Guthrie v. Allison

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — — 6 — — 7 — — 8 — 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA — 11 — 12 IAN GUTHRIE, Case No.: 3:19-cv-1452-WQH-AHG Petitioner, 13 ORDER v. — 14 — 15 KATHLEEN ALLISON, Secretary of the California 16 Department of Corrections and 17 Rehabilitation, Respondent. — 18 — 19 HAYES, Judge: 20 The matters before the Court are the Report and Recommendation issued by 21 Magistrate Judge Allison H. Goddard (ECF No. 30) and the Reply (“Objection”) filed by 22 Petitioner Ian Guthrie (ECF No. 33). 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 On May 19, 2016, a jury found Petitioner guilty of first-degree murder on a theory 25 of either aiding and abetting or conspiracy in San Diego Superior Court.1 (ECF No. 1 at 1; — 26 — — 27 — 1 Petitioner was jointly tried for first-degree murder along with Dion Chambers, a/k/a Peter Johnson, on a — 28 — 1 Lodgment (“Lodg.”) 14-45 at 42.) On August 12, 2016, Petitioner was sentenced to a term 2 of 50 years to life plus an additional five years due to a serious prior felony enhancement. 3 (Lodg. 14-45 at 14.) 4 Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal. (ECF No. 145 37.) On February 5, 2019, the Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction.2 (ECF No. 6 14-45.) On April 10, 2019, the Supreme Court of California summarily denied the petition 7 for review. (ECF No. 14-47.) Petitioner did not seek collateral relief in the state courts. 8 On August 1, 2019, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a 9 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . (ECF No. 10 1.) Petitioner challenges his first-degree murder conviction on five grounds: (1) Petitioner’s 11 statements to the police were erroneously admitted in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 12 U.S. 436 (1966); (2) the case against Petitioner was insufficient as a matter of due process; 13 (3) the trial court erred in admitting the uncharged offenses of identity fraud and illegal 14 immigration due to the risk of unfair prejudice; (4) the trial court erred in admitting 15 irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial rap lyrics; and (5) the cumulative effect of the errors 16 denied Petitioner due process. (See ECF No. 1 at 6–9.) 17 On March 19, 2020, Respondent filed an Answer. (ECF No. 13.) 18 On June 11, 2021, Petitioner filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 26.) 19 On June 22, 2023, Judge Goddard issued a Report and Recommendation, 20 recommending that the Court deny the Petition. (ECF No. 30.) In the Report and — 21 — — 22 — 23 14-45 at 3, 42.) On Petitioner’s verdict form, the jury was not required to specify whether it reached a guilty verdict based on the theory that Petitioner aided and abetted the murder or was a conspirator to the — 24 — murder, or both. See id. at 42 . Chambers was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 50 years 25 to life plus a consecutive life term after the jury found that Chambers intentionally and personally discharged a firearm during the commission of the murder, causing death. Id. at 14 . — 26 — 2 The California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction in its entirety but ordered the matter be 27 remanded to the Superior Court for the limited purpose of considering whether Petitioner’s serious prior felony enhancement should be stricken. (Lodg. 14-45 at 61.) On August 16, 2019, the Superior Court — 28 — 1 Recommendation, Judge Goddard first addressed Petitioner’s contention that the trial court 2 erred in denying his motion to suppress statements obtained in violation of his Miranda 3 rights. See id. at 9–19. Judge Goddard concluded, inter alia, that “the state court did not 4 unreasonably apply the principles of Miranda and its progeny in finding that Petitioner did 5 not unambiguously invoke his right to counsel during questioning by police.” Id. at 14 . 6 Second, with respect to Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence ground, Judge Goddard 7 concluded that there was no due process violation since a “rational trier of fact could have 8 found the elements of either aiding and abetting murder or conspiracy to commit murder 9 to have been met beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 24 . As to Petitioner’s third and fourth 10 grounds for relief, Judge Goddard also concluded they were without merit. She found that 11 Petitioner failed to show that admission of the illegal entry documents and rap lyrics “was 12 erroneous or that it was prejudicial to his case,” id. at 36 , or that “there was clearly 13 established federal law showing that admission of such evidence rendered the trial 14 fundamentally unfair in violation of due process.” Id. at 37 (quotations omitted) (citation 15 omitted). Finally, Judge Goddard recommended that the Court reject Petitioner’s claim of 16 cumulative prejudice, since “Petitioner has failed to establish any constitutional violation 17 in the first instance.” Id. at 38 . 18 On August 14, 2023, Petitioner filed an Objection to the Report and 19 Recommendation. (ECF No. 33.) In the Objection, Petitioner reiterated his contention that 20 the conviction was based on insufficient evidence. See id. at 1–2, 4–5. Petitioner also raised 21 an additional, unexhausted claim regarding instructional error. See id. at 3 . 