Abdullah v. City of San Diego

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 DOMINQUE ABDULLAH, Case No.: 18cv1634 DMS (MSB) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER (1) GRANTING 13 v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 14 CITY OF SAN DIEGO, SAN DIEGO AND (2) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S POLICE DEPARTMENT, BLAKE 15 MOTION FOR SUMMARY WILLIAMS, and DOES 1 through 10, JUDGMENT 16 inclusive, 17 Defendants. [18] 19 This case comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion for partial reconsideration 20 or, in the alternative, for certification for interlocutory appeal, of this Court’s March 4, 21 2021 Order denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Defendant 22 seeks reconsideration of the Court’s denial of Defendant’s motion on the issue of equitable 23 tolling of the statute of limitations.1 Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion, and 24 Defendant filed a reply. After the motion was submitted, the Court set the matter for 25 hearing and heard argument from counsel. After hearing those arguments, the Court now [27] 1 The only other issue in the Court’s Order was qualified immunity, on which Defendant [28] 1 grants the motion for reconsideration, and on reconsideration, grants Defendant’s motion 2 for summary judgment. 3 “Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly 4 discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, 5 or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah 6 County, Oregon v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, Defendant relies 7 on the “clear error” prong. To warrant reconsideration under this prong, Defendant must 8 show there is a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed[.]” Latman 9 v. Burdette, 366 F.3d 774, 781 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing In re Banks, 263 F.3d 862 , 869 (9th 10 Cir. 2001)). 11 Defendant argues the Court committed clear error in several respects. First, he 12 asserts the Court clearly erred when it found that an Internal Affairs (“IA”) Complaint 13 could serve as the basis for equitable tolling. The Court disagrees with this interpretation 14 of the Order. Contrary to Defendant’s suggestion, the Court did not find that an IA 15 complaint, standing alone, was sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. Rather, the Court 16 simply found that Plaintiff’s IA Complaint satisfied the notice requirement for equitable 17 tolling. 18 Nevertheless, Defendant cites a handful of cases to support his argument that an IA 19 complaint is insufficient to justify equitable tolling. See Ucci v. LAPD, No. 2:15-cv-0838620 CAS-KES, 2020 WL 1032359 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2020); Hendrix v. Rohan, No. 2:13-cv21 01527-JAD-CWH, 2019 WL 1083568 (D. Nev. Mar. 7, 2019); Ahearn v. Redondo Beach 22 Police Dept., No. CV 07-1452-AHS (RNB), 2008 WL 638354 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008); 23 Panaro v. City of North Las Vegas, 432 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005). All of these cases were 24 decided before the Court issued its Order, but Defendant failed to cite any of them in his 25 numerous briefs to the Court. Most of these case are distinguishable from this case. Ahearn 26 is distinguishable because it deals with claims under California’s Government Claims Act, 27 not a claim under § 1983. Hendrix is distinguishable as it deals with equitable tolling under 28 Nevada law, not California law. Panaro is also distinguishable as it deals with the 1 exhaustion requirement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, not equitable tolling under 2 California law. One case, however, does address the issue raised here. See Ucci, 2020 WL 3 1032359. In that case, the court declined to apply equitable tolling to the filing of an IA 4 complaint, finding the plaintiff failed to act reasonably when he delayed filing suit 5 “because he was ostensibly waiting for the LAPD to investigate his IAG Complaint.” Id. 6 at *14. The court gave four reasons for that finding. First, it effectively found the plaintiff 7 had no reasonable basis to expect “the LAPD’s internal affairs group to resolve his 8 complaints favorably.” Id. Second, the court found that “in pursuing his IAG Complaint, 9 Plaintiff was not pursuing an administrative remedy that was a legal prerequisite to filing 10 suit, like exhaustion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act or a written tort claim under 11 the [California Tort Claims Act].” Id. at *15. Third, the court stated it was unable to locate 12 “any case awarding equitable tolling based on a telephonic complaint.” Id. And finally, 13 the court stated “Plaintiff did not need information from the LAPD to pursue his claims.” 14 Id. 15 Ucci gives this Court pause as to whether an IA complaint warrants equitable tolling. 16 McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist., 45 Cal. 4th 88, 105 (2008), also 17 raises questions about whether the IA process affords the benefits that justify equitable 18 tolling, namely, whether the IA process provides the complaining party with any remedy 19 or relief that would “lessen the harm that is the subject of a potential second action[.]” Id. 20 at 100. But see Bey v. City of Oakland, No. 14-cv-01626-JSC, 2016 WL 1639372 , at *9 21 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2016) (finding equitable tolling could apply to the filing of an IA 22 complaint). This Court need not resolve the issue, however, as Plaintiff has not met his 23 burden on the third element of equitable tolling, as discussed below. 24 To meet this third element, Plaintiff must prove that his conduct was reasonable and 25 in good faith. In a recent case, the California Supreme Court held this element of equitable 26 tolling “encompass[es] two distinct requirements: A plaintiff’s conduct must be 27 objectively reasonable and subjectively in good faith.” Saint Francis Memorial Hosp. v. 28 State Department of Public Health, 9 Cal. 5th 710 , 729 (2020). “An analysis of 1 reasonableness focuses not on a party’s intentions or the motives behind a party’s actions, 2 but instead on whether that party’s actions were fair, proper, and sensible in light of the 3 circumstances.” Id. “Good faith pivots instead on a party’s intentions.” Id. Or stated 4 differently, good faith depends on whether the party’s late filing “was the result of an 5 honest mistake or was instead motivated by a dishonest purpose.” Id. 6 Here, Plaintiff did not present any evidence to support a finding that his delayed 7 filing of the Complaint was objectively reasonable. As set out in the Court’s previous 8 orders, the incident giving rise to this case occurred on August 16, 2014, and the Complaint 9 was not filed until July 19, 2018, nearly four years later. Petitioner was entitled to statutory 10 tolling while he was in custody awaiting trial on charges stemming from the underlying 11 arrest, but even with that tolling his Complaint was filed more than eighteen months after 12 the statute of limitations had expired. Plaintiff states that during his time in the San Diego 13 County Jail and later in state prison, “I was not able to find an attorney to represent me for 14 the incident involving Officer Blake Williams beating me.” (Decl. of Dominique Abdullah 15 in Supp. of Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. ¶15.) He also states, “I had limited ability to make 16 telephone calls because the telephone calls were very expensive.” (Id.) However, 17 Defendant cites evidence that Plaintiff made 183 phone calls during his time in custody. 18 (Decl. of Seetal Tejura in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. ¶10.) There is also no dispute that 19 Plaintiff was able to file an IA Complaint in 2016 despite his incarceration. (Decl. of 20 Dominique Abdullah in Supp. of Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss ¶2.) Under these 21 circumstances, the Court cannot say Plaintiff’s eighteen-month delay in filing the present 22 case was objectively reasonable.2 23 In the Order, the Court reached the opposite conclusion and effectively found that 24 Plaintiff had met his burden to show reasonable and good faith conduct. That finding was 25 in error, and on reconsideration, the Court reaches the opposite conclusion. With that [28] 1 || conclusion, Plaintiff is not entitled to equitable tolling, and his Complaint is untimely. The 2 ||Court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for reconsideration and grants Defendant’s 3 ||motion for summary judgment. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly, and 4 || close this case. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 ||Dated: June 23, 2021 pm Bh 7 a Yn. Hon. Dana M. Sabraw, Chief Judge United States District Court