Parker v. SDSU Police Dept (SDSUPD)

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 ROBERT L. PARKER, Case No.: 20cv661-LL-JLB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 13 v. ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT 14 VINCE DEQUITO, JONATHAN [ECF No. 58] BECERRA, and CARRIE HOGAN, [15] Defendants. [17] 18 This matter is before the Court on the Motion of Plaintiff Robert L. Parker to Alter 19 or Amend the Court’s Amended Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary 20 Judgment. ECF No. 58. The California Attorney General filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s 21 Motion [ECF No. 59] on behalf of Defendants Becerra, Dequito, and Hogan, and Plaintiff 22 filed a reply in support of his Motion [ECF No. 60]. The Court finds this matter suitable 23 for determination on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of 24 Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. Upon review of the parties’ 25 submissions and the applicable law, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Motion presents neither 26 newly discovered evidence nor an intervening change in law, and articulates no manifest 27 injustice or manifest error in this Court’s prior judgment. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion 28 is DENIED. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff originally filed this case on April 6, 2020, bringing civil rights claims 3 against current or former members of the San Diego State University Police Department, 4 arising from an incident at the San Diego State University Aztec Recreation Center 5 (“ARC”) on March 4, 2019. See ECF No. 1. After the Court granted a joint motion by the 6 parties to dismiss certain defendants and causes of action, the remaining claims against 7 Defendants Becerra, Dequito, and Hogan were federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 8 unlawful detention, arrest without probable cause, and false imprisonment in violation of 9 the Fourth Amendment, and state claims for negligence, violation of the Bane Act, and for 10 equitable relief. See ECF Nos. 1, 7. 11 The Court originally granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on March 12 28, 2022 [ECF No. 47], and the clerk issued a judgment that same day [ECF No. 48]. 13 Plaintiff subsequently moved to amend or correct the Court’s order [ECF No. 49], and the 14 Court vacated its prior order and reopened the case [ECF No. 53]. On June 10, 2022, the 15 Court issued an amended order granting summary judgment against Plaintiff [ECF No. 56], 16 and the Clerk issued judgment in accordance with that order [ECF No. 57]. Specifically, 17 the Court found that, based on the undisputed material facts on the record, that: (1) Plaintiff 18 could not show that his initial detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion or was 19 longer than necessary because he was detained as necessary to determine his identity and 20 gather basic facts [ECF No. 56 at 14]; (2) Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity 21 on Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claim because it was not clearly established that police may 22 not arrest a person under California Penal Code section 148(a)(1) for refusal to identify 23 themselves [id. at 20]; and that (3) Plaintiff’s claim for false imprisonment was not 24 cognizable because his unlawful detention and arrest claims failed [id. at 21]. The Court 25 declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on Plaintiff’s state claims after granting 26 summary judgment on his federal claims. Id. at 23 . 27 Plaintiff’s instant Motion contends that the Court incorrectly stated that Plaintiff’s 28 declaration was unsigned, improperly discussed an accusation that Plaintiff was under the 1 influence of alcohol, improperly presumed a specific chronological order of events, and 2 disputes the Court’s characterization of the facts and filings before the Court on 3 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See ECF No. 58. 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 Under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to have 6 the court amend its judgment within twenty-eight days after the entry of judgment. Fed. R. 7 Civ. P. 59(e). “In general, there are four basic grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion 8 may be granted: (1) if such motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact 9 upon which the judgment rests; (2) if such motion is necessary to present newly discovered 10 or previously unavailable evidence; (3) if such motion is necessary to prevent manifest 11 injustice; or (4) if the amendment is justified by an intervening change in controlling law.” 12 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing McDowell v. 13 Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253 , 1255 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam).1 A Rule 59(e) 14 motion “may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence 15 that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, [16] 554 U.S. 471 , 485 n.5 (citing 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 17 2810.1, pp. 127-128 (2d ed. 1995)). “Since specific grounds for a motion to amend or alter 18 are not listed in the rule, the district court enjoys considerable discretion in granting or 19 denying the motion.” McDowell, 197 F.3d at 1255 n.1 (internal citation omitted). But 20 amending a judgment after its entry remains “an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly 21 in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. 22 Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877 , 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citation and quotation marks 23 omitted). [25] 26 1 Additionally, the Civil Local Rules provide that any party moving for reconsideration 27 “present to the judge . . . an affidavit . . . setting forth . . . what new or different facts and circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown, upon such prior [28] 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Plaintiff’s Motion2 neither asserts that there has been an intervening change in the 3 controlling law nor that there is newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence. 4 Instead, Plaintiff asserts that the Court’s understanding of the facts and application of legal 5 standards is incorrect. Although there is no precise definition for what constitutes manifest 6 error or manifest injustice that would justify relief under a Rule 59(e) motion, the Ninth 7 Circuit looks to the clear error standard as instructive. See Ybarra v. McDaniel, 656 F.3d 8 984, 998 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A Rule 59(e) motion may be granted if . . . the district court 9 committed clear error or made an initial decision that was manifestly unjust[.]”); see also 10 Teamsters Local 617 Pension & Welfare Funds v. Apollo Grp., Inc., 282 F.R.D. 216 , 231 11 (D. Ariz. 2012) (explaining that courts routinely look to the “clearly erroneous” standard 12 invoked in the law of the case doctrine to inform their analysis of manifest or clear error in 13 Rule 59(e) motions). Under the clear error standard, it is insufficient to show “‘mere doubts 14 or disagreement about the wisdom of a prior decision.’” Teamsters Local 617, 282 F.R.D. 15 at 231 (quoting Campion v. Old Republic Home Prot. Co., No. 09-cv-748-JMA(NLS), [16] 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54104 , at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 20, 2011)). The error must be one 17 “that is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling 18 law or the credible evidence in the record.” Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted). 19 Plaintiff makes a number of arguments regarding the Court’s prior findings in ruling 20 on summary judgment in this case. Namely, Plaintiff argues that: (1) the Court’s discussion 21 of Plaintiff’s alleged alcohol use and chronology of events is prejudicial to Plaintiff; (2) [24] 2 Although Plaintiff’s Motion was timely filed within twenty-eight days after the entry of 25 the Court’s order and judgment, the Motion is procedurally faulty for failure to include an affidavit setting forth what new or different facts and circumstances are claimed to exist [26] which did not exist or were not shown at the time of this Court’s prior amended order 27 granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, as required by the Civil Local Rules. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1.i.1. Nevertheless, the Court considers the arguments presented. [28] 1 there are material disputes about the chronology as presented; (3) the Court incorrectly 2 found that there were reasonable grounds for Hogan to detain Plaintiff; (4) the Court 3 incorrectly applied the qualified immunity doctrine; and (5) the Court failed to consider 4 Plaintiff’s primary argument for denying the reopening of discovery. 5 The Court’s amended order granting summary judgment to Defendants found that 6 the undisputed material facts supported that there was reasonable and articulable suspicion 7 to support Plaintiff’s temporary detention for the purpose of verifying or dispelling that 8 suspicion. See United States v. Woods, 720 F.2d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Florida 9 v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)). Namely, that Plaintiff left the ARC after being 10 involved in an altercation, returned to the ARC, and approached Defendant Hogan, who 11 had responded to an alarm activated by ARC staff and informed Plaintiff that she was 12 investigating a reported altercation. These undisputed facts do not rely on the presumed 13 chronology which Plaintiff imputes to the Court’s reasoning, and the Plaintiff may not re14 hash arguments that were previously raised in his opposition to the motion for summary 15 judgment—and were considered by the Court—on a motion brought under 59(e). See 16 Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 485 n.5. 17 Plaintiff’s assertion that the Court erred in finding that Defendants were entitled to 18 qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claim is similarly unavailing. Although 19 the Court determined that the undisputed material facts did not support a finding that there 20 was probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest under section 148(a)(1) of the California Penal 21 Code, the question of whether Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity “rests on 22 different legal footing than the determination of the existence of probable cause to effect 23 an arrest.” Alexander v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315 , 1322 (9th Cir. 1995). “Officers 24 are entitled to qualified immunity even if they acted unconstitutionally, as long as a 25 reasonable officer could have believed the conduct lawful.” Id. Additionally, where a 26 Defendant affirmatively asserts qualified immunity as a defense, “[i]t is the plaintiff who 27 ‘bears the burden of showing that the rights allegedly violated were clearly established’” 28 Shafer v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing LSO, Ltd. v. 1 Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted). “If that burden 2 is satisfied, the defendant must prove that his conduct was ‘reasonable.’” LSO, Ltd., 205 3 F.3d at 1157 (citing Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278 , 4 1285 (9th Cir. 1994)). The Court’s prior order considered Plaintiff’s argument that he need 5 not identify any clearly established law to rebut Defendants’ assertion of qualified 6 immunity [see ECF No. 32 at 41-43] and found that qualified immunity barred Plaintiff’s 7 claims because he failed to carry his burden to identify clearly established law that was 8 violated by the Defendants’ actions [ECF No. 56 at 20]. 9 Plaintiff also seeks to relitigate his argument that discovery should be re-opened, 10 which the Court denied on the basis that Plaintiff was not diligent in seeking discovery 11 despite awareness of the video sought, access to Defendants’ expert before the close of 12 discovery, and opportunity to file a noticed motion to modify the scheduling order in this 13 case to allow additional time for discovery. See ECF Nos. 56 at 24; 58 at 8. As articulated 14 elsewhere in this Order, a Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to relitigate issues, and 15 Plaintiff has not provided any basis for revisiting the Court’s ruling except to express his 16 disagreement with the Court’s reasoning. 17 Finally, the Court notes that although Plaintiff correctly notes that the Court’s prior 18 order incorrectly stated that Plaintiff’s declaration was unsigned [ECF No. 56 at 16 n.7], 19 such error was harmless and provides no basis for amendment of the judgment because the 20 Court nevertheless gave sufficient weight to Plaintiff’s statements by stating that “the Court 21 will not rely on Plaintiff’s failure to sign this particular declaration because there is no 22 indication he would not make his factual assertions under oath” [id.]. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 61 (“[T]he court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party’s 24 substantial rights.”). Similarly, the Court’s citation to Plaintiff’s own allegations about 25 Defendants’ statements, regarding whether Plaintiff was under the influence of alcohol, did 26 not alter this Court’s analysis and the issue is therefore moot. See Tur v. YouTube, Inc., 562 27 F.3d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 2009) (“an issue is moot when deciding it would have no effect 28 within the confines of the case itself”). l Plaintiff has not asserted that there is any newly discovered or previously unavailable 2 || evidence, an intervening change in controlling case law, or alleged any grounds for finding 3 ||that this Court’s prior order granting summary judgment to Defendants was manifestly 4 || unjust or relied on manifest errors of fact or law that would justify amendment or alteration 5 || of the Court’s judgment in this case. Therefore, the Court has no basis to grant the instant 6 || Motion. 7 IV. CONCLUSION 8 For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or 9 || Amend the Court’s Amended Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 10 |] ECF No. 58. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 Dated: November 15, 2022 NO 13 Qe | 14 Honorable Linda Lopez 15 United States District Judge