Y.I. v. County of San Diego

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 Y.I., a minor, by and through her Case No: 3:20-cv-00588-LAB-DEB guardian ad litem, et al. [12] ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS Plaintiffs, 13 TO DISMISS [DKT. 19, 20] v. [14] COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al. [15] Defendants. [16] 17 Plaintiffs Y.I., A.G., and D.G. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) are the three minor 18 children of Defendant Mayra Gonzalez, who has a history of alcohol abuse and 19 drunk driving. In 2015 and 2016, following drunk driving arrests with Plaintiff Y.I. 20 present in the car, Defendant Gonzalez was investigated for complaints of child 21 abuse. Social workers reported findings of “severe neglect” in both instances. On 22 November 12, 2018, Plaintiffs were injured in a serious car accident involving a 23 drunk Gonzalez, who drove into oncoming traffic, slamming headfirst into another 24 car, injuring all three children. 25 Plaintiffs filed this suit against Defendants County of San Diego (the 26 “County”); Sharon McMunn, Bob Prokesch, and Michele Winter (collectively, 27 “Defendant Social Workers”); and their mother, Mayra Gonzalez. They bring seven 28 causes of action against Defendants, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; 1 breach of mandatory duties under the California Welfare & Institutions Code and 2 CDSS Manual of Policies and Procedures; negligence; and battery. Defendant 3 Social Workers and the County each filed a motion to dismiss the claims made 4 against them. (Dkt. 19, 20.) 5 Having considered the arguments in support of and in opposition to 6 Defendants’ respective motions, the Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss and 7 DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state 8 law claims, which are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 9 I. BACKGROUND 10 A. Defendant Gonzalez’s History of Alcohol Abuse 11 Defendant Mayra Gonzalez, the natural mother of Plaintiffs Y.I., A.G., and 12 D.G., has a documented history of alcohol abuse and drunk driving. (Dkt. 15, 13 Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶¶ 17–18.) This history dates back to 14 November 2009, when family and friends stopped an inebriated Gonzalez from 15 driving her car, ultimately resulting in Gonzalez’s arrest and a public intoxication 16 charge. (Id.) 17 Then, on March 25, 2015, a very drunk Gonzalez got behind the wheel again, 18 this time with Plaintiff Y.I. and another child in the car. (Id. ¶ 19.) At approximately 19 10:00 a.m., Gonzalez lost consciousness while driving drunk, veered into another 20 lane and crashed, causing the car’s air bags to deploy. (Id. ¶ 20.) She refused 21 medical attention at the scene and drove away. She then checked herself in to the 22 Tri-City Medical Center, which measured her Blood Alcohol Concentration (“BAC”) 23 level at 0.259%. (Id. ¶¶ 21–23.) The County received a Child Abuse Referral 24 designated for “immediate” investigation following this incident. (Id. ¶ 24.) Tri-City 25 Medical Center staff informed Defendant Sharon McMunn, who was assigned to 26 investigate, of the circumstances of Gonzalez’s crash and her extreme level of 27 intoxication. Gonzalez lied to McMunn claiming she was not drunk and gave a false 28 account of other details of the crash and its aftermath. (Id. ¶ 25–27.) McMunn and 1 Defendant Bob Prokesch found “severe neglect,” determining that Gonzalez 2 willfully endangered Y.I. and posed a serious risk of future harm to her. (Id. ¶¶ 28– 3 30.) They provided their findings to the California Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 4 which, in turn, placed Gonzalez on the Child Abuse Central Index (“CACI”). (Id. 5 ¶ 31.) McMunn and Prokesch followed up on creating a “voluntary safety plan” 6 relating to Gonzalez’s parenting and supervision of Y.I., which included educating 7 her about the safety and risk factors associated with consuming alcohol and driving 8 under the influence. (Id. ¶¶ 39–40, 47.) 9 In May 2016, Defendant Gonzalez, now pregnant with Plaintiff D.G., once 10 again drove drunk with Plaintiff Y.I. in the car. (Id. ¶ 50.) This time, she was 11 speeding and driving erratically, and she ultimately crashed into a vehicle stopped 12 at a red light. Law enforcement officials determined her BAC was 0.23% and that 13 she had been driving without a valid driver’s license. (Id. ¶¶ 55–56.) They arrested 14 Gonzalez and charged her with willful child endangerment, driving under the 15 influence with a child in the car, and hit-run driving among other charges. (Id. ¶ 57.) 16 The County received another Child Abuse Referral, and McMunn once again 17 investigated the child abuse allegations. (Id. ¶¶ 59–60.) McMunn and Defendant 18 Michelle Winter asked the hospital to “flag” D.G. at birth, and prompted a state 19 court judge to require Gonzalez to wear an alcohol ankle monitor until D.G.’s birth. 20 (Id. ¶¶ 66–67.) McMunn and Winter again reported findings of “severe neglect,” 21 determining that Gonzalez posed a “high risk” of harm to Y.I. A written report of 22 their findings was submitted to the California DOJ, who again placed Gonzalez on 23 the CACI. (Id. ¶ 74.) McMunn and Winter also created a voluntary safety plan and 24 offered to provide Gonzalez with counseling resources. (Id. ¶ 86–87.) 25 On August 17, 2017, Gonzalez pled guilty to willful child endangerment and 26 driving under the influence. (Id. ¶¶ 97–98.) The court sentenced her to five years’ 27 probation and ordered her not to drive without a valid license or insurance. (Id. 28 ¶¶ 98–99.) 