relief under the 26 ADA and the Unruh Act, each of which is addressed in turn. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 a. Discrimination under Title III of the ADA 2 Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public accommodations. 42 U.S.C. 3 § 12182(a). To state a claim under the ADA, Plaintiff’s complaint must first demonstrate 4 that he has Article III standing to bring an ADA claim. Further, Plaintiff must show (1) he 5 is disabled under the ADA; (2) “The Dank House” contains architectural barriers 6 prohibited by the ADA; and (3) “that the removal of those barriers is readily achievable.” 7 Hubbard v. Rite Aid Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1158 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. 8 § 12182(a)). 9 i. Standing to Bring a Claim Under the ADA 10 As with all actions, Plaintiff must have Article III standing to bring a claim under 11 the ADA. To establish Article III standing under the ADA, Plaintiff “must demonstrate 12 that [he has] suffered an injury in fact, that the injury is traceable to the challenged action 13 of the Defendant and that the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision.” Hubbard, [14] 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1162 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992)). 15 Since Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief, this analysis considers the threat of future harm, 16 defined by the likelihood that Plaintiff will return to “The Dank House.” See Vogel, 992 17 F. Supp. 2d at 1008 (citing San Diego Cty. Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121 , 1126 18 (9th Cir. 1996)). In the context of the ADA, when “determining the likelihood that a 19 plaintiff will return to defendant’s facility, courts have examined such factors as (1) the 20 proximity of the place of public accommodation to plaintiff’s residence, (2) plaintiff’s past 21 patronage of defendant’s business, (3) the definitiveness of plaintiff’s plans to return, and 22 (4) the plaintiff’s frequency of travel near defendant.” Hubbard, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1162 . 23 (citing Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002)). 24 Further, a disabled individual “suffers a cognizable injury if he is deterred from visiting a 25 noncompliant public accommodation because he has encountered barriers related to his 26 disability there.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2011). 27 Here, Plaintiff alleges he faced difficulties when he attempted to patronize 28 Defendant’s store. He alleges he could not find any designated accessible parking on site. 1 (Compl. at ¶ 14). Plaintiff also alleges the ramp to the dispensary entrance “was too steep 2 and in need of repair.” (Id.) While Plaintiff was “able to enter the place of public 3 accommodation with some difficulty,” he alleges he “suffered legally cognizable injury 4 including, but not limited to, difficulty, discomfort or embarrassment in accessing 5 Defendants’ place of public accommodation.” (Id. at 14—16, 18). Taking these 6 allegations as true, Plaintiff’s complaint states an adequate claim for an injury based on his 7 past visit to Defendant’s store. See TeleVideo Systems, Inc., 826 F.2d at 917-18. 8 In terms of the likelihood of Plaintiff returning to Defendant’s property, Plaintiff 9 alleges he resides near the property. (Compl. at ¶ 14). Plaintiff also notes he attempted to 10 patronize the business on February 4, 2019, as discussed. (Compl. at ¶ 12). Finally, 11 Plaintiff notes he “will continue in the future to visit this place of public accommodation 12 for the purposes of shopping and/or otherwise using and enjoying the facility’s 13 accommodations, and to evaluate the facility’s accessibility to individuals with disabilities 14 or to determine if other forms of discrimination exist.” (Compl. at ¶ 11). Taking these 15 allegations as true, Plaintiff has alleged a sufficient claim for threat of future injury based 16 on the likelihood he will return to Defendant’s property. See TeleVideo Systems, Inc., 826 17 F.2d at 917-18. In sum, Plaintiff has standing to bring this ADA claim. 18 ii. Discrimination under the ADA 19 To prevail on a claim for discrimination under Title III of the ADA, the Plaintiff 20 must show (1) he is disabled under the definitions provided by the ADA, (2) the Defendant 21 is “a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation,” and 22 (3) the Plaintiff “was denied public accommodations . . . because of [his] disability.” 