Great Western Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Harris

Mr. Justice Day, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. The theory of the complainant’s case seems to be that the transfers of the stock of the defendant and other directors and stockholders, paid for out of the proceeds of the bonds, in view of the allegations of the bill as to the condition of the company and the purposes in view by the defendant and associates, amounted to a breach of duty upon the part of the defendant and other directors, and a conversion to their own use of the property of the company, for which they should be held to account in an action brought by the company through its receiver, under the order of the Circuit Court of Kentucky. The particulars of the suit in which the receiver was appointed are not very fully set forth, but enough appears to show that he *574 was appointed in a suit to adjudicate and enforce liens and subject the property to the payment of the claims of creditors. In the brief of the learned counsel for complainant, it is styled a “general creditors’ and foreclosure suit.” It does not appear that by order of the court or otherwise there has been any conveyance of the property and assets of the company to the receiver, nor has the corporation been dissolved, and the receiver made ait-s successor, entitled to its property and assets. The minute books of the company in evidence do not show any authority by the corporation for the filing of this bill in the name of the Great Western Mining and Manufacturing Company or otherwise, although meetings were held after the appointment of the receiver. Nor is our attention called to any statute vesting the title ©f the corporation in the receiver. So far, then, as the receiver is concerned, his right to prosecute the action .must depend upon his powers as such officer of the court and the order of the court, set forth in the statement of facts, authorizing him to bring suit against the stockholders and directors for the purpose of realizing the assets, either in his own name or that of the corporation, as may be proper. This condition of the record brings up for consideration at the threshold of this case the question of the extent of the power of the receiver to maintain this action under the order of the court, either in his own name or that of the company. As to the power of the court to authorize the receiver to sue, we think the case is ruled by Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322, 338, in which case the authority of the court to authorize a receiver appointed in one jurisdiction to sue in a foreign jurisdiction was the subject of very full consideration. In that case it was held that a receiver is an officer of the court which appoints him, and, in the absence of some conveyance or statute vesting the property of the debtor in him, he can not sue in courts of a foreign jurisdiction upon the order of the court which appointed him, to recover the property of the debtor. While that case was decided in 1854, its authority has been frequently recognized in this court, and as late as Hale v. Allinson, *575 188 U. S. 56, it was said by Mr. Justice Peckham, who delivered the opinion of the court: “We do not think anything has been said or decided in this court which destroys or limits the controlling authority of that case.” In that case the following language, as to a receiver’s powers, from Booth v. Clark, supra, is quoted with approval: “He has no extraterritorial power of official action; none which the court appointing him can confer, with authority to enable him to go into a foreign jurisdiction to take possession of the debtor’s property; none which can give him, upon the principle of comity, a privilege to sue in a foreign court or another jurisdiction, as the judgment creditor himself might have done, where his debtor may be amenable to the tribunal which the creditor may seek.” Mr. Justice Wayne, who delivered the opinion of the court in Booth v. Clark, stated, among others, the following reasons for refusing to recognize the powers of a receiver in foreign jurisdictions: “We think that a receiver could not be admitted to the comity extended to judgment creditors, without an entire departure from chancery proceedings, as to the manner of his appointment, the securities which are taken from him for the performance of his duties, and the direction which the court has over him in the collection of the estate of the debtor, and the application and distribution of them. If he seeks to be recognized in another jurisdiction, it is to take the fund there out of it, without such court having any control of his subsequent action in respect to it, and without his having even official power to give security to the court, the aid of which he seeks, for his faithful conduct and official accountability. All that could be done upon such an application from a receiver, according to chancery practice, would be to transfer him from the locality of his appointment to' that where he asks to be recognized, for the execution of his trust in the last, under the coercive ability of that court; and that it would be *576 difficult tó do, where it may be asked to be done, without the court exercising its province to. determine whether the suitor,. or another person within its jurisdiction, was the proper person to act as receiver.” It will thus be seen that the decision in Booth v. Clark rests upon the principle that the receiver’s right to sue in a foreign jurisdiction is not recognized upon