Bonilla v. People of the State of California

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — — 6 — — 7 — 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA — 10 — 11 Case No.: 3:24-cv-00681-JES-KSC STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA — 12 — CDCR #J-48500, ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL 13 ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PAY Plaintiff, FILING FEES REQUIRED BY — 14 — vs. 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (a) AND FOR 15 FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO — 16 — PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) 17 CALIFORNIA, 18 Defendant. — 19 — Plaintiff Steve Wayne Bonilla, currently incarcerated at California Medical Facility — 20 — in Vacaville, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint — 21 — (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff is a serial litigant, and — 22 — seeks to have his 1988 Alameda County criminal judgment and death sentence in Case — 23 — No. C-02-0636 MHP declared “void.” (See Compl. at 7.) Bonilla claims he was arrested — 24 — without probable cause and falsely imprisoned as the result of a malicious prosecution. — 25 — (Id. at 3.) — 26 — / / / — 27 — 1 I. Failure to Pay Filing Fee or Request IFP Status 2 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 3 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 4 $405. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (a). The action may proceed despite a failure to pay the entire 5 fee only if the Plaintiff seeks and the court grants him leave to proceed in forma pauperis 6 (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047 , 1051 7 (9th Cir. 2007); Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2023) 8 (“[W]here [an] IFP application is denied altogether, Plaintiff’s case [cannot] proceed 9 unless and until the fee[s] [a]re paid.”). 10 “While the previous version of the IFP statute granted courts the authority to waive 11 fees for any person ‘unable to pay[,]’ … the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act] 12 amended the IFP statute to include a carve-out for prisoners: under the current version of 13 the IFP statute, ‘if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the 14 prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.’” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767 15 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(1)). Section 1915(b) “provides a structured timeline for 16 collecting this fee.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(1)-(2)). 17 Therefore, to proceed IFP, prisoners must “submit[] an affidavit that includes a 18 statement of all assets [they] possess[,]” as well as “a “certified copy of the[ir] trust fund 19 account statement (or institutional equivalent) for … the 6-month period immediately 20 preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(1), (2). Using this financial 21 information, the court “shall assess and when funds exist, collect, … an initial partial 22 filing fee,” which is “calculated based on ‘the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s 23 account’ or ‘the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account’ over a 6-month term; 24 the remainder of the fee is to be paid in ‘monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding 25 month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account.” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767 (quoting 28 26 U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(1)–(2)); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015). 27 / / / 1 Bonilla has neither paid the $405 filing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (a) nor 2 submitted a properly supported Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a). 3 Therefore, his case cannot proceed. See Andrews, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 ; Hymas, 73 F.4th 4 at 765. 5 And while the Court would typically grant Bonilla leave to file an IFP Motion, he 6 has abused that privilege so many times in the past he is precluded from doing so now 7 unless he faced “imminent danger of serious physical injury” at the time of filing. 28 8 U.S.C. § 1915 (g). “A negative consequence that may impact a prisoner who files [] 9 frivolous complaint[s] is a restriction on his ability to file future cases without prepaying 10 filing fees.” Harris v. Mangum, 863, F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2017). Pursuant to 11 § 1915(g), a prisoner with three “strikes,” i.e., prior civil cases or appeals dismissed as 12 frivolous, malicious, or for failing to state a claim, “cannot proceed IFP.” Andrews v. 13 King, 398 F.3d 1113 , 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). Bonilla is one of those prisoners, and he 14 makes no plausible allegations of imminent danger here. See In re Steven Bonilla, 2012 15 WL 216401 , at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (noting Plaintiff’s litigation history in the 16 Northern District of California, including the dismissal of 34 pro se civil rights actions 17 between June 1 and October 31, 2011 alone, which were dismissed “because the 18 allegations in [his] complaints d[id] not state a claim for relief under § 1983.”); id. at *3 19 n.1 (“The Court recently informed Plaintiff that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (g), 20 he no longer qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil rights action.” (citing In 21 re Steven Bonilla, Nos. C 11-3180, et seq. CW (PR), Order of Dismissal at 6:23-7:19.)). 22 II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) 23 Even if Bonilla paid the full filing fee or were eligible to proceed IFP, however, 28 24 U.S.C. § 1915A, also enacted as part of the PLRA, requires sua sponte dismissal of 25 prisoner complaints like his, or any portions of them, which are “frivolous, malicious,” 26 those that “fail[ ] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or those that “seek[] 27 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 1 Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532 , 538‒39 (2015). Section 1915A(a) “mandates early 2 review—‘before docketing [] or [] as soon as practicable after docketing’—for all 3 complaints ‘in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or 4 employee of a governmental entity.’” Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 5 2016). The mandatory screening provisions of § 1915A apply to all prisoners, no matter 6 their fee status, who bring suit against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. See, 7 e.g., Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443 , 446‒47 (9th Cir. 2000). 8 “On review, the court shall … dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the 9 complaint,” if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 10 may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 11 relief.” Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dept. of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017) 12 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the 13 familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of 14 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). “The 15 purpose of § 1915A is to ‘ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not 16 bear the expense of responding.”’ Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903 , 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 17 2014) (citation omitted). 18 As noted above, Bonilla seeks to vacate his state criminal judgment pursuant to 42 19 U.S.C. § 1983 . He may not. For state prisoners wishing to challenge to the validity of a 20 criminal conviction or sentence, a habeas corpus action is the sole federal remedy. The 21 United States Supreme Court has long held that a § 1983 suit cannot be used as “a 22 collateral attack on [an individual’s] conviction[.]” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 , 484 23 (1994). Heck and its progeny reaffirm that “a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 24 1983 action to challenge ‘the fact or duration of his confinement.’” Wilkinson v. Dotson, — 25 — 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)). Simply 26 put, “[r]elease from penal custody is not an available remedy under the Civil Rights Act.” 27 Preiser, 411 U.S. at 479 ; Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 1 || “[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy to attack the legality of [a] conviction or 2 ||sentence....”); Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (“There is no 3 || question that Heck bars ... claims that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest ... and 4 || brought unfounded criminal charges.”’). 5 For these reasons, the Court finds that Bonilla’s Complaint also fails to state a 6 ||claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted and is therefore subject to sua sponte 7 || dismissal without leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). See Washington 8 || v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that a 9 || § 1983 complaint barred by Heck may be dismissed for failure to state a claim when the 10 || pleading as a whole “present[s] an ‘obvious bar to securing relief.’’’). “[T]he PLRA 11 |/expressly authorize[s] the district court to dismiss [a] complaint [barred by Heck] for 12 || failure to state a claim at any time even when ... the legal basis for the dismissal [is 13 ||raised] o[n] its own accord.” Hebrard v. Nofziger, 90 F.4th 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 2024). 14 || Dismissal of the complaint without leave to amend is appropriate if, as is true in Bonilla’s 15 || case, “amendment would be futile.” Carrico v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 16 || 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). 17 Conclusion and Order 18 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this civil action based on Plaintiffs failure to 19 || pay the $405 civil filing and administrative fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (a) and for 20 || failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 21 1915A(b)(1). Leave to amend is DENIED and the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to 22 close the file. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 ||Dated: April 19, 2024 “i 95 Soar Sur], . 26 United States District Judge — 27 — «