Sommer v. General Motors Corporation

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 JOSEPH SOMMER, an individual, Case No.: 20-cv-2161-GPC-KSC 12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) DISMISSING THE SECOND 14 GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, a Delaware CAUSE OF ACTION; AND limited liability company; CITY [15] CHEVROLET OF SAN DIEGO, a (2) DISMISSING THE SEVENTH 16 California corporation; and DOES 1 CAUSE OF ACTION AND THROUGH 10, 17 STRIKING PUNITIVE DAMAGES Defendants. [18] [ECF Nos. 5, 6, 10, 11] [19] 20 Before this Court are Motions to Dismiss the Second and Seventh Causes of 21 Action in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), and Motions to Strike Punitive 22 Damages from the FAC, filed by Defendant General Motors, LLC (“GM”) and 23 Defendant City Chevrolet of San Diego (“Chevrolet”). Based on the FAC, the moving 24 papers, and applicable law, the Court DISMISSES the Second Cause of Action 25 WITHOUT PREJUDICE and Seventh Cause of Action WITH PREJUDICE, and 26 STRIKES Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. Plaintiff may amend the complaint. [27] 1 BACKGROUND 2 This case concerns an alleged defect of a motor vehicle that Plaintiff purchased in 3 May 2012. On November 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed the FAC. The FAC generally alleges: 4 (1) violations of various warranties (both implied and express); (2) failures to repair, 5 replace, and/or make restitution; (3) conversion; and (4) negligence. ECF No. 3. One of 6 the forms of relief sought is punitive damages based on Plaintiff’s claim of conversion. 7 Id. at 12, 14. 8 On December 16, 2020, GM filed a Motion to Dismiss the Second and Seventh 9 Causes of Action (“1st MTD”), and a Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from the FAC 10 (“1st MTS”). ECF Nos. 5, 6. Plaintiff filed Oppositions to both Motions on December 11 29, 2020. ECF Nos. 8, 9. On January 6, 2021, GM filed its respective Replies. ECF 12 Nos. 13, 14. 13 On January 4, 2021, Chevrolet filed a Motion to Dismiss the Seventh Cause of 14 Action (“2d MTD”), and a Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from the FAC (“2d 15 MTS”). ECF Nos. 13, 14. On January 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed Statements of Non16 Opposition to Chevrolet’s Motions. ECF Nos. 15, 16. 17 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 18 GM moved to dismiss the FAC’s Second Cause of Action pursuant to Federal Rule 19 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”). 1st MTD 5, ECF No. 5; Reply 1st MTD 20 2–3, ECF No. 13. The Second Cause of Action alleges that Defendants breached the 21 implied warranty of fitness, specifically the “implied warranty that the Subject Vehicle 22 would be fit for Plaintiff’s particular purpose.” FAC 6–7, ECF No. 3. Because the FAC 23 does not allege sufficient facts to establish the requirements for a valid claim for a breach 24 of implied warranty of fitness, the Court GRANTS GM’s Motion to Dismiss the Second 25 Cause of Action. At the same time, since Plaintiff could potentially cure the defects, the 26 Court also GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. [27] 1 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, i.e. 2 whether the complaint lacks either a cognizable legal theory or facts sufficient to support 3 such a theory. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 4 For a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, it must contain “sufficient 5 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 7 U.S. 544 , 570 (2007). In reviewing the motion, the Court “must accept as true all of the 8 allegations contained in a complaint,” but it need not accept legal conclusions. 9 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 10 statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 11 The Court agrees with GM that the Second Cause of Action, breach of the implied 12 warranty of fitness, fails to meet the standard to survive the Motion to Dismiss pursuant 13 to Rule 12(b)(6). For a valid implied warranty of fitness claim under California law, 14 Plaintiff must establish the following: [15] (1) the purchaser at the time of contracting intends to use the goods for a 16 particular purpose, (2) the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know of this particular purpose, (3) the buyer relies on the seller’s skill or [17] judgment to select or furnish goods suitable for the particular purpose, and 18 (4) the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know that the buyer is relying on such skill and judgment. [19] 20 Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 25 (1985) (citing Metowski v. Traid Corp., 28 21 Cal. App. 3d 332 , 341 (1972)); accord T & M Solar & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Lennox 22 Int’l Inc., 83 F. Supp. 3d 855, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2015); cf. S. California Stroke Rehab. 