Sawyer v. IBEW Local 569

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 DANIEL MARK SAWYER, Case No.: 3:20-cv-01898-BEN-WVG an individual, [12] ORDER: Plaintiff, [13] v. (1) GRANTING MOTION TO [14] REMAND IBEW LOCAL 569, [15] Defendant. (2) DENYING MOTION TO [16] AMEND [17] [ECF Nos. 3, 4, 9] [18] 19 Plaintiff Daniel Mark Sawyer is suing his labor union, Defendant IBEW Local 569 20 (“Local 569”), for public disclosure of private facts, false light, negligence, and 21 defamation. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1-2. Local 569 removed the matter to this 22 Court on September 23, 2020, ECF No. 1, and thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss, ECF 23 No. 3. Sawyer filed a Motion to Remand, ECF No. 4, and Local 569 has since filed a 24 Motion to Amend/Correct the Notice of Removal, ECF No. 9. Local 569 attached its 25 Proposed Amended Notice of Removal to its Motion to Amend/Correct. After 26 considering the papers submitted, supporting documentation, and applicable law, the 27 Court GRANTS the Motion to Remand, DENIES Motion to Amend/Correct the Notice 28 of Removal, and declines to decide the Motion to Dismiss as set forth below. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 In October 2014, Sawyer began an apprenticeship program that led to his 3 membership in Local 569. ECF No. 1-2, ¶¶ 11-12. On November 26, 2018, Sawyer left 4 his workplace because he was being harassed and left his home in San Diego, California 5 to visit relatives on the East Coast. Id. at ¶ 12. While in Colorado, he suffered burns to a 6 large part of his body and was admitted to a burn unit at a local hospital. Id. 7 Two weeks later, a social worker from the hospital informed Local 569’s Business 8 Manager that Sawyer had been admitted to the burn unit and was in stable condition. 9 ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 13. Sawyer alleges that thereafter, Local 569 published a story to others 10 that Sawyer was high on drugs at work, left work running from people, was involved in a 11 car crash, and was admitted to the hospital. Id. at ¶ 15. 12 On August 10, 2020, Sawyer filed a Complaint against Local 569 in the San Diego 13 Superior Court for the State of California alleging claims of public disclosure of private 14 facts, false light, negligence, and defamation. See generally ECF No. 1-2. Local 569 15 removed Sawyer’s case to this Court, initially arguing “[a]ny action to enforce a union’s 16 duty of fair representation arises ‘under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 17 [(“Section 301”)] and is a case controlled by federal law.’” Notice of Removal, ECF No. 18 1, 4 (quoting Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1964)). Local 569 later 19 conceded Section 301 was not a proper basis for removal. Mot. to Amend, ECF No. 9-1, 20 3. In its Proposed Amended Notice of Removal, Local 569 instead argues the appropriate 21 basis for removal is Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a) 22 (“Section 9(a)”). Amended Notice of Removal, ECF No. 9-2, 3. Because Local 569 23 abandoned its earlier basis for removal, the Court only addresses Local 569’s Section 9(a) 24 arguments put forward in its Motion to Amend/Correct the Notice of Removal. [26] 27 1 The following overview of the facts is drawn from Sawyer’s Complaint, ECF No. 1-2, which the Court assumes true in analyzing IBEW’s Motion to Dismiss. Erickson v. [28] 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Federal courts have limited jurisdiction. Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. N.Y., 790 3 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1986). As such, the Court cannot reach the merits of any dispute 4 until it confirms its own subject matter jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 5 Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998). The Ninth Circuit “strictly construe[s] the removal 6 statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there 7 is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 8 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 9 In circumstances where a defendant’s removal of the action is objectively 10 unreasonable, the Court may award attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c). Martin v. 11 Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 140-41 (2005). 12 III. ANALYSIS 13 A. Motion to Remand 14 Local 569 argues only that Sawyer’s negligence claim provides a basis for 15 removal. Specifically, it contends Section 9(a) preempts Sawyer’s negligence claim 16 because the claim alleges Local 569 owed Sawyer “a heightened duty of care by virtue of 17 its status under federal labor law as his exclusive collective bargaining representative.” 18 ECF No. 9-1, 1-2. Sawyer argues the matter should be remanded because his claims 19 against Local 569 involve state law claims that arise out of California law, not federal 20 labor law. Mot., ECF No. 4, 2. In support, Sawyer cites to Saenz v. Kaiser Permanente 21 Int’l, in which the court remanded a similar action after finding the plaintiff’s claims did 22 not turn on the labor union’s position as her exclusive bargaining agent. Case No. C 0923 5562 PJH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21246 , at *15-16 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2010). 