Bridge WF II CA Parkway Club, LLC v. Cabrera

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] BRIDGE WF II CA PARKWAY Case No. 23-cv-01617-BAS-DDL 11 CLUB, LLC, ORDER: 12 Plaintiff, (1) REMANDING ACTION FOR 13 v. LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION; 14 CYNTHIA CABRERA, AND 15 Defendant. (2) TERMINATING MOTION FOR 16 LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (ECF No. 2) [17] 18 On September 1, 2023, Defendant Cynthia Cabrera, proceeding pro se, removed 19 this matter to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . 20 (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.) On the same day, she filed a motion seeking leave to 21 proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 2.) 22 Courts address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction first, as “[t]he requirement 23 that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the nature and limits 24 of the judicial power of the United States and is ‘inflexible and without exception.’” Steel 25 Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 , 94–95 (1998) (quoting Mansfield, C. & 26 L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). “Federal courts are courts of limited 27 jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 28 “They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be 1 expanded by judicial decree.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “It is to be presumed that 2 a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary 3 rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see 4 also Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006). 5 Consistent with the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, the removal statute is 6 strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564 , 566 7 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Sygenta Crop Prot. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002); 8 O’Halloran v. Univ. of Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). “The ‘strong 9 presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden 10 of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 ; see also Nishimoto v. 11 Federman–Bachrach & Assoc., 903 F.2d 709 , 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990); O’Halloran, 856 12 F.2d at 1380. “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right 13 of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 . 14 It is well-established that “a district court’s duty to establish subject matter 15 jurisdiction is not contingent upon the parties’ arguments.” See United Inv’rs Life Ins. 16 Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004). Courts may consider the 17 issue sua sponte. Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139 , 1149 n.8 (9th Cir. 1984). 18 Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “district courts have an ‘independent 19 obligation to address subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte.’” Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas 20 Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 593 (2004) (quoting United States v. S. Cal. Edison 21 Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 964, 972 (E.D. Cal. 2004)). 22 Here, Defendant seeks to remove this action from state court based upon federal 23 question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . Section 1331 provides that “district courts 24 shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or 25 treaties of the United States.” “[T]he presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction 26 is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction 27 exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly 28 pleaded complaint.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (quoting 1 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). A federal “defense is not part of 2 a plaintiff’s properly pleaded statement of his or her claim.” Id. (citing Metropolitan Life 3 Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987)). A case, therefore, may not be removed to 4 federal court based on a federal defense “even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s 5 complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at 6 issue in the case.” Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust 7 for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 14 (1983); see also Rivet, 522 U.S. at 475 . 8 The case removed here is a residential unlawful detainer action. (Complaint – 9 Unlawful Detainer, Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1-2.) Therefore, the action arises 10 exclusively under California state law. Nonetheless, Defendant argues that federal 11 question exists because Plaintiff allegedly did not comply with the “Protecting Tenants at 12 Foreclosure Act of 2009” (“PTFA”) and did not “state a cause of action under the PTFA,” 13 but should have done so. (Notice of Removal ¶¶ 5–7.) 14 This showing is unpersuasive. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not raise a federal issue; 15 rather, Defendant argues Plaintiff should have raised the PTFA in its pleading. Even if 16 this was so, the plaintiff is “the master of [its] complaint” and may “avoid federal 17 jurisdiction by relying exclusively on state law.” Balcorta v. Twentieth Century–Fox 18 Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000). The PTFA, nor any other federal 19 statute, is part of Plaintiff’s Complaint. As such, this Court lacks federal question 20 jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint rule. See Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. 21 Forteza, No. CV 12-1561 CAS (EX), 2012 WL 12897033 , at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 22 2012) (“A defendant’s attempt at creating federal subject matter jurisdiction by adding 23 claims or defenses to a notice of removal must fail.”) (citing McAtee v. Capital One, 24 F.S.B., 479 F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 2007))). 25 Accordingly, Defendant has failed to meet her burden of establishing this Court’s 26 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . Therefore, this Court REMANDS this action to the 27 San Diego Superior Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 28 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks 1 ||subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”’). Further, because the Court 2 |\lacks jurisdiction over this case, the Court TERMINATES Defendant’s motion to 3 ||proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2). 4 In addition, the Court warns Defendant that any further attempt to remove 5 ||this action without an “objectively reasonable basis for removal” may result in an 6 |jaward of attorneys’ fees for Plaintiff. See Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 7 136 (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c); see also Wells Fargo Bank Nat’! Ass’n v. Vann, 8 |INo. 13—cv—-01148-YGR, 2013 WL 1856711 , at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2013) (awarding 9 |{$5,000.00 in attorneys’ fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c) following defendant’s third 10 |jattempt to remove unlawful detainer action despite the court’s two prior orders remanding 11 ||the action). 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 f 14 || DATED: October 4, 2023 (pil 4 (Lyphaa. 6 15 United States District Judge