1 B. The November 2018 Car Crash 2 Despite these interventions, on November 11, 2018, Gonzalez drove drunk 3 with her children in the car for at least the third time. On that day, Gonzalez left a 4 birthday party at Chuck E. Cheese where she had already consumed alcohol and 5 drove to the beach with all three of her children in the car. (Id. ¶ 103.) Once there, 6 Gonzalez continued drinking. (Id. ¶ 104.) She then drove to a house party, where 7 she drank at least eleven more alcoholic drinks. (Id. ¶ 105.) Extremely intoxicated, 8 Gonzalez left the party with the children. She hit a parked car, then crashed into a 9 sign post and a wall, then ran multiple red lights, drove the wrong way into 10 oncoming traffic, and ultimately slammed headfirst into another car. (Id. ¶¶ 10611 14.) The impact caused A.G. to fly into the car’s windshield and suffer serious 12 physical injuries, including brain injuries that resulted in seizures for multiple weeks 13 afterward. (Id. ¶¶ 115.) Y.I. and D.G. also suffered physical injuries including 14 broken bones, swelling, and abrasions. (Id. ¶ 116–17.) 15 On November 19, 2018, Gonzalez was criminally charged with three counts 16 of felony child abuse; driving under influence and causing injury with a prior DUI; 17 and driving without a license with a prior DUI. (Id. ¶ 122.) The state court sentenced 18 her to 14 years in prison. (Id. ¶ 125.) 19 Through their guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs allege that the County and the 20 Defendant Social Workers failed to properly investigate the complaints of child 21 abuse and failed to adequately protect the minor Plaintiffs from Gonzalez. The 22 County and Defendant Social Workers move to dismiss those claims, arguing that 23 the SAC doesn’t allege facts sufficient to establish any federal or state law 24 violation. 25 II. LEGAL STANDARD 26 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, [27] 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 28 must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 1 that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 2 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). A claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations 3 permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 4 the misconduct alleged.” Id. While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual 5 allegations,” a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief 6 above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 , 545 7 (2007). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it 8 asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. 9 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 ). The Court need not accept legal conclusions 10 couched as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 . 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 A. Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 13 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , a plaintiff must allege that a person 14 acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a constitutional right. 15 Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 16 (providing a cause of action against “[e]very person who, under color of any 17 statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or 18 causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 19 or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . .”). “The purpose of § 1983 20 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals 21 of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such 22 deterrence fails.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (citing Carey v. Piphus, [23] 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978)). “In order to seek redress through § 1983, however, 24 a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal 25 law.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (citations omitted) 26 (emphasis in original). 27 Plaintiffs bring three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – two against Defendant 28 Social Workers and one against the County. Plaintiffs allege that the Social 1 Workers violated § 1983 by depriving them of their constitutional rights guaranteed 2 by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and by violating their 3 rights under Titles IV-A, B, and E of the Social Security Act (“SSA”) and under the 4 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (“CAPTA”). Plaintiffs also allege that 5 the County is liable under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) 6 because its policies, practices, and customs were the driving force behind the 7 violations of their rights. 8 i. Due Process Claim Against Social Worker Defendants 9 This Court, sua sponte, previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ original Complaint, 10 finding that their Due Process claim was foreclosed by the holding of DeShaney v. 11 Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). (See Dkt. 7.) Plaintiffs 12 then filed an Amended Complaint (Dkt. 8), and now the SAC, with the same flawed 13 allegations that fail to address the deficiencies identified in the Court’s previous 14 Order. In their Opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs repeat their deficient 15 arguments under the guise that this lawsuit is not based on a failure to act, but 16 rather on Defendant Social Workers’ affirmative actions and alleged abandonment 17 of the minor Plaintiffs. But reframing the same inadequate facts under a different 18 legal theory doesn’t help Plaintiffs overcome DeShaney. 