Harris v. City of San Diego, San Diego Police Department

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 KEITH WARREN HARRIS, Case No.: 23cv739-LL-SBC 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 13 v. REMAND [ECF No. 5] 14 CITY OF SAN DIEGO, SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT AND OFFICER [15] CHAD LUCAS, [16] Defendants. [17] 18 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Keith Harris’ Motion to Remand. ECF 19 No. 5. Defendants, City of San Diego, San Diego Police Department and Officer Chad 20 Lucas, filed an Opposition [ECF No. 10]. The Motion is fully briefed, and the Court deems 21 it suitable for submission without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 22 GRANTS the Motion. 23 I. Background 24 Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this lawsuit in San Diego County Superior Court, 25 and the original complaint was filed on February 21, 2023. ECF No. 1-4. The original 26 complaint asserted eleven causes of action arising from an incident that Plaintiff alleges 27 resulted in him being unlawfully detained by Officer Lucas. Id. at ¶¶ 4-10. Defendants 28 subsequently removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 in light of 1 the “civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 , the Fourth Amendment, as well as a 2 Monell municipal liability claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 .” Notice of Removal at 3 ECF No. 1 at 2. On April 28, 2023, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion to 4 Strike Plaintiff’s Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(f). 5 ECF No. 3. Less than one month later, on May 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave 6 to Amend his Complaint and to Remand the Action to State Court. ECF No. 5. On May 7 22, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend and denied as moot the 8 pending Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike. ECF No. 6. Plaintiff filed his amended 9 complaint on the same day that the Court granted leave to amend. ECF No. 7. Plaintiff’s 10 First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges eleven causes of action like the original 11 complaint, but replaces the two federal causes of action from the original complaint with 12 state claims. Specifically, Plaintiff replaced the Monell municipal liability claim under 42 13 U.S.C. § 1983 with a claim for vicarious liability. ECF No. 7 at ¶¶ 61-63. Plaintiff’s FAC 14 also replaced the Fourth Amendment claim with a claim for Violation of California’s 15 Constitution Article I § 13. ECF No. 7 at ¶¶ 73-75. 16 II. Legal Standards 17 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power 18 authorized by Constitution and statute. . . .” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., [19] 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). It is “presume[d] that federal courts lack jurisdiction unless the 20 contrary appears affirmatively from the record.” Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991) 21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The right of removal is entirely a creature 22 of statute and a suit commenced in a state court must remain there until cause is shown for 23 its transfer under some act of Congress.” Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 24 U.S. 28 , 32 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The burden of 25 establishing federal jurisdiction is upon the party seeking removal. . . . ” Emrich v. Touche 26 Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988). Moreover, courts must “strictly construe 27 the removal statute against removal jurisdiction.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564 , 566 [28] 1 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as 2 to the right of removal in the first instance.” Id. 3 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 , this Court has original jurisdiction over civil actions 4 “arising under” federal law. “A case ‘arises under’ federal law either where federal law 5 creates the cause of action or ‘where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily 6 turn[s] on some construction of federal law.’” Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 7 F.3d 1086 , 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers 8 Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 , 8–9 (1983)). “The presence or absence of federal-question 9 jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal 10 jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's 11 properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 12 III. Discussion 13 A. Summary of Parties’ Arguments 14 Plaintiff argues that this case should be remanded because it “was originally filed in 15 State Court but mistakenly alleged two federal causes of action.” ECF No. 5 at 7. Plaintiff 16 further asserts that in light of the FAC, “this case no longer presents any federal question, 17 and the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. 