23 Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). Further, in the context of 24 discrimination based on architectural barriers, Plaintiff must show (1) “The Dank House” 25 contains architectural barriers prohibited by the ADA; and (2) “that the removal of those 26 barriers is readily achievable.” Hubbard, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1158 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 27 12182(a)). [28] 1 Here, Plaintiff established he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA as an 2 amputee who uses a wheelchair for mobility.1 (P’s Mot. For Def. Judg. At 2). Plaintiff 3 also alleges “Defendant operates the marijuana dispensary on this property,” and 4 Defendant has not contested this assertion. (Id.) Finally, “The Dank House” is a public 5 accommodation because it is a sales establishment that is open to the public. See Vogel, [6] 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2); § 12181(7)(E)) (“A sales 7 establishment is a place of public accommodation.”). Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated 8 a claim for a violation of the ADA, if he suffered discrimination on Defendant’s property 9 due to his disability. 10 Discrimination “on the basis of disability includes a failure to remove architectural 11 barriers where such removal is readily achievable.” Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F. 3d 12 1034, 1043 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182 ). Under the ADA, the term “readily 13 achievable” is defined as “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much 14 difficulty or expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (9)(A)—(D). 15 Here, Plaintiff alleges the architectural barriers at Defendant’s establishment include 16 the lack of accessible parking and the steep ADA ramp. However, Plaintiff only requests 17 the Court issue an injunction requiring Defendant to designate an accessible parking spot 18 and path to the store entrance. Although determining what is “readily achievable” requires 19 analyzing context-specific facts such as the nature and cost of the repair and the overall 20 financial resources of the facilities and covered entity, Plaintiff did not have the opportunity 21 to acquire this information from Defendant because Defendant failed to appear. See id. in 22 addition, some courts have found “the creation of a handicap accessible parking space is 23 per se readily achievable.” See, e.g., Johnson v. San, No. 2:15-CV-162-JAM-EFB, 2015 24 WL 7188245 , at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2015), report and recommendation adopted No. 2:15-CV25 [26] 27 1 Under the ADA, the term “disability” includes “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 28 1 162-JAM-EFB, 2016 WL 659791 (E.D. Cal. 2016). The creation of designated accessible 2 parking spaces is also listed as an example of a readily achievable step in ADA guidelines. 3 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.304 (b). This makes good sense. Further, Plaintiff’s allegation that 4 removal of such barriers is readily achievable “is sufficient to satisfy his burden of 5 production” because his allegations are taken as true upon default. See Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 6 2d at 1011 (citing Johnson v. Beahm, 2011 WL 5508893 *3 (E.D. Cal. 2011)). Therefore, 7 the second and third Eitel factors weigh in favor of Plaintiff’s ADA claim. 8 b. Unruh Act Claim 9 Plaintiff’s second claim for relief is based on a violation of the Unruh Act. (P’s Mot. 10 For Def. Judg. At 7). The Unruh Act provides for “full and equal accommodations, 11 advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments” for “all persons 12 . . . no matter what their . . . disability.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (b). Unlike the ADA, the 13 Unruh Act provides for monetary damages, including actual damages, treble damages, or 14 independent statutory damages of $4,000. Molski, 491 F.3d at 731. The Unruh Act also 15 provides for attorney’s fees and costs. Id.; Cal. Civ. Code § 52 (a). 16 “[A] violation of the ADA is, per se, a violation of the Unruh Act.” See Lentini v. 17 Cal. Ctr. For the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2004); Cal. Civ. Code § 18 51(f). Moreover, “no showing of intentional discrimination is required when the Unruh 19 Act violation is premised on an ADA violation.” Id. Because Plaintiff’s claim for relief 20 under the ADA meets the second and third Eitel factors, these factors are also met with 21 respect to his Unruh Act claim. 22 3. Sum of Money at Stake in the Action 23 The fourth factor to be considered is the sum of money at stake in relation to the 24 seriousness of the defendant’s conduct. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72 . Courts disfavor 25 default judgment when “the sum of money at stake is too large or unreasonable in relation 26 to the defendant’s conduct.” Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1012 . 