22 II. LEGAL STANDARD 23 The duties of the district court in connection with a report and recommendation 24 issued by a magistrate judge are set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 25 U.S.C. § 636 (b). The district judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions 26 of the report … to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole 27 or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b). 28 The district court need not review those portions of a report and recommendation to which 1 neither party objects. See Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992 , 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005); 2 United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“Neither the 3 Constitution nor the [Federal Magistrates Act] requires a district judge to review, de novo, 4 findings and recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct.”). 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 In the Report and Recommendation, Judge Goddard correctly found that the Petition 7 is governed by the deferential standard of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 8 Act of 1996. (ECF No. 30 at 10.) Under this standard, a “petition cannot be granted unless 9 the state court decision is ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 10 established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ or ‘was 11 based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 12 the State court proceeding.’” Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th 13 Cir. 2006) (overruled on other grounds by Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 14 2010)) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)). 15 Where there is no “reasoned decision” from the state’s highest court, the Court 16 “looks through” to the last reasoned state court decision and presumes it provides the basis 17 for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 , 805– 18 06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” 19 federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine 20 whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 21 established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) 22 (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). 23 The Court has reviewed the Petition, the record, and the submissions of the parties. 24 The Court has also reviewed the Report and Recommendation, and has conducted a de 25 novo review of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which Petitioner has 26 objected. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 2 In ground two of his Petition, Petitioner contends that the evidence presented by the 3 prosecution was constitutionally insufficient. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) Specifically, Petitioner 4 contends that the case against him rested “almost entirely” on speculative and 5 circumstantial evidence. Id. In support of his argument, Petitioner notes that “not one law 6 enforcement officer could testify that Petitioner did any of the things the state claimed.” — 7 — Id. 8 In the Report and Recommendation, Judge Goddard concluded that the state court’s 9 denial of Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claim was not contrary to, nor an 10 unreasonable application, of federal law. (ECF No. 30 at 33.) Judge Goddard first stated 11 that, contrary to Petitioner’s contentions, reliance on circumstantial evidence “does not 12 render the guilty verdict constitutionally unsound.” Id. at 25. Additionally, Judge Goddard 13 summarized ample evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, including video footage from 14 the vicinity of the murder scene showing a man resembling Petitioner opening the trunk of 15 a car so that his co-conspirator could retrieve what appeared to be the murder weapon; cell 16 phone communications between Petitioner and other co-conspirators in the moments 17 before and after the murder; cell phone records placing Petitioner near the scene of the 18 murder; fake identification documents showing a link between Petitioner and co19 conspirators; and Petitioner’s own admission that he was in the vicinity of the murder scene 20 and in contact with the gunman on the day of the murder. See id. at 25–32. 21 In his Objection, the Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to meet its burden 22 of proof. (ECF No. 33 at 1–2, 4–5.) Petitioner contends that the cell phone records failed 23 to prove “what was being said on the phone call.” Id. at 2. Petitioner further contends that 24 the probative value of the video footage is weak because, during the investigation, police 25 misidentified him as a different man in the video “for a whole year.” Id. at 1. Petitioner 26 notes that a detective who watched the video footage “over and over was not able to put 27 Petitioner as the person” near the scene of the murder. Id. Finally, Petitioner highlights 28 certain statements made to the police that indicate Petitioner was not involved in the 1 murder, including a statement from the gunman who claimed “[he] [had] no accomplice.” 2 Id. at 2. 3 “A petitioner for a federal writ of habeas corpus faces a heavy burden when 4 challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used to obtain a state conviction on federal due 5 process grounds.