principles of comity, and the court of his appointment can clothe him with no power to exercise his official duties beyond its jurisdiction. The ground of this conclusion is that every jurisdiction, in which it is sought by means of a receiver to subject property to the. control of the court, has the right and power to determine for itself who thé receiver shall be, and to make such distribution of the funds realized within its own jurisdiction as will protect the rights of local parties interested therein, ánd not permit a foreign court to prejudice the rights of local creditors by removing assets from the local jurisdiction without an order of the court or its approval as to the officer who shall act in the holding and distribution of the property recovered. In Quincy &c. Railroad Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 82, the powers of a receiver were under consideration, and the following language was quoted with approval (p. 98): “The ordinary chancery receiver, such as we have in this case, is clothed with no estaté in the property, but is a mere custodian of it for the court; and, by special authority, may become an officer of the court to effect a sale of the property, if that be deemed necessary for the benefit of the parties concerned.” There are exceptional cases, such as Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U. S. 222, in which the entire property of the insolvent company was vested in the superintendent of insurance of thé State, where his authority did not come from the decree of the court, and his right to sue was maintained. In Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U. S. 319, it appeared that G|enn had derived title by assignment and deed and he was permitted to sue. In the case now before us it docs not appear that the receiver had any other title to the assets and property of the company than that derived from *577 his official relation thereto as receiver under the order of the court. In such a case we think the doctrine of Booth v. Clark is fully applicable. It is doubtless because of the doctrine therein declared that the practice has become general in the courts of the United States, where the property of a corporation is situated in more than one jurisdiction, to appoint ancillary receivers of the property in such separate jurisdictions. It is true that the ancillary receiverships are generally conducted in harmony with the court of original jurisdiction, but such receivers are appointed with a view of vesting control of property rights in the court in whose jurisdiction they are located. If the powers of a chancery receiver in the Federal courts should be extended so as to authorize suits beyond the jurisdiction of the court appointing him, to recover property in foreign jurisdictions, such enlargement of authority should come from legislative and. not judicial action. Nor do we think the jurisdiction is established because the action is authorized to be instituted by the receiver in the name of the corporation. Such actions subjecting local assets to a foreign jurisdiction and to a foreign receivership would come within the reasoning of Booth v. Clark. If a recovery be had, although in the name of the corporation, the property would be turned over to the receiver, to be by him administered under the order of the court appointing him. It is urged that jurisdiction in this case is sustained by the case of Great Western Tel. Co. v. Purdy, 162 U. S. 329, in which it was held that the assets and affairs of an insol vent corporation being in the hands of a receiver, the eourt might direct the calls or assessments upon delinquent shareholders who had not paid for their shares, thereby using the authority the directors might have exercised before the appointment of the receiver. In that case, a receiver appointed by the Circuit Coürt of Cook County, in Illinois, under the direction of that court brought an action in the name of the. Great Western Telegraph Company, an Illinois corporation, by its receiver, against Purdy, a citizen of Iowa, to recover a sum alleged to *578 be due from him upon an assessment upon his stock subscription, and it was held that the Illinois court might make the assessment and calls necessary to collect the stock which would be binding in another court. The jurisdiction of the Iowa court was not called in question in the state court of Iowa, where the original action was brought, nor was the question of jurisdiction raised in this court, or passed upon in deciding the case. While not detracting from the authority of that case as to the . matter decided, we see nothing in it to indicate that had the question herein presented been made it would have been decided otherwise than herein indicated. There are numerous and conflicting decisions in the state courts as to the rights of a receiver to sue in a foreign jurisdiction upon principles of comity, which it is not necessary to review here. In this court, since the case of Booth v. Clark, supra, we deem the practice to be settled, and to limit a receiver, who derives his authority from his appointment as such, to actions, either in his own name, or that of an insolvent corporation, to such as may be authorized within the jurisdiction wherein he was appointed. We think the Circuit Court of Appeals was right in holding that the Circuit Court, had no jurisdiction of this action. This view of the case renders it unnecessary to consider the other questions made in the record. Decree affirmed. Mr. Justice Brewer concurs in the decree.