24 Section 9(a) imposes a duty of fair representation on labor organizations. See 29 25 U.S.C. § 159 (a); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). “Generally, the statutory duty 26 of fair representation requires a union (and its designated agents) to represent all union 27 members and to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination 28 toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid 1 arbitrary conduct.” Saenz, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21246 , at *14 (citing Air Line Pilots 2 Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 75-76 (1991)). “The federal statutory duty which 3 unions owe their members to represent them fairly has been held to displace and preempt 4 state law that would impose duties upon unions by virtue of their status as the workers’ 5 exclusive collective bargaining representative.” Id. (citing Adkins v. Mireles, 526 F.3d 6 531, 539-40 (9th Cir. 2008)). However, like Saenz, this case does not implicate the duty 7 of fair representation. 8 In Saenz, the plaintiff alleged her union committed various state law negligence 9 and privacy torts by failing to adequately safeguard her personal information. Saenz, [10] 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21246 , at *3-4. The union’s conduct allegedly caused the 11 plaintiff to suffer damages from identity theft when her personal information was stolen. [12] Id. at *5 . In addressing the union’s argument that the plaintiff’s claims invoked the duty 13 of fair representation, the court observed “the ‘duties’ that plaintiff claims were violated 14 stem—not from the union’s duty to fairly represent her—but rather from the statutory, 15 constitutional, and common law duties that guarantee plaintiff’s right to privacy in the 16 maintenance of her personal information.” Id. at *16 . Because the claims did not involve 17 the duty of fair representation, the court remanded the case. Id. at *16-17 . 18 Local 569 does not attempt to distinguish Saenz, and any attempt would be futile 19 on the facts alleged. Moreover, Local 569’s cited authority does not require a different 20 conclusion. In Richardson v. United Steelworkers, the court found federal question 21 jurisdiction exists when a complaint, “though garbled in state-law raiment, sufficiently 22 asserts a claim implicating a duty of fair representation.” 864 F. 2d 1162, 1169-70 (5th 23 Cir. 1989). But Richardson involved allegations that the union defendant failed to 24 properly advise the plaintiffs of the consequences of going on strike, including the 25 possibility they would be replaced by new employees. Id. at 1164 . That alleged inaction 26 clearly relates to the union’s role as the employee’s bargaining representative. Not so 27 here, where Sawyer’s claims fall outside Local 569’s duty of fair representation and 28 instead stem from privacy rights created by California law. Because there is no basis for 1 || the Court’s jurisdiction of these claims, Sawyer’s Motion to Remand is granted. 2 B. = Attorney’s Fees 3 Having concluded the case should be remanded, the Court turns to Sawyer’s 4 request for attorney’s fees related to his Motion to Remand. As noted above, where a 5 || defendant’s removal of the action is objectively unreasonable, the Court may award 6 || attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c) (“Section 1447(c)”). Martin, 546 U.S. at 140 - 7 Moreover, a district court maintains jurisdiction after remand to enter an award of 8 and costs under Section 1447(c). See Cavanaugh v. Cty. of San Diego, Case No. 189 || cv-2557-BEN-LL, 2019 WL 3202238 , at *2, n. 3 (S.D. Cal. Jul 16, 2019) (citing Moore 10 || v. Permanente Med. Grp., 981 F.2d 443 , 445 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[I]t is clear that an award 11 attorney’s fees is a collateral matter over which a court normally retains jurisdiction 12 || even after being divested of jurisdiction on the merits.’’)) 13 While the appropriateness of fee-shifting is left to the discretion of the Court in this 14 ||instance, the Court must be mindful of Congressional intent. The Court finds that Local 15 569’s removal was not objectively baseless, but instead, was based on a reasonable 16 || (though incorrect) interpretation of Sawyer’s negligence claim. Accordingly, the Court 17 || declines to award attorney’s fees associated with Sawyer’s Motion to Remand. 18 CONCLUSION 19 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, ECF No. 4, is 20 || GRANTED. In view of the foregoing, the Court declines to consider the merits of the 21 || pending Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 3. Because the jurisdictional deficiency would not 22 ||be cured by amendment, Defendant’s Motion to Amend/Correct the Notice of Removal, 23 || ECF No. 9, is DENIED. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Date: February 11, 2021 *ROGER T. BENITE 27 United States District Judge