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). A conviction is 6 supported by sufficient evidence if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 7 elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 319 8 (1979) (citation omitted). Here, the video footage, cell phone records, and evidence of 9 Petitioner’s relationship with the co-conspirators provide sufficient basis for a rational jury 10 to find guilt. While Petitioner contends that the video footage and cell tower records are 11 not a reliable basis for his conviction, and that statements made to the police reflect his 12 innocence, it is not the role of this Court to second-guess decisions made by the jury in 13 weighing the evidence. See id.; see also Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011) (“Jackson 14 v. Virgnia makes clear that it is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide 15 what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial.”). At this stage, the 16 Court “must view the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume 17 that the jury resolved any evidentiary conflicts in its favor.” Kyzar v. Ryan, 780 F.3d 940 , 18 943 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326 ). 19 As to Petitioner’s contention that a guilty verdict cannot rest on circumstantial 20 evidence, “circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to demonstrate a defendant’s 21 guilt.” United States v. Cordova Barajas, 360 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 2004). 22 Accordingly, even if the case against Petitioner rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, 23 the conviction would still be constitutionally sound. 24 After de novo review, the Court finds Judge Goddard correctly concluded that the 25 California Court of Appeal’s decision with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence was 26 not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 B. Instructional Error 2 In Petitioner’s Objection, Petitioner raises a new, unexhausted claim contending that 3 the trial court erred in giving a prejudicial jury instruction. (ECF No. 33 at 3.) Petitioner 4 contends that by inserting his name into California Criminal Jury Instruction 5 (“CALCRIM”) No. 416,3 California’s model jury instruction on evidence of uncharged 6 conspiracy, the Court “influence[d] the Jury to believe Petitioner was a conspirator in the 7 murder.” (ECF No. 33 at 3.) 8 1. Exhaustion 9 Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction or the 10 length of their confinement in state prison must first exhaust state judicial remedies. See — 11 — 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 , 133–34 (1987); see also 12 Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (“[A] state prisoner must normally exhaust — 13 — — 14 — 15 3 The relevant part of CALCRIM No. 416 states: — 16 — The People have presented evidence of a conspiracy. A member of a conspiracy is criminally 17 responsible for the acts or statements of any other member of the conspiracy done to help accomplish the goal of the conspiracy. — 18 — To prove that (the/a) defendant was a member of a conspiracy in this case, the People must prove 19 that: — 20 — 1. The defendant intended to agree and did agree with [one or more of] (the other defendant[s]/ 21 [or] <insert name[s] or description[s] of coparticipant[s]>) to commit <insert alleged crime[s]>; — 22 — 2. At the time of the agreement, the defendant and [one or more of] the other alleged member[s] 23 of the conspiracy intended that one or more of them would commit <insert alleged crime[s]>; — 24 — 3. (The/One of the) defendant[s][,] [or <insert name[s] or description[s] of coparticipant[s]>][,] 25 [or (both/all) of them] committed [at least one of] the following overt act[s] to accomplish <insert alleged crime[s]>: <insert the alleged overt acts>; — 26 — AND — 27 — 4. [At least one of these/This] overt act[s] was committed in California. — 28 — 1 available state judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas 2 corpus.”). “A petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion requirement if: (1) he has ‘fairly 3 presented’ his federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider it,” which 4 in this case is the California Supreme Court, “or (2) he demonstrates that no state remedy 5 remains available.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 6 “The burden of proving that a claim has been exhausted lies with the petitioner.” Matthews 7 v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997). 8 Here, Petitioner failed to raise the jury instruction claim in the California state courts, 9 and thus did not present the California Supreme Court with a fair opportunity to rule on the 10 merits of the claim. Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that there is no available state 11 remedy. Therefore, the claim appears to be unexhausted. 12 When a petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims, a petitioner may 13 file a motion to stay the proceeding while he returns to state court to exhaust unexhausted 14 claims. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 , 275–76 (2005). However, this “stay and 15 abeyance” procedure is “only appropriate when the district court determines there was 16 good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court.” Id. at 277 . 