27 Here, Plaintiff is requesting a total of $21,406.35—consisting of $4,000 in actual 28 damages, $12,000 in treble damages, and $5,406.35 in attorney’s fees and costs. In the 1 alternative, Plaintiff requests $9,406.35: $4,000 in statutory minimum damages and 2 $5,406.35 in attorney’s fees and costs. Plaintiff also seeks an injunction ordering 3 Defendant to provide and designate accessible parking and a path to the store entrance in 4 compliance with ADA guidelines. Though the scope of injunctive relief will add to 5 Defendant’s financial burden, the ADA “limits this liability to removal of barriers that is 6 readily achievable, and in this way caps a defendant’s liability.” See Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 7 2d at 1012. 8 As discussed below, this Court will decline to award treble damages to Plaintiff. 9 Thus, the sum of money at stake in the action here is $9,406.53, in addition to the cost 10 associated with injunctive relief. This amount is within the range of acceptable sums of 11 money other courts within this Circuit have awarded in similar actions. See, e.g., id. at 12 1012 (granting a judgment of $13,739.20, including statutory damages, attorneys’ fees, and 13 costs); Moore v. Cisneros, No. 1:12—cv—00188 LJO SKO, 2012 WL 6523017 , at *4 14 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (granting an award of $10,119.70 on default judgment and noting the 15 amount “was not a particularly large sum of money”); Johnson v. Huynh, No. Civ S—08— 16 1189 JAM DAD, 2009 WL 2777021 , at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (holding $12,000 was “a 17 relatively small award of damages” in a default judgment). Therefore, the fourth Eitel 18 factor weighs in favor of entry of default judgment against Defendant here. 19 4. The Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts 20 The fifth factor asks whether there is a possibility of a dispute over material facts. 21 Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72 . When a court clerk enters default, “all allegations in a well22 pleaded complaint are taken as true,” and there is “no likelihood that any genuine issue of 23 material fact exists.” Elektra Ent. Grp. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 24 So it is here. Defendant failed to respond, and default was entered Thus, the fifth factor 25 weighs in favor of Plaintiff. 26 / / / 27 / / / [28] 1 5. Excusable Neglect 2 The sixth Eitel factor is excusable neglect. See 782 F.2d at 1472 . The question of 3 what conduct “constitutes excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) and similar rules is at 4 bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the 5 party’s omission.” Brandt v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, 653 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th 6 Cir. 2011) (quoting Pioneer Inv. Svcs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380 , 395 7 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules 8 of Civil Procedure governs grounds for relief from a final judgment, Rule 55(b) constitutes 9 a similar rule because it governs the grounds for entering a default judgment. 10 There is “little possibility of excusable neglect and default judgment is favored when 11 defendants fail to respond after being properly served.” See Constr. Laborers Trust Funds 12 for S. California Admin. Co. v. Anzalone Masonry, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d 1192 , 1201-02 13 (C.D. Cal. 2018). Here, Defendant received notice of the complaint and did not respond. 14 Though Plaintiff did not provide evidence of serving Defendant with the instant motion, 15 such service is not required by Rule 55(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Thus, this factor 16 weighs in favor of entry of default judgment. 17 6. Strong Policy Underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Favoring 18 Decisions on the Merits 19 The final factor requires the Court to consider the strong policy favoring decisions 20 on the merits. See 782 F.2d at 1472 . Although resolving disputes on the merits is the 21 preferred approach, that is not possible where, as here, a defendant fails to respond. 22 Nonetheless, this factor does not weigh in favor of Plaintiff. 23 7. Conclusion Regarding the Eitel Factors 24 Here, all factors, aside from the seventh factor favoring decisions on the merits, weigh 25 in favor of Plaintiff. 26 B. The Character and Amount of Plaintiff’s Recovery 27 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c), a default judgment “must not differ in 28 kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” The demand for 1 relief must be specific. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3). When deciding whether to grant a 2 default judgment, “the general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the 3 complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” Geddes 4 v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557 , 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted). When 5 “determining damages, a court may rely on declarations submitted by the plaintiff in lieu 6 of a full evidentiary hearing.” Ewing v. Senior Life Planning, LLC., 19-CV-1005-BAS7 LL, 2019 WL 4573703 at *1 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Phillip Morris USA v. Castworld 8 Prods. Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P 55(b)(2)). Further, 9 “[s]tatutory damages are appropriate in default judgment cases because the ability to 10 determine a plaintiff’s actual damages is limited when a defendant fails to mount a defense 11 or participate in discovery.” G&G Closed Circuit Events, LLC v. Sanchez, 18-CV-38212 WQH-KSC, 18 WL 5311792 at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2018). 13 1. Statutory Damages 14 As noted, Plaintiff is seeking $4,000 in actual damages and an additional $12,000 in 15 treble damages for discrimination under the Unruh Act. In the alternative, Plaintiff seeks 16 the statutory minimum damages of $4,000. While the statutory damages provided by the 17 Unruh Act are reasonable, the trebling of those damages is not. Under California Civil 18 Code § 52 (the “Unruh Act”), 19 “whoever denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to Section 51, 51.5, or 51.6, is liable for each and every offense for the [20] actual damages, and any amount that may be determined by a jury, or a court sitting 21 without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000), and any attorney’s fees that may be [22] determined by the court in addition thereto.” Cal. Civ. Code §52 (a) (West). [23] 24 Here, Plaintiff seeks damages based on emotional distress, but fails to set out the 25 basis for those damages, let alone the need to treble them. (P’s Mot. For Def. Judg. at 8). 26 In the alternative, Plaintiff seeks the $4,000 statutory minimum damages. (Id.) To recover 27 statutory damages, the Plaintiff “need not prove she suffered actual damages.” Molski, 481 28 F.3d at 731. Plaintiff “need only show that he was denied full and equal access, not that 1 he was wholly excluded from enjoying defendant’s services.” See Vogel, 992 F.Supp.2d 2 at 1014 . 3 Because Defendant did not respond, the record is undeveloped as to Plaintiff’s claim 4 for actual and treble damages. And while Defendant bears the burden of this default 5 judgment due to his failure to respond, there is no indication Plaintiff’s injury would not 6 be adequately redressed with statutory minimum damages, attorney’s fees, and injunctive 7 relief. Therefore, the Court declines to award treble damages for Plaintiff and finds the 8 award of statutory damages is sufficient. 9 2. Injunctive Relief 10 Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief under the ADA to compel Defendant to “install 11 a van accessible parking space and access aisle and an accessible path of travel from the 12 parking and public sidewalk to and through the entrance to the facility in full compliance 13 with . . . the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”).” (P’s 14 Mot. For Def. Judg. at 9). Under the ADA, “injunctive relief is proper when architectural 15 barriers at defendant’s establishment violate the ADA and the removal of the barriers is 16 readily achievable.” Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1015 . Further, the plaintiff is “not required 17 to satisfy the other prerequisites generally needed for injunctive relief.” Id. (citing Moeller 18 v. Taco Bell, 816 F. Supp. 2d 831, 859 (N.D. Cal. 2011)). As discussed, Plaintiff’s request 19 for injunctive relief is readily achievable. Defendant, in his capacity as property owner, 20 can “make the physical changes necessary to remove the specific barriers,” either as the 21 operator of the establishment or in his capacity as landlord. See id. Defendant shall 22 therefore install a van accessible parking space and create an accessible path of travel from 23 the parking and sidewalk to the entrance of “The Dank House” in compliance with the 24 ADAAG. 25 3. Attorney’s Fees and Costs 26 Plaintiff further requests attorney’s fees and costs in the sum of $4,446.00 and 27 $600.35, respectively, both of which are permitted under the ADA and the Unruh Act. See [28] 42 U.S.C. § 12205 ; Cal. Civ. Code § 52 (a). Plaintiff provided declarations in support of 1 request for fees and costs. The requested attorney’s fees and costs are reasonable. 2 || Therefore, the Court will award fees and costs totaling $5,046.35. 3 III. 4 CONCLUSION 5 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for default 6 || judgment for $4,000 in statutory damages and $5,046.35 in attorney’s fees and costs. The 7 Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion for treble damages. The Court ORDERS Defendant to 8 || provide and designate accessible parking and a path to the store entrance at 956 Broadway, 9 ||Chula Vista, CA 91910, in compliance with the American with Disabilities Act 10 || Accessibility Guidelines. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment 11 against Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff. [12] 13 || IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: October 28, 2019 15 ns my. L4\ Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 16 United States District Judge