Hale v. Villalpando

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — — 6 — — 7 — 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA — 10 — 11 DYLAN SCOTT HALE, Case No.: 22cv-24-LL-JLB No. 00141227HD, — 12 — ORDER: Plaintiff, — 13 — vs. (1) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION — 14 — PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULES 15 OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(h)(3) ANNE E. VILLALPANDO, U.S. Navy AND — 16 — Commander; JAMIE I. ROMAN, U.S. 17 Navy Commander; JUDSON M. KIRK, (2) DENYING MOTION FOR Commander; JESS COMBS, Deputy APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND — 18 — Director of Operations, MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 19 Defendants. PAUPERIS AS MOOT — 20 — [ECF Nos. 2, 3] — 21 — 22 Dylan Scott Hale (“Plaintiff”), a military prisoner currently housed at the Miramar 23 Naval Consolidated Brig in San Diego, California, proceeding pro se, has initiated this civil 24 action on January 5, 2022 pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal 25 Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1. Plaintiff did not 26 prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (a) when he filed his Complaint; 27 instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”), along with a Motion to 28 Appoint Counsel. ECF Nos. 2, 3. 1 I. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) 2 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, obligates the 3 Court to review complaints filed by anyone “incarcerated or detained in any facility who 4 is accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the 5 terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as 6 soon as practicable after docketing” and regardless of whether the prisoner prepays filing 7 fees or moves to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c). Pursuant to this provision of 8 the PLRA, the Court is required to review prisoner complaints which “seek[] redress from 9 a governmental entity or officer or employee of a government entity,” and to dismiss those, 10 or any portion of those, which are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon 11 which relief may be granted,” or which “seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 12 immune.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 13 2000); Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889 , 892 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011). “The purpose of § 1915A 14 is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of 15 responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903 , 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler 16 v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). 17 In addition to reviewing prisoners’ IFP complaints under 28 U.S.C. Section 18 1915(e)(2) and Section 1915A(b), the Court must also determine sua sponte whether it has 19 subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s case. See Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 20 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at 21 any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). 22 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages arising from alleged 23 violations of his constitutional rights while housed at the Naval Consolidated Brig. See 24 Compl. at 18-32. The four named Defendants are all Naval officers in charge of the Brig 25 including the former Executive Officer, current Executive Officer, former Commanding 26 Officer, and the Deputy Director of Operations. See id. at 1-4. — 27 — — 28 — I A. Feres Doctrine 2 In Feres v. United States, the Supreme Court held that members of the armed 3 || services could not sue the Government for injuries that “arise out of or are in the course of 4 || activity incident to service.” 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). Since Feres, the Supreme Court 5 || has held that it applies not only to tort actions brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims 6 || act, but to Bivens actions as well. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983) (“We 7 ||hold that enlisted military personnel may not maintain a suit to recover damages from a 8 superior officer for alleged constitutional violations.”); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 9 || 669, 680-81 (1987) (holding that Chappell applies to all activities “incident to service” and 10 merely to activities performed within the officer/subordinate relationship); see also 11 || Bowen v. Oldstead, 125 F.3d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 1997) (“In sum, the Feres doctrine is 12 || applicable “whenever a legal action ‘would require a civilian court to examine decisions 13 |/regarding management, discipline, supervision, and control of the members of the armed 14 || forces of the United States.’’’) 15 Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims involving the conditions 16 his confinement and disciplinary proceedings while housed at the Naval Consolidated 17 || Brig fall within the Feres doctrine. Because the Feres doctrine applies to Plaintiffs claims 18 |/in this action, this Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims. Dreier v. United States, 106 19 || F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended (Feb. 4, 1997). 20 II. Conclusion and Order 21 Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this civil action is 22 || DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 23 || Procedure 12(h)(3). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed Jn 24 || Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2) and Motion to Appoint Counsel are DENIED as moot. The 25 Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. 26 IT IS SO ORDERED. _ 27 ||Dated: February 10, 2022 tp 28 Honorable Linda Lopez United States District Judge