Langer v. Ralphs Grocery Company

[1] . [7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 |} CHRIS LANGER, Case No.: 20cv2497-JO-KSC 12 Plaintiff, [13] 14 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 15 || RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY, an | MUULUN SUR SUMMARY Ohio Corporation, and DOES 1-10, 16 Defendants. [20] 21 In this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Plaintiff Chris Langer anc 22 ||Defendant Ralphs Grocery Company filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Dkts. 14 23 ||16. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary 24 ||judgment and denies Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as moot. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 On October 26, 2020, Plaintiff Chris Langer commenced an action in state cour 27 alleging that three videos on Defendant’s websites did not contain closed captioning anc 28 ||thus violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Unruh Civil Right: 1 See Dkt. 1; 42 U.S.C. § 12101 ; Cal. Civ. Code § 51 . Plaintiff, who allegedly suffers 2 ||from permanent partial hearing loss, visited Defendant’s websites! in 2020 and identified 3 three videos without closed captions. Dkt. 1-2 9 10-11. Plaintiff claims that the lack ot 4 ||closed captions prevented him from fully understanding the videos, and that Defendant 5 |{thus denied him full and equal access to its websites in violation of the ADA. Id. □□ 156 Plaintiff also brings a state law claim under the Unruh Act, which provides that a 7 || violation of the ADA is also a violation of the Unruh Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 51 . On 8 || December 23, 2020, Defendant removed the action to this Court based on the Court’s 9 || original jurisdiction over Plaintiff's ADA claim. 10 On November 1, 2021, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 11 Dkts. 14, 16. Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot 12 establish the elements of an ADA claim, that Plaintiffs ADA claim is moot, and that 13 || Plaintiff's claim under the Unruh Act cannot survive without his ADA claim. See Dkt. 14. 14 |/In turn, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the grounds that there is no genuine 15 dispute of fact with respect to the elements of his ADA claim. See Dkt. 16. 16 Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW 17 Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 18 || Procedure if the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 19 || and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 20 (1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect 21 ||/the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); 22 || Freeman vy. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732 , 735 (9th Cir. 1997). A dispute as to a material fact is || genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the 24 ||nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-50 . [26] 27 || ———___—_28 ! Defendant’s websites at issue are ralphs.com and thekrogerco.com. □ 1 A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing 2 ||the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 . The moving 3 party can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates ar 4 |lessential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that th 5 ||nonmoving party failed to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case or 6 || which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial. Jd. at 322-23. The cour 7 ||must view all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the 8 ||nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 , 58% 9 ||(1986). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing o: 10 || legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] he [o: 11 is ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 . 12 Il. DISCUSSION 13 Plaintiff's ADA Claim Is Moot 14 Before reaching the merits of Plaintiffs claim, the Court first addresses the thresholc 15 |/issue of whether Plaintiff's ADA claim is moot. Plaintiff filed his ADA lawsuit based or 16 ||three videos on Defendant’s websites that did not contain closed captioning in 2020 17 || Dkt. 16-2 (“Pltfs. Contentions”) at 2; Dkt. 17-1 (“Pltfs. Resp. to Defs. Contentions”) at 218 ||3. The parties do not dispute that Defendant has since added closed captioning to two o 19 ||the videos and removed the third video from the relevant website. Id. Plaintiff argues tha 20 || his claim is not moot despite this remediation, because an injunction is necessary to preven 21 ||recurrences of the violation. See Dkt. 17 (“Langer’s Opposition”) at 15-18. 22 In an ADA case, a defendant can render a case moot by voluntarily remediating th: 23 || challenged conditions, as long as the behavior is not reasonably likely to recur. A claim i: 24 || moot “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally □□□□□□□□□□ 25 ||interest in the outcome.’” Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996 , 1011 (9th Cir. 2001 26 ||(citation omitted). Because the ADA only provides injunctive relief, a plaintiff's ADA 27 ||claim may be mooted where a defendant voluntarily remedies the challenged conditions 28 || Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2011) (“voluntary removal o: 1 |{alleged barriers prior to trial can have the effect of mooting a plaintiff's ADA claim”); 2 || Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1145 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (“[T]he fact the 3 |{alleged barrier has been remedied renders the issue moot.”). Although voluntary 4 ||remediation of allegedly noncompliant conditions can moot a case, the defendant “bears 5 formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior 6 |;could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw □□□□□□□ 7 Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000). “Reasonable expectation means something 8 ||more than ‘a mere physical or theoretical possibility.” Brach v. Newsom, 38 F.4th 6 , 14 9 Cir. 2022) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982)). As neither party 10 || disputes that Defendant has remediated the videos on its website, the Court turns to the 11 ||record to determine whether Defendant has met its burden on “reasonable expectation” of 12 |/recurrence. 13 To demonstrate that is it not likely to revert to its alleged wrongdoing, Defendant 14 submitted evidence that it already had a policy of captioning videos and has instituted a 15 system to ensure future compliance with its policy. On behalf of the company, Evette 16 || McKinney testified that Defendant has always had a policy of providing closed captioning 17 ||on its websites. Dkt. 14-2 (“McKinney Decl.”) J 4; Dkt. 14-3 (“Defs. Contentions”) at 118 ||2. After being notified that these videos did not have captions, Defendant added captions 19 ||to two of the videos and removed the third video. McKinney Decl. §§ 2, 5; Defs. 20 Contentions at 1-2. Defendant also submitted testimony that it reviewed the remaining 21 || videos on its sites for compliance with its policy, confirmed compliance, and implemented 22 ||practices for ensuring that future videos are reviewed for captioning prior to posting. 23 ||McKinney Decl. { 5-6; Defs. Contentions at 1-2. Coupled with testimony that the 24 ||company has received no other complaints about the lack of closed captioning, McKinney 25 ||Decl. J 3; Defs. Contentions at 2, this evidence suggests that the three videos were isolated 26 || oversights despite Defendant’s preexisting policy of captioning videos. 27 Plaintiff neither refutes Defendant’s testimony nor provides his own evidence 28 ||supporting any expectation of recurrent behavior. Plaintiff points to no additional 1 |/instances, past or current, of closed captioning violations by Defendant. See Pltfs 2 ||Contentions; Pltfs. Resp. to Defs. Contentions. No evidence in the record suggests tha 3 ||Defendant has a history of repeatedly posting uncaptioned videos or that Defendant i: 4 currently failing to comply with its own policy. Compare Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., 81¢ 5 ||F. Supp. 2d 831, 860-61 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (claim not moot where defendant was “no 6 |icurrently following its own access policies, and [had] a history of not doing so”), wit 7 || Lopez v. Garcia Apartments, LLC, 2014 WL 12696711 , at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2014 8 (claim moot where defendant had completed remediation and there was no evidence that i 9 would not comply in the future). Plaintiff merely expresses concern that there is nc 10 || guarantee that Defendant will continue to comply, but “the mere power to ‘reenact 11 ||challenged [policy] is not a sufficient basis on which a court can conclude that a reasonabl 12 ||expectation of recurrence exists.” White v. Bank of Am., N.A., 200 F. Supp. 3d 237 , 24! 13 ||(D.D.C. 2016) (citation omitted). Plaintiff's generalized concern, unsupported by 14 evidence, does not create a genuine dispute concerning the proof put forth by Defendan 15 || with respect to their ongoing policy to close caption its videos. 16 The Court therefore concludes that Defendant has met its heavy burden to show tha 17 || there is no reasonable expectation of recurrence and concludes on that basis that Plaintiff’: 18 || ADA claim is moot. 19 ||B. The Court Declines To Exercise Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff?s Remaining State Lav 20 Claim 21 Because Plaintiff's only federal claim is moot, the Court declines to exercis 22 supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claim. A district court “may 23 || decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over a state law claim if it “has dismissed al 24 |\claims over which it has original jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3); United Min 25 || Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“if the federal claims are dismissex 26 || before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims shoulc 27 || be dismissed as well”); Vogel v. Winchell’s Donut Houses Operating Co., 252 F. Supp. 3¢ 28 985-88 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (declining supplemental jurisdiction over Unruh Act clair I dismissing ADA claim). Here, the only claim that conferred original jurisdiction was 2 ||Plaintiff’s federal claim under the ADA. Now that Plaintiff's ADA claim is moot, the 3 || Court need not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claim 4 ||under the Unruh Act. 5 Furthermore, judicial economy does not weigh in favor of retaining jurisdiction over 6 || Plaintiff's Unruh Act claim. “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are 7 |/eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent 8 || jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point 9 || toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie10 || Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 , 350 n.7 (1988); see also Oliver, 654 F.3d at 911 11 || C‘‘judicial economy ... did not ‘tip in favor of retaining the state-law claims’ after the 12 ||dismissal of the ADA claim”) (citation omitted). Plaintiff argues that this Court should 13 || exercise its discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over his Unruh Act claim because 14 ||the parties and the Court have already dedicated substantial resources to this case. 15 || Plaintiff's Opposition at 22. The Court disagrees. The docket shows that the only activity 16 this case aside from the complaint, answer, and mandatory settlement conference before 17 ||the Magistrate Judge, are the instant motions for summary judgment before the Court. 18 || Plaintiff does not argue that the parties have conducted discovery, and the Court finds no 19 |/indication of discovery activity in the less than 30-page record on summary judgment, 20 || which consists of website screenshots. See Dkts. 16-21. Moreover, because □□□□□□□□□□□ 21 federal claim is moot, the Court has not addressed the merits of □□□□□□□□□□□ 22 || discrimination claims under the ADA or state law. See Dkt. 1. Given that only state law 23 ||issues remain, judicial economy favors sending this case back to state court where the case 24 || was originally filed. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs remaining state law claim 25 || without prejudice. 26 || /// 27 /// 28 || /// 1 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 2 For the reasons set out above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary 3 |{judgment [Dkt. 14] and DENIES Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as moot [Dkt. 4 1116]. [5] 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 / 8 || Dated: □ [292 9 Hon-Jinsook Ohta United States District Judge [15] 16 |}