18 Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand on the grounds that “Plaintiff’s 19 efforts are an unapologetic effort to forum shop.” ECF No. 10 at 3. Defendants 20 acknowledge in the Opposition that Plaintiff “substituted a claim under the California 21 Constitution for his existing Fourth Amendment claim” and that he “dismissed his Monell 22 claim in favor of an untethered vicarious liability claim under California Government Code 23 section 815.2(a).” Id. Notwithstanding these acknowledgements that Plaintiff’s federal 24 claims were amended and replaced with state claims, Defendants still argue that the “FAC 25 continues to allege multiple violations of federal rights and laws (ECF No. 7 at ¶¶ 28, 35, 26 41, 72).” ECF No. 10 at 3. In sum, Defendants argue that “[t]his Court should retain 27 supplemental jurisdiction over the action based on the continued invocation of federal 28 rights.” Id. 1 B. Analysis 2 As an initial matter, the court has an obligation where the plaintiff “is pro se, 3 particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 4 [plaintiff] the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342, n.7 (9th Cir. 5 2010) (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026 , 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)). Based on the 6 Court’s review of the FAC, it alleges only state law causes of action. Defendants have not 7 met their burden to show that the FAC still alleges multiple violations of federal rights. 8 The mere mention of federal laws in a paragraph of the complaint captioned as a state law 9 cause of action is not enough to convert that cause of action into a federal count. For 10 example, although the FAC references in Paragraph 28 “the federally protected rights of 11 others,” the cause of action raised by Plaintiff is for “intentional infliction of emotional 12 distress.” ECF No. 7. Similarly, the FAC states in Paragraph 35 that “Plaintiff’s civil rights 13 under State and Federal Law were violated,” but this was in the cause of action for “false 14 arrest and false imprisonment.” Id. It is quite clear that Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, 15 intended to advance only state law claims, notwithstanding passing mention of federal 16 statutes. 17 A plaintiff can make a tactical decision to abandon a federal claim after removal. 18 See generally Baddie v. Berkeley Farms, Inc., 64 F.3d 487, 389 (9th Cir. 1995). In Baddie 19 the plaintiffs “dismissed their federal claims and moved for remand with all due speed after 20 removal,” and the Court of Appeals explained there “was nothing manipulative about that 21 straight-forward tactical decision. . . .” Id. at 489 . Here, Plaintiff states in his Motion to 22 Remand that in his original complaint, he “mistakenly alleged two federal causes of 23 action.” ECF No. 5 at 7. Plaintiff’s FAC eliminates the two federal claims brought in the 24 original complaint (Monell claim and Fourth Amendment). Accordingly, the causes of 25 action on which the Court’s original jurisdiction rested are now gone. See Horne v. Wells 26 Fargo Bank, N.A., 969 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1209 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 27 Even though the court had original jurisdiction at the time of removal, the court finds 28 no basis for original jurisdiction over the First Amended Complaint, which prompts the 1 Court’s discretion under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3). A 2 district court may decline “supplemental jurisdiction over a claim…[if] the district court 3 has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction.” Id. This provision applies 4 where an amended pleading voluntarily eliminates the federal question. See Cal. Dep’t of 5 Water Res. v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008). “Under 1367(c)(3), the 6 [C]ourt can properly exercise its discretion to remand the supplemental state law claims.” 7 Horne, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1209-10 . In exercising this discretion, courts are instructed to 8 consider the factors of “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Sanford v. 9 MemberWorks, Inc. 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. 10 Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 11 715, 726 (1966). These factors weigh strongly in favor of remand where all federal claims 12 are dismissed before trial. See Horne, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1207-1208 ; 1210; see also Millar 13 v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (noting that 14 “[t]he factor of comity also weighs strongly in favor of remand” when “plaintiff now 15 proceeds exclusively on his state claims”); Bay Area Surgical Mgmt. v. United Healthcare 16 Ins. Co., 2012 WL 3235999 , *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2012) (court declined to exercise 17 supplemental jurisdiction and remanded the case “in the interests of judicial economy, 18 convenience, fairness, and comity,” when “the federal claims were eliminated at the 19 pleading phase”). This case is still in an early procedural posture, at the pleading phase, 20 and no discovery has been conducted to date. The Court finds that the balance of factors in 21 this case point toward declining jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is 22 GRANTED and the Court REMANDS the case to San Diego Superior Court. 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / l IV. Conclusion 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. 3 || IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 Dated: August 14, 2023 NO 5 Je J 6 Honorable Linda Lopez 5 United States District Judge