23 Assocs., Inc., v. Nautilus, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1112 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (adding the 24 fifth element of “the product failed to suit buyer’s purpose and subsequently damaged the 25 buyer”). See generally Cal. Bus. Law Deskbook § 9:4 (discussing the four previously 26 mentioned elements); Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instruction 1232 [27] 1 (discussing the similar “Essential Factual Elements” for “Implied Warranty of Fitness for 2 a Particular Purpose”). 3 The FAC lacks factual descriptions that correspond to any of the above elements, a 4 requirement for a legitimate implied warranty of fitness claim. In fact, Plaintiff alleges 5 that he purchased the vehicle “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 6 FAC ¶ 12, ECF No. 3. For the purposes of an implied warranty of fitness, a “particular 7 purpose” means “a specific use by the buyer which is peculiar to the nature of his 8 business.” T & M Solar, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 877 (quoting Am. Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Sup. 9 Ct., 37 Cal. App. 4th 1291 , 1295 n.2 (1995)). The vehicle’s “purpose of providing 10 transportation” is not considered a particular purpose. Am. Suzuki, Cal. App. 4th at 1295 11 n.2. 12 Plaintiff’s Opposition fails to address the specific requirements to establish an 13 implied warranty of fitness. Plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish T & M Solar does not guide 14 the Court, as the legal standard provided by that case (for an implied warranty of fitness) 15 still stands. Plaintiff refers to California Civil Code Section 1794(a), but this provision 16 only discusses the ability to bring an action for breach of “any obligation under this 17 chapter or under an implied or express warranty or service contract.” Plaintiff has failed 18 to plead adequate facts that Defendants breached the implied warranty of fitness, i.e. one 19 of the bases to seek action pursuant to Section 1794(a). 20 Plaintiff presents an alternative standard and cites to Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto 21 Superstores California, 19 Cal. App. 5th 1234, 1246 (2018), as modified on denial of 22 reh’g (Feb. 22, 2018). This case discusses the implied warranty of merchantability, 23 which is Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action. Id. (“Here the alleged wrongdoing is a breach 24 of the implied warranty of merchantability imposed by the Song-Beverly Consumer 25 Warranty Act . . . .”). The implied warranty of merchantability is a different basis of 26 liability from the implied warranty of fitness. See Am. Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Sup. Ct., 37 [27] 1 Cal. App. 4th 1291 , 1295 n.2 (1995) (discussing how “ordinary purposes” go to “the 2 concept of merchantability”). 3 Plaintiff also requested a leave to amend. “Courts are free to grant a party leave to 4 amend whenever ‘justice so requires,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), and requests for leave 5 should be granted with ‘extreme liberality.’” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962 , 6 972 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708 , 712 7 (9th Cir. 2001)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that an 8 amendment can save the complaint. Id. (citation omitted). Since an amendment could 9 potentially cure the defects raised by this Order,1 leave to amend is appropriate. 10 SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES 11 Defendants have also moved to dismiss the Seventh Cause of Action in the FAC, 12 which alleges conversion. Relatedly, Defendants have moved to strike the FAC’s 13 requested relief of punitive damages, in which the only basis for such relief is grounded 14 in conversion. 1st MTD, ECF No. 5; 1st MTS, ECF No. 6; 2d MTD, ECF No. 13; 2d 15 MTS, ECF No. 14. While Plaintiff initially contested GM’s Motions on this issue, see 16 Opp’n 1st MTD 3–6, ECF No. 8; Opp’n 1st MTS, ECF No. 9, the recently filed 17 Statements of Non-Opposition indicate that such is no longer the case. ECF Nos. 15, 16. 18 With all parties in agreement, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the Seventh 19 Cause of Action in the FAC, and STRIKES Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. 20 CONCLUSION 21 For the reasons discussed above, IT IS ORDERED that the Court DISMISSES 22 WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Second Cause of Action, and DISMISSES WITH [25] 1 For example, the FAC states that the purchased vehicle was “primarily for personal, 26 family, or household purposes,” FAC ¶ 12, ECF No. 3 (emphasis added), which could mean that other purposes exist. [27] 1 || PREJUDICE the Seventh Cause of Action. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the 2 Court STRIKES Paragraph 8 in the Prayer Section of the FAC (“8. For punitive damages 3 |/in the amount of at least $100,000.”’). 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint 5 || which addresses the deficiencies discussed in this Order on or before February 22, 2021. 6 || IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court VACATES the hearing on this matter 7 scheduled for February 5, 2021. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. [9] 10 Dated: February 1, 2021 72 Hon. athe Coke 12 United States District Judge [27] 28 20-cv-2161-GPC-KSC