19 In DeShaney, the Supreme Court held that a child’s Due Process rights 20 weren’t infringed by a county and its employees who failed to prevent the severe 21 abuse of a child by his natural father, even if they knew from various prior 22 complaints and investigations that the child was at risk. The defendant social 23 workers had investigated the complaints of child of abuse, recommended several 24 protection measures, made monthly visits to the minor’s home, and, at one point, 25 even removed the minor from the custody of his father only to later return him to 26 his home. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192–93. The defendants took no further action 27 to protect the child, and his father ultimately beat him so severely that he suffered 28 permanent brain damage. Id. at 193 . 1 The DeShaney Court confirmed that “nothing in the language of the Due 2 Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of 3 its citizens against invasion by private actors.” Id. at 195, 200 (“The Clause is 4 phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain 5 minimal levels of safety and security.”). And while state law might impose on the 6 county and its officials a duty to protect the child, the Constitution imposes no such 7 duty. Id. at 201 . A failure to carry out a duty created by state law doesn’t violate 8 substantive Due Process. Id. 9 Plaintiffs here allege that they were harmed by the actions of a private actor 10 – Defendant Gonzalez. Their claims must therefore fall within an exception to the 11 general rule that the Constitution doesn’t require state actors to protect persons 12 from the violent acts of private parties. Id. at 197 . Under the “special relationship” 13 exception, a state actor may be liable for the act of a third party in situations where 14 the state actor has established a relationship with the plaintiff through, for example, 15 incarceration or involuntary hospitalization. L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th 16 Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Under the “danger creation” exception, state actors 17 may be liable where they created the danger resulting in injury to the plaintiff. Id. 18 A claim based on the danger-creation theory “necessarily involves affirmative 19 conduct on the part of the state in placing the plaintiff in danger.” Id. (citations 20 omitted). 21 Plaintiffs argue that DeShaney was about a failure to act but that this case is 22 about affirmative acts. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that “[h]ere, unlike in 23 DeShaney, the [Social Worker] Defendants acted and intervened to first identify a 24 serious danger to the children, and then to develop a plan to protect them—which 25 Defendants later decided to abandon.” (Dkt. 25 at 1.) But this is a 26 mischaracterization of the facts alleged in the SAC, which point only to a 27 suggestion that Defendants didn’t do enough to follow up on the child abuse 28 complaints and protect the children from harm. 1 Here, the County had received complaints that Plaintiff Y.I. might be a victim 2 of child abuse. The Social Workers investigated the complaints, reported their 3 findings, and provided voluntary services to Defendant Gonzalez, but ultimately 4 left Y.I. in the custody of her mother. But Defendants couldn’t have established a 5 “special relationship” with Plaintiffs where they never removed any of them from 6 their mother’s custody, launched any formal protection plan, or sought court 7 intervention. Defendants’ awareness of Gonzalez’s child abuse and their prior 8 offers to provide voluntary services to Gonzalez aren’t enough to create a special 9 relationship. 10 Nor does the SAC allege any facts suggesting that the Social Workers 11 actively placed the children in danger. Nearly two years had passed after the Social 12 Workers last investigated Defendant Gonzalez and before her November 2018 car 13 accident. Up until that accident, the SAC alleges that Plaintiffs had been in the 14 private care of Gonzalez, not that of the County. Neither the County nor the Social 15 Workers took any affirmative actions with respect to Plaintiffs or played any active 16 role in their protection during that period. Plaintiffs repeatedly argue that 17 Defendants “abandoned” their safety and case planning, yet simultaneously 18 acknowledge that there was never a formal safety plan in place—only that 19 voluntary services were offered. (See SAC ¶ 84 (“[Defendant Social Workers] 20 worked on and/or created a voluntary safety plan designed to protect Y.I. and D.G. 21 Prior to completing the necessary safety and/or case plan, [Defendants] decided 22 and/or agreed to abandon and/or terminate the case planning process.”); id. ¶ 90 23 (“Instead of taking the legally required steps to protect the Plaintiffs, [Defendant 24 Social Workers] merely ‘educated’ Ms. Gonzalez (for a second time) about safety 25 and risk factors involving Y.I. when consuming excessive alcohol and/or driving 26 under the influence.”).) This points to the same conclusion the Court reached in 27 DeShaney: “a State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply 28 not does constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. 1 at 197 . 