Griffin v. Hodges

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 HAROLD GRIFFIN, Case No.: 21-cv-01474-MMA-DEB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 14 K. WILLIAMS, et. al., 15 DKT. NO. 15 16 Defendants. [17] 18 Before the Court is Plaintiff Harold Griffin’s Request for Appointment of Counsel 19 and Declaration of Indigency (“Motion”). Dkt. No. 15. Plaintiff requests the Court appoint 20 counsel on his behalf “so that [his] interest may be protected by the professional assistance 21 required.” Id. He states he is “indigent and unable to afford counsel” because he has no 22 assets or income. Id. Plaintiff invokes California Rules of Court 4.551(c)(2) in support of 23 his Motion. Id. 24 For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request without 25 prejudice. 26 Cal. R. Ct. 4.551(c)(2) does not apply to this case, because it is a rule that applies 27 only to habeas corpus proceedings filed in California state courts. [28] 1 In 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights cases pending in a District Court such as this one, 2 the court may appoint counsel only in “exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 3 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). “A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an 4 evaluation of both the likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the petitioner 5 to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Neither 6 of these factors is dispositive and both must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” [7] Id. (internal quotations omitted). 8 The Court finds no exceptional circumstances here. Plaintiff’s indigency does not 9 constitute an exceptional circumstance. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N. 10 C., 452 U.S. 18, 26–27. (1981) (“[A]n indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel 11 only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty.”); see also Mallard v. 12 U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 , 298–309 (1989) (finding District Courts 13 generally lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases.) 14 Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, and, at this stage 15 of the proceedings, the record is not sufficiently developed for the Court to make this 16 finding. 17 Moreover, there is no reason to conclude Plaintiff lacks the ability to articulate and 18 prosecute his claims. Plaintiff has demonstrated the ability to articulate the essential facts 19 supporting his claim, which appear relatively straightforward and uncomplicated. See Dkt. 20 No. 9 at 8 (“Plaintiff’s FAC contains plausible Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care 21 claims as to Defendant Shakiba sufficient to survive . . . sua sponte screening required by [22] 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2) and 1915A(b).”). Plaintiff, therefore, appears capable of 23 articulating and prosecuting his arguments pro se. 24 Lastly, pro se litigants are afforded some leniency to compensate for their lack of 25 legal training. “In civil rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must 26 construe the pleadings liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” 27 Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 757 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). This also 28 applies to motions. Bernhardt v. Los Angeles Cty., 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). 1 || Accordingly, the Court will take Plaintiff's pro se status into consideration when his filings 2 || are reviewed. 3 For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated there are 4 ||“‘exceptional circumstances” to warrant appointment of counsel. Plaintiff's Motion 1s, 5 || therefore, DENIED without prejudice. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 ||Dated: June 3, 2022 — ‘ Daud Teron, 9 Honorable Daniel E. Butcher United States Magistrate Judge