Schutza v. Enniss Family Realty I LLC

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 SCOTT SCHUTZA, Case No.: 20-CV-0298 W (JBL) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 13 v. MOTION TO DISMISS [DOC. 9] 14 ENNISS FAMILY REALTY I LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY [15] COMPANY; ENNIS INC., A 16 CALIFORNIA CORPORATION; AND DOES 1-10, [17] Defendants. [18] 19 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, 20 arguing that the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law 21 claim. (Defs.’ Mot. [Doc. 9-1.].) Plaintiff filed its Opposition after the hearing date of 22 May 31, 2020. (Pl.’s Opp’n [Doc. 12].) As a result, Plaintiff’s late-filed Opposition is 23 disregarded. 24 The Court decides the motion on the papers submitted and without oral argument 25 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS 26 Defendants’ motion. [28] 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff Scott Schutza, a California resident, is a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair 3 for mobility. (Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶ 1.) According to PACER, Plaintiff has filed 35 4 accessibility lawsuits in the Southern District in the 12 months prior to filing the present 5 lawsuit. Thus, Plaintiff is a “high-frequency litigant” under sections 425.50 and 425.55 6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 7 Defendants Enniss Family Realty I LLC and Enniss Inc. own and operate a 8 recycling facility located in Lakeside, California. (Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶¶ 2–5.) Plaintiff 9 alleges Defendants’ facility is “open to the public, a place of public accommodation, and 10 a business establishment.” (Id. ¶ 11.) 11 On unspecified days in January and February 2020, Plaintiff went to Defendants’ 12 facility intending to partake in its services and determine if Defendants complied with 13 disability access laws. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges he personally encountered Defendants’ 14 failure to provide Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) compliant wheelchair 15 accessible parking and wheelchair accessible paths of travel, which denied him “full and 16 equal access” to the facility and resulted in personal difficulty and discomfort. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 17 14, 17, 18.) 18 On February 18, 2020, Plaintiff brought this suit. (Compl. [Doc. 1].) Plaintiff 19 alleges that, by violating the ADA, Defendants also violated California’s Unruh Act. (Id. 20 ¶¶ 23–35.) Plaintiff requests injunctive relief under the federal ADA and the state Unruh 21 Act, damages under the Unruh Act, and reasonable attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, 22 and costs of suit. (Id.) [23] 24 II. LEGAL STANDARD 25 Federal district courts have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that 26 form part of the same case or controversy as claims over which they have original 27 jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a). However, “district courts may decline to exercise 28 supplemental jurisdiction” if: (1) “the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law;” 1 (2) the claim “substantially predominates” claims over which the district court has 2 original jurisdiction; (3) “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has 3 original jurisdiction;” or (4) “there are other compelling reasons for declining 4 jurisdiction.” § 1367(c). 5 Considerations of judicial economy, fairness to litigants, and comity underly § 6 1367(c) determinations. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). If 7 those factors are absent, courts should hesitate to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Id. [8] 9 III. DISCUSSION 10 Defendants ask the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 11 Plaintiff’s derivative state law Unruh Act claim. The request requires an examination of 12 the pertinent parts of California’s Unruh Act. 13 Under the Unruh Act, all persons are “free and equal,” and no matter their 14 disability “are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, 15 privileges, or services in all business establishments.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (b). In 16 enacting the Unruh Act, the state Legislature intended to strengthen state law where it 17 was weaker than the ADA and to retain state law where it provided more protection than 18 the ADA. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51 . Thus, the Unruh Act provides that a violation of the 19 ADA necessarily constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (f). 20 A key distinction between the ADA and the Unruh Act is the ADA only allows 21 injunctive relief, while the Unruh Act allows injunctive and monetary damages. 22 Compare Cal. Civ. Code § 52 (a), with Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 23 2002). While an Unruh Act claim generally requires proof of intent, a plaintiff is entitled 24 to the Unruh Act’s monetary damages if they establish an ADA violation as the basis for 25 their Unruh Act claim. Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 46 Cal. 4th 661, 670 (2009). 26 In 2012, the California Legislature enacted legislation requiring heightened 27 pleading standards for Unruh Act cases. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 425.50-55 . In 2015, the 28 California Legislature implemented additional procedural requirements for high1 frequency litigants. These plaintiffs must pay an additional $1,000 filing fee and plead 2 more specifics, such as “the reason the individual was in the geographic area of the 3 defendant’s business.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 70616.5; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 4 425.50(a)(4)(A). In passing the legislation, the California Legislature noted that the 5 financial incentive available under the Unruh Act has given rise to an industry of litigants 6 and law firms whose goal is not to correct accessibility violations, but to extract “quick 7 cash settlements” from “small businesses on the basis of boilerplate complaints.” Cal. 8 Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(a)(2). 9 With this context in mind, the Court exercises its discretion to decline 10 supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim for two reasons. First, the 11 claim “substantially predominates” over the ADA claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(2). 12 Plaintiff’s complaint states a federal claim for violation of the ADA and a state law claim 13 for violation of the Unruh Act. Although the ADA does not entitle Plaintiff to recover 14 damages, the complaint seeks them under the Unruh Act—even though the Unruh Act 15 provides for the same injunctive relief available under the ADA. See Schutza v. 16 Cuddeback, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1031 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (“It is unclear what 17 advantage—other than avoiding state-imposed pleading requirements—Plaintiff gains by 18 being in federal court since his sole remedy under the ADA is injunctive relief, which is 19 also available under the Unruh Act.”); see also Molski v. EOS Estate Winery, No. CV 20 03-5880-GAF, 2005 WL 3952249 , at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2005) (noting that “[s]ince 21 the state law claims provide for injunctive relief, the federal claim adds nothing to the 22 lawsuit that could not be obtained in Superior Court”). Thus, the ADA claim appears to 23 be a secondary claim used to justify filing in this Court. As such, the state claim 24 substantially predominates over the ADA claim. See Feezor v. Tesstab Operations Grp., 25 Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1224 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (“Given the disparity in terms of 26 comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, state law claims substantially predominate over 27 the ADA for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(2).”); Org. for the Advancement of 28 Minorities with Disabilities v. Brick Oven Rest., 406 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1131 (S.D. Cal. 1 || 2005) (finding that disparity between monetary damages and injunctive relief lifts state 2 claims over federal claims). 3 Second, principles of comity and fairness weigh heavily in favor of declining 4 ||supplemental jurisdiction. See § 1367(c)(4) (granting courts discretion to decline to 5 |}exercise supplemental jurisdiction where “there are other compelling reasons” for doing 6 ||so). As noted above, considerations of judicial economy, fairness, and comity underly § 7 || 1367(c) determinations. United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 726 . Here, Plaintiff is a 8 || high-frequency litigant who would have to abide by heightened pleading standards of 9 || veracity, specificity, and special fees if his claims were filed in state court. §§ 425.50-55. 10 || Allowing Plaintiff to bootstrap his Unruh Act claim onto an ADA claim for the sole 11 || purpose of avoiding California’s procedural rules would allow Plaintiff the enjoyment of 12 || those parts of California law that benefit him while disallowing the parts purposefully 13 |}enacted to protect Defendants. Further, there is no risk the parties will be unfairly 14 || burdened by inconsistent orders. Success in either or both courts will lead to the same 15 |/result: the access barriers will be remedied. 16 Therefore, the principles of comity and fairness, in conjunction with the state law 17 claim’s predominance, oblige this Court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over 18 || Plaintiff's Unruh Act claims. [19] 20 ||IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER 21 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Unruh Act claim is GRANTED and the 22 ||claim is DISMISSED without prejudice. [Doc. 9.] Defendants shall file an Answer or 23 || otherwise respond to the ADA claim no later than 14 days from the filing of this Order. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 ||Dated: June 18, 2020 \ 26 pe lnLor 27 Hn. 7 omas J. Whelan 28 Unted States District Judge