2 Even if state law imposed a duty on the Social Workers to act, failure to carry 3 out a duty imposed by the state doesn’t amount to a federal substantive Due 4 Process violation. (Dkt. 7 (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 ).) Plaintiffs renewed 5 allegations fail to state a Due Process violation against the Social Workers under [6] 42 U.S.C. §1983 , and because they have not or cannot cure the same deficiencies 7 identified in the Court’s prior order, the First Claim for Relief is DISMISSED WITH 8 PREJUDICE. 9 ii. Federal Statutory Rights 10 Defendant Social Workers next argue that the federal statutes Plaintiffs rely 11 on for their second claim—Titles IV-A, B, and E of the SSA and CAPTA—don’t 12 create a right enforceable under Section 1983. (Dkt. 19-1 at 9.) 13 Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides 14 a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 15 U.S. 266 , 271 (1994) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To establish 16 a claim under Section 1983 for violation of a federal statutory right, a court must 17 consider three factors: “(1) Congress must have intended that the provision in 18 question benefit the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right 19 assertedly protected by the statute is not so vague and amorphous that its 20 enforcement would strain judicial competence; and (3) the statute must 21 unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States.” Sanchez v. Johnson, [22] 416 F.3d 1051 , 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 23 329, 34–41(1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “a plaintiff seeking 24 redress under § 1983 must assert the violation of an individually enforceable right 25 conferred specifically upon him, not merely a violation of federal law or the denial 26 of a benefit or interest, no matter how unambiguously conferred.” Sanchez, 416 27 F.3d at 1062. 28 The SAC alleges that the County is “required to comply with federal 1 mandates attached to th[e] funds” it receives from the federal government to 2 provide services to children in the child welfare system. (SAC ¶ 140.) Further, 3 “under these laws and regulations, once it was determined that services were 4 necessary, the County and the Social Worker Defendants were required to 5 complete an assessment, develop and/or implement a formal safety and/or case 6 plan, and/or a program of supervision, and or document the plan.” (Id. ¶ 141.) 7 However, while the SAC makes cursory mention of federal statutory 8 violations, Plaintiffs nowhere identify the federal right of which they have allegedly 9 been deprived. Instead, they merely refer generally the SSA and CAPTA without 10 invoking any specific provisions of these statutes and without making any 11 argument establishing which interests they might have been deprived of in the first 12 place. See Guatay Christian Fellowship v. Cnty. of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957 , 986 13 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming denial of the plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim where plaintiff 14 failed to lay the necessary foundation regarding which of the defendant’s “actions 15 constituted a deprivation for procedural due process purposes, nor an argument 16 establishing which interests it might have been deprived of in the first place.”). 17 Plaintiffs attempt to overcome these deficiencies in their Opposition by 18 identifying certain rights allegedly created under the SSA and CAPTA. (Dkt. 25 at 19 14–15.) But on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court must limit its 20 inquiry to the four corners of the complaint and the documents it incorporates. Van 21 Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). The 22 absence of any allegations in the SAC identifying which of Plaintiffs’ rights were 23 violated and whether Congress intended any of those rights to benefit them is fatal 24 to their claim under Section 1983. The Court GRANTS Defendant Social Workers’ 25 motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Claim for Relief. Because this is the first time 26 this claim has been dismissed and it is conceivable that it may be cured by further 27 amendment, this claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 28 // 1 iii. Monell Liability 2 Plaintiff’s third claim under Section 1983 is alleged against the County for 3 violation of Plaintiffs’ due process rights. This claim fails because, as previously 4 explained, Plaintiffs fail to state any violation of their Constitutional rights. See 5 Palmerin v. City of Riverside, 794 F.2d 1409, 1414-15 (9th Cir. 1986) (“absent any 6 constitutional violations by the individual defendants, there can be no Monell 7 liability”). Plaintiffs have also insufficiently alleged that they suffered injuries 8 pursuant to any governmental policy or custom. A municipality can only be held 9 liable for injuries inflicted by its employees or officers if it somehow participated in 10 the wrongdoing through its official rules, policy, custom, or practice. See Monell, 11 436 U.S. at 690–91. To establish Monell liability, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the 12 plaintiff “possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived;” (2) the 13 municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the 14 plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the “moving force” behind or 15 cause of the constitutional violation. Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 16 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831 , 835 17 (9th Cir. 1996)). 