17 “[E]ven if a petitioner had good cause for that failure, the district court would abuse its 18 discretion if it were to grant him a stay when his unexhausted claims are plainly meritless.” — 19 — Id. The Court finds that the “stay and abeyance” procedure is not available as to Petitioner’s 20 instructional error argument because Petitioner has failed to show there was “good cause 21 for that failure [to exhaust]” and this unexhausted claim is “plainly meritless,” as discussed 22 below. Id. 23 2. Merits 24 Petitioner contends that the trial court’s adaptation of CALCRIM No. 416 negated 25 the presumption of innocence because it included his name (Ian Guthrie) within one of the 26 elements of conspiracy, thereby “influencing the jury to believe Petitioner is … [a] 27 conspirator in the murder.” (ECF No. 33 at 3.) The adapted instruction stated: “To prove 28 that defendant was a member of a conspiracy in this case, the People must prove that: … 1 3. Dion Chambers, Ian Guthrie, and other unknown co-conspirators committed at least one 2 of the following overt acts to accomplish the murder[.]” (Lodg. 14-8 at 5.) The jury 3 instruction then went on to list the overt acts necessary to establish conspiracy. See id. at 4 5–6. 5 A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a 6 claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 7 62 , 71–72 (1991). To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, the 8 petitioner must show that the “ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the 9 resulting conviction violates due process.” Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973). 10 An instructional error will give rise to a due process violation where the jury instruction 11 fails to “give effect to the prosecutor’s burden of proving every element of the crime 12 charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” Townsend v. Knowles, 562 F.3d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir. 13 2009) (citing Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 422 , 437 (2004)). When determining whether 14 a jury instruction lowers the burden of proof, “[a] single jury instruction … may not be 15 judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.” 16 Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146–47. 17 Here, the disputed jury instruction does not alter the presumption of innocence, as 18 Petitioner claims. Although the trial court’s adaptation of CALCRIM No. 416 refers to 19 Petitioner by name—which is consistent with the directions in the model instruction—it 20 states that the prosecution “must prove” that Petitioner (or a co-conspirator) committed an 21 overt act necessary to establish conspiracy. (Lodg. 14-8 at 5.) The jury was further 22 instructed, in the trial court’s adaptation of CALCRIM No. 220, that a “defendant in a 23 criminal case is presumed to be innocent” and this “presumption requires that the People 24 prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Lodg. 14-7 at 56.) When read 25 together, the instructions permitted the jury to find Petitioner guilty of conspiracy to 26 commit first-degree murder only if the prosecution proved all of the elements of conspiracy 27 beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution was thus not relieved of its burden of proof or — 28 — 1 the presumption of innocence, and Petitioner’s claim is “plainly meritless.” Rhines, 544 2 U.S. at 277. 3 Accordingly, the Court overrules Petitioner’s objections with respect to sufficiency 4 of the evidence and instructional error. After conducting a review of the Report and 5 Recommendation, the Court finds it correct and adopts the Report and Recommendation 6 in its entirety. The Petition is denied. 7 IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 8 “The district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a 9 final order adverse to the applicant.” Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 11(a), 28 10 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254. “A certificate of appealability should issue if ‘reasonable jurists 11 could debate whether’ (1) the district court’s assessment of the claim was debatable or 12 wrong; or (2) the issue presented is ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 13 further.’” Shoemaker v. Taylor, 730 F.3d 778, 790 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Slack v. 14 McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 15 The Court concludes a certificate of appealability should issue in this instance as to 16 ground one because reasonable jurists could find debatable the correctness of the Court’s 17 ruling concerning whether Petitioner’s statements to the police were erroneously admitted 18 in violation of his Miranda rights. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484 . The Court finds that issuing 19 a certificate of appealability is not appropriate as to the remainder of the issues presented 20 as reasonable jurists would not find debatable or incorrect the Court’s conclusions that 21 habeas relief is not warranted on grounds two through five and these claims do not deserve 22 encouragement to proceed further. 23 V. CONCLUSION 24 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 33) is 25 adopted in full. 26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Objection (ECF No. 30) is overruled. — 27 — — 28 — l IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 2 || 1) is denied. A Certificate of Appealability is granted as to ground one and is otherwise 3 || denied. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly. — 4 — 5 Dated: September 29, 2023 BE: eg Ze. A a 6 Hon, William Q. Hayes 7 United States District Court — 8 — — 9 — — 10 — — 11 — — 12 — — 13 — — 14 — — 15 — — 16 — — 17 — — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 — — 28 —