Thibodeaux v. United States Postal Service

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 DELMER THIBODEAUX, Case No.: 3:20-cv-0651 W (LL) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 13 v. DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO 14 UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, AMEND [DOC. 10] 15 Defendant. [18] 19 Defendant United States Postal Service (“USPS”) moves to dismiss arguing this 20 Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this removed case under the derivative21 jurisdiction doctrine. Plaintiff Delmer Thibodeaux opposes the motion. 22 The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. 23 See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d.1). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion [Doc. 24 10] and DISMISSES this lawsuit WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. [25] 26 I. BACKGROUND 27 Plaintiff Delmer Thibodeaux filed this lawsuit in the San Diego Superior Court 28 against Defendant USPS for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. (See Compl. p. 1 5. ) On April 3, 2020, USPS removed the case to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2 1442(a)(1). (Notice of Removal ¶ 4.) USPS now moves to dismiss arguing that this 3 Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (P&A [Doc. 10] 1:12.) [4] 5 II. LEGAL STANDARD 6 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may move to dismiss a 7 case for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “Federal courts are courts of limited 8 jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 9 Because of this, “[i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, 10 and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” [11] Id. (internal citations omitted). However, removal jurisdiction under § 1442 is to be 12 construed “broadly in favor of removal.” Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 13 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2006). 14 Challenges to jurisdiction may be either facial or factual in nature. San Luis & 15 Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 905 F. Supp. 2d 1158 , 1167 16 (E.D. Cal. 2012). A facial attack to jurisdiction “accepts the truth of the plaintiff's 17 allegations but asserts that they ‘are insufficient on their face to invoke federal 18 jurisdiction.’” Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Safe Air 19 for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) ). A factual attack “contests 20 the truth of the plaintiff's factual allegations, usually by introducing evidence outside the 21 pleadings.” Id. [22] 23 III. DISCUSSION 24 USPS argues Thibodeaux sued the wrong party because the United States of 25 America is the only appropriate defendant to a negligence claim. (P&A [Doc. 10] 1:12– [28] 1 15.) As a result, USPS contends the state court lacked jurisdiction and, under the 2 derivative jurisdiction doctrine, this Court also lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. (Id. 1:5– 3 6.) Thibodeaux responds that the USPS may be sued under the Postal Reorganization 4 Act, 39 U.S.C. § 409 (“PRA”) and 28 U.S.C. § 1441 abolished the derivative-jurisidction 5 doctrine. (Opp’n [Doc. 11] 2:16–3:3.) 6 Under the PRA, the USPS is “an independent establishment of the executive 7 branch” of the United States Government. Dolan v. U.S. Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481 , 8 483–84 (2006) (citing 39 U.S.C. § 201 ). “Consistent with this status, the Postal Service 9 enjoys federal sovereign immunity absent a waiver.” Id. at 484 (citing Postal Service v. 10 Flamingo Industries (USA) Ltd., 540 U.S. 736, 741 (2004)). “Although the Postal 11 Reorganization Act generally ‘waives the immunity of the Postal Service from suit by 12 giving it the power to sue and be sued in its official name,’ [citation omitted], the statute 13 also provides that the [Federal Tort Claims Act] ‘shall apply to tort claims arising out of 14 activities of the Postal Service,’ § 409(c).” Id. (quoting Flamingo Industries, 540 U.S. at 15 741 (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 401 (c))). Thus, contrary to Thibodeaux’s contention, tort 16 claims against the USPS arising from automobile accidents are governed by the FTCA, 17 not the PRA. 18 Under the FTCA, “[t]he USPS . . . it is not a proper party under . . . . The United 19 States is the only proper party defendant . . . .” Jordan v. United States, 2007 WL 20 935585, *3 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (quoting Kennedy v. U.S. Postal Service, 145 F.3d 1077 , 21 1078 (9th Cir. 1988)). “A ‘claim against the [USPS] in its own name is not a claim 22 against the United States.’” Id. (quoting Kennedy, at 1078). For this reason, the San 23 Diego Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over Thibodeaux’s case. 24 Thibodeaux argues, however, that he should be given leave to amend to name the 25 United States. But the derivative-jurisdiction doctrine provides “[i]f the state court lacks 26 jurisdiction of the subject-matter or of the parties, the federal court acquires none [upon 27 removal], although it might in a like suit originally brought there have had jurisdiction.” 28 Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); see also 1 || Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232 , 242 n.17 (1981); Minnesota v. United States, 305 2 || U.S. 382, 389 (1939). “[T]his doctrine of derivative jurisdiction is premised on the legal 3 || fiction that a case filed in state court over which that court lacks jurisdiction is void from 4 ||its very beginning, and a federal court therefore has no jurisdiction to acquire over the 5 || case via removal.” Rubie’s LLC v. First American Title Co., 2018 WL 6419674 , *4 6 || (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2018) (citations omitted). Because the San Diego Superior Court 7 || lacked jurisdiction over this case, this Court also lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. 8 Thibodeaux, nevertheless, argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1441 abolished the derivative 9 jurisdiction doctrine. Though he is correct, this case was removed under 28 U.S.C. § 10 || 1442, not section 1441. Congress did not abolish the doctrine in cases removed under 11 |}section 1442 and “it appears the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction remains the law of this 12 || Circuit for removals under § 1442, any prior criticism of the doctrine notwithstanding.” 13 || Rubie’s LLC, 2018 WL 6419674 , * 3 (citing cases within the Ninth Circuit applying the 14 || derivative jurisdiction doctrine). Accordingly, the Court must dismiss this case. [15] 16 ||TV. CONCLUSION & ORDER 17 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion [Doc. 10] and 18 || DISMISSES this case WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 Dated: January 25, 2021 \ 21 [pe Dor 22 Hn. 1 omas J. Whelan 3 United States District Judge