18 There are three ways to show the existence of a custom or policy: (1) by 19 showing a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the municipality’s 20 standard operating procedure; (2) by showing that an official with final 21 policymaking authority made the decision; or (3) by showing that an official with 22 final policymaking authority either delegated that authority to, or ratified the 23 decision of, a subordinate. Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950 , 24 964 (9th Cir. 2008). Mere negligence doesn’t support a Monell claim. Doughterty 25 v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing City of Cantonth v. 26 Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)). 27 Additionally, failure to train serves as a basis for Section 1983 liability only 28 where it reflects a “deliberate or conscious choice” by a municipality that amounts 1 to its policy. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (internal citations 2 and quotations omitted). As the Ninth Circuit has noted: 3 [D]eliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known [4] or obvious consequence of his action. Satisfying this 5 standard requires proof that the municipality had actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their [6] training program will cause[] [municipal] employees to 7 violate citizens’ constitutional rights. In turn, to demonstrate that the municipality was on notice of a constitutionally [8] significant gap in its training, it is ordinarily necessary for a 9 plaintiff to demonstrate a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees. [10] 11 Kirkpatrick v. Cty. of Washoe, 843 F.3d 784, 794 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal citations 12 and quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). This situation is “rare”—“‘the 13 unconstitutional consequences of failing to train’ must be ‘patently obvious’ and 14 the violation of a protected right must be a ‘highly predictable consequence’ of the 15 decision not to train.” Id. (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 63 (2011)). 16 Here, the factual allegations regarding how the Social Workers chose to 17 handle Plaintiffs’ case do not, without more, support a Monell claim against the 18 County. Plaintiffs list several of what they allege are the County’s “policies, 19 customs, and/or practices,” such as “[n]ot requiring a social worker to seek judicial 20 intervention and/or promote a case after child abuse allegations have been 21 substantiated against a parent” or “leaving a child, like Y.I. and D.G., in a home in 22 which a parent has multipl[e] substantiated child abuse allegations,” but these 23 allegations relate to three county officials and their actions in a single isolated case, 24 not to a widespread custom or policy or a county-wide failure to train. (Dkt. 26 at 25 8–9.) Conclusory allegations that the County has widespread unconstitutional 26 customs, policies, and practices or failed to properly train individuals, and that the 27 unconstitutional actions of the individual Social Workers in this case were ratified 28 by policy-making officials, without further factual allegations to support these 1 general assertions, are insufficient to state a Monell claim. See Hyun Ju Park v. 2 City & County of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2020); AE ex rel. 3 Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). 4 Plaintiffs general allegations that the County made a deliberate or conscious 5 choice not to adequately train its social workers and that this failure in a single 6 case amounts to County policy, custom, or practice is inadequate to state a Monell 7 liability claim. Plaintiffs’ Third Claim for Relief is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE 8 as to the County. 9 B. State Law Claims 10 The Court’s jurisdiction in this case is predicated on the existence of claims 11 arising under federal law, namely 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . In federal question cases, a 12 district court “‘may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction’ over state law 13 claims if it ‘has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” Sanford 14 v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 15 § 1367(c)(3)). Because the Court has dismissed Plaintiffs’ sole federal claims it 16 has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining 17 state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c); Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 18 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are 19 eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent 20 jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the 21 remaining state-law claims.”). The Court exercises that discretion here and 22 DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE all remaining claims in this case. 23 IV. CONCLUSION 24 The Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the SAC’s First and Third Claims 25 for Relief; DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the SAC’s Second Claim for 26 Relief; and DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ 27 remaining state law claims under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Claims for 28 Relief, which are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 1 If Plaintiffs choose to file an amended complaint, they must do so on or 2 ||before October 18, 2021. [3] 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. [5] 6 ||Dated: September 27, 2021 lau A: (Qywy7 Honorable Larry AlanBurns 8 United States District Judge