Lefranc v. Fuson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION EFRAN SANTIAGO LEFRANC Applicant, v. CASE NO. 8:23-cv-2569-SDM-AAS JUDGE ROBIN F. FUSON, Respondent. ____________________________________/ ORDER Lefranc files a copy of a letter addressed to the Honorable Robin F. Fuson, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Hillsborough County, which paper is best construed as an application under 28 U.S.C. § 1641 for the writ of mandamus. Lefranc complains that the state court should not rely on a 1988 sex offender charge from the State of California because he was “never found guilty of this charge . . . .” (Doc. 1 at 1