Armstrong v. County of San Diego

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 ARCHIE TYRELL ARMSTRONG, Case No.: 3:23-cv-1684-CAB-DDL Inmate Booking No. 23705591, [12] ORDER DISMISSING FIRST Plaintiff, 13 AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR vs. FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM [14] PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2) 15 & 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; CITY OF [16] SAN DIEGO; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; 17 SAN DIEGO DISTRICT ATTTORNEY, 18 Defendants. [22] 23 I. Procedural History 24 On September 7, 2023, Archie Tyrell Armstrong (“Plaintiff”), currently housed at 25 the George Bailey Detention Facility (“GBDF”) located in San Diego, California and 26 proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . (See Compl., 27 ECF No. 1). Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant 28 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a) (ECF No. 3). 1 On October 26, 2023, this Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but 2 simultaneously DISMISSED his Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 3 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2) and 1915A. (See Oct. 26, 2023 Order, ECF No. 5 at 7-8.) 4 Specifically, the Court found that Plaintiff was attempting to challenge the basis for his 5 current detention and ongoing state criminal proceedings. (See id. at 5 .) To the extent that 6 Plaintiff was requesting that this Court intervene in the state court’s proceedings, the Court 7 declined to do so finding that Younger abstention was appropriate. (See id. citing Younger 8 v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46, 53-54 (1971) (A federal court cannot interfere with ongoing 9 state criminal proceedings by granting injunctive relief absent a showing of the state’s bad 10 faith or harassment, or a showing that the statute challenged is “flagrantly and patently 11 violative of express constitutional prohibitions.”). In addition, the Court found that 12 Plaintiff failed to identify any specific Defendant whom he claimed violated his 13 constitutional rights. (See id. at 6 citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).) 14 Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint in order to correct the 15 deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. (See id. at 7.) On November 7, 16 2023, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (See ECF No. 6.) However, 17 for the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s FAC, once again, fails to 18 state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2) and 1915A. 19 II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) 20 A. Standard of Review 21 As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, because he is a prisoner and is 22 proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a 24 prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a 25 claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 26 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)); Rhodes v. 27 Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The 28 purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not 1 bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903 , 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) 2 (citation omitted). 3 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 4 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 5 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 6 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 7 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 8 applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 10 as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 11 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121 . 12 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 13 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 14 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 15 [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 16 experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 17 the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 18 standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 19 B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 20 “Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under 21 color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey, [22] 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive 23 rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” 24 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations 25 omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right 26 secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was 27 committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 28 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 1 C. Analysis 2 Plaintiff’s FAC contains no factual allegations and does not identify any specific 3 constitutional violations. Plaintiff does appear to allege that there are many problems with 4 the “criminal justice system” which “moves along at a great pace, with millions of cases 5 coming [and] going.” (FAC at 5.) He names as Defendants the County of San Diego, City 6 of San Diego, State of California, and the San Diego District Attorney. (See id. at 2.) 7 In his claim for relief, Plaintiff raises the issue of “false imprisonment” and seeks 8 $10,271,995.35 in compensatory damages and $10,231,995.35 in punitive damages. 9 Again, to the extent that Plaintiff is asking this Court to intervene with his ongoing state 10 court criminal proceedings, the Court declines to do so for the same reasons set forth in the 11 Court’s October 26, 2023 Order and finds that Younger abstention is still warranted. 12 Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, 53-54 . 13 If Plaintiff has since been convicted and is seeking relief from alleged “false 14 imprisonment,” there are two methods for state prisoners to raise complaints related to their 15 imprisonment in federal court. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) 16 (“Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment....”) 17 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)). In general, claims of constitutional 18 violations related to the “circumstances” of a prisoner’s confinement must be brought in a 19 civil rights action under Section 1983, see id., while constitutional challenges to the validity 20 or duration of a prisoner’s confinement which seek either “immediate release from prison” 21 or the “shortening of [a state prison] term” must be raised in a petition for federal habeas 22 corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or through appropriate state relief. Wilkinson v. Dotson, [23] 544 U.S. 74, 78-79 (2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Nettles v. 24 Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“The Court has long held that habeas 25 is the exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state prisoners that fall within the core of 26 habeas, and such claims may not be brought in a § 1983 action.”) (citing Dotson, 544 U.S. 27 at 81-82), cert. denied, (Jan. 9, 2017) (No. 16-6556). 28 To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief based on claims that he 1 has been falsely imprisoned, without first showing his conviction has already been 2 invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). 3 In Heck, the Supreme Court held: 4 in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions [5] whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence 6 invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by [7] executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 8 make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . A [9] claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or 10 sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. [11] 12 Id. at 486-87; Washington v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048 , 1054-55 13 (9th Cir. 2016). 14 “Suits challenging the validity of the prisoner’s continued incarceration lie within 15 ‘the heart of habeas corpus,’ whereas ‘a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner 16 who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the 17 fact or length of his custody.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003) 18 (emphasis added), quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498-99 (holding that a writ of habeas corpus 19 is “explicitly and historically designed” to provide a state prisoner with the “exclusive” 20 means to “attack the validity of his confinement” in federal court). 21 Because Plaintiff may be seeking damages based on an allegedly unlawful 22 conviction, he may not proceed pursuant to § 1983, unless that conviction and/or sentence 23 has already been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 ; Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 855 -56 24 (“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state 25 remedies has no cause of action under § 1983.’”), quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489 . 26 Thus, because Plaintiff does not claim to have already invalidated any conviction by 27 way of direct appeal, executive order, or through the issuance of either a state or federal 28 court writ of habeas corpus, Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 , his current FAC must be dismissed in 1 entirety for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(b)Gi) and § 1915A(b)(1). 3 Conclusion and Order 4 For the foregoing reasons, the Court: 5 DISMISSES Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint sua sponte and in its entirety 6 || based on his failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 7 1188 1915(e)(2)(B)1) and 1915A(b)(1); and the Court finds further amendment would be 8 futile. See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood, 759, F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) 9 |\(“‘Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of ... leave to amend.’”) 10 || (quoting Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995)). 11 The Clerk of Court is directed to close the file. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 || Dated: November 16, 2023 14 ( Op 15 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo United States District Judge [28] 9 oo