Herrera v. FCA US LLC

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 JUAN HERRERA and ELIZABETH Case No.: 3:17-cv-00579-AJB-BGS HERRERA, [12] Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 13 DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S v. MOTION FOR COSTS AND [14] FCA US LLC, a Delaware Limited EXPENSES 15 Liability Company; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, (Doc. No. 102) [16] Defendant. [17] 18 Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for costs and expenses. (Doc. No. 102.) 19 Defendant FCA US LLC (“FCA”) opposed the motion. (Doc. No. 104.) For the reasons 20 stated herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion, 21 with a reduction of costs as set forth in detail below. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 This case arises out of the purchase of a new 2011 Jeep Grand Cherokee (“the 24 Vehicle”) for a sales price of $45,706.32. The Vehicle was manufactured and distributed 25 by Defendant FCA US LLC, which provided a written warranty with the Vehicle. Within 26 the applicable warranty period, the Vehicle exhibited repeated engine and electrical issues. 27 Despite numerous attempts by FCA to fix Plaintiffs’ Vehicle, the problems persisted. 28 Plaintiffs eventually contacted FCA customer service in November 2015, and requested 1 FCA repurchase the Vehicle. FCA rejected Plaintiffs’ request. Plaintiffs filed their 2 Complaint in San Diego Superior Court on June 17, 2016, alleging violations of the Song3 Beverly Act and fraudulent concealment. The action was removed to this Court on March 4 23, 2017. On May 29, 2019, the parties filed a joint settlement. 5 II. DISCUSSION 6 Plaintiffs seek costs in the amount of $14,711.06. (Doc. No. 102-1 at 2.) “In general, 7 an award of costs in federal district court is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 54(d) and not applicable state law, even in diversity cases.” Self v. FCA US LLC, No. 1:179 CV-01107-SKO, 2019 WL 1994459 , at *12 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2019) (citing Champion 10 Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co., 342 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003)). An exception 11 exists under Clausen v. M/V NEW CARISSA, 339 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended 12 on denial of reh’g (Sept. 25, 2003), which held that the measure of damages is a matter of 13 state substantive law where “a state law provision allows for the awarding of costs as part 14 of a substantive, compensatory damages scheme[,]” Kelly v. Echols, No. 15 CIVF05118AWISMS, 2005 WL 2105309 , at *16 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2005). In Clausen, 16 the Ninth Circuit found that the measure of damages under Oregon’s Oil Spill Act “‘is 17 inseparably connected with the right of action[.]’” Clausen, 339 F.3d at 1065 (quoting 18 Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 491 (1916)). The Ninth Circuit added 19 that the Oregon Oil Spill Act presented the court “with an ‘express indication’ of a state 20 legislature’s ‘special interest in providing litigants’ with full compensation for reasonable 21 sums expended in pursuit of [their] Oil Spill Act claim.” Clausen, 339 F.3d at 1065 22 (citation omitted). Thus, the pertinent analysis in Clausen focuses on whether a state 23 legislature has expressed a special interest in providing litigants with attorneys’ fees and 24 costs. 25 Here, section 1794(d) of the California Civil Code provides that buyers prevailing 26 in an action under the Song-Beverly Act “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part 27 of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including 28 attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been 1 reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution 2 of such action.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1794 (emphasis added). The California Legislature has 3 demonstrated a “special interest” in permitting prevailing Song-Beverly plaintiffs to 4 recover costs and expenses under section 1794. As the California Court of Appeal has noted 5 “[a]n analysis by the Assembly Committee on Labor, Employment, and Consumer Affairs 6 states: ‘Indigent consumers are often discouraged from seeking legal redress due to court 7 costs. The addition of awards of ‘costs and expenses’ by the court to the consumer to cover 8 such out-of-pocket expenses as filing fees, expert witness fees, marshal’s fees, etc., should 9 open the litigation process to everyone.’” Jensen v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 35 Cal. App. 4th 10 112, 138 (1995), as modified on denial of reh’g (June 22, 1995). Therefore, the Court 11 concludes that the Song-Beverly Act applies to Plaintiffs’ contention that they are entitled 12 to costs and expenses. 13 However, while state substantive law may apply, this does not obviate the Court’s 14 obligation to ensure that the costs were “reasonably incurred.” Thus, the Court will briefly 15 review whether Plaintiffs’ requested costs and expenses are reasonable. First, Plaintiffs 16 seek $69.95 for service of summons on La Mesa Chrysler Jeep, Inc. (Doc. No. 104 at 5.) 17 The Court declines to award this amount of costs to Plaintiffs as La Mesa Chrysler Jeep, 18 Inc. was not a defendant in this federal proceeding. 19 Second, FCA takes issue with Plaintiffs’ request for reimbursement of travel 20 expenses incurred for attending depositions. (Id. at 6.) However, because FCA does not 21 cite any authority limiting travel costs in Song-Beverly cases, these costs are deemed 22 recoverable. See Hellenberg v. Ford Motor Co., No. 18CV2202 JM (KSC), 2020 WL 23 1820126, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2020) (agreeing that costs and expenses related to travel 24 for a deposition may be recovered); Heffington v. FCA US LLC, No. 25 217CV00317DADJLT, 2020 WL 5017610 , at *12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2020) (“But, as 26 plaintiff points out in response, plaintiff is not limited to recovery of taxable costs in this 27 Song Beverly Act case. Accordingly, the court will not reduce any of the requested amount 28 for plaintiff’s attorneys’ travel.”) (citation omitted). 1 Third, FCA disputes the $11,226.75 amount in expert witness fees in this case. (Doc. 2 ||No. 104 at 6.) In particular, FCA argues the charge of $6,854.75 related to Dr. Barbara 3 ||Luna is unreasonable because Dr. Luna spent nearly 29 hours on a case “where her 4 ||testtmony was nearly identical to that given in a hundred or more other cases against 5 || Defendant.” Ud. at 7.) Moreover, FCA argues Dr. Luna was Plaintiffs’ fraud expert, yet 6 || Plaintiffs did not recover anything on the fraud claim. (/d. at 8.) The Court largely agrees 7 || with FCA, and so, in its discretion, will reduce the recoverable cost relating to Dr. Luna by 8 $3,427.37. 9 In sum, based on the reasoning provided above, the Court will reduce Plaintiffs’ 10 || requested cost by $3,497.32. 11 CONCLUSION 12 After thorough review of Plaintiffs’ submitted Bill of Costs, and briefing filed in 13 support thereof, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ 14 ||motion for costs. Plaintiffs will be awarded $11,213.73 in costs. By June 1, 2021, the 15 || parties are ORDERED to either (1) file a joint motion to dismiss the entirety of this action, 16 |/or (2) contact the chambers of Magistrate Judge Skomal for final scheduling of this case. [17] 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. [19] 20 || Dated: May 20, 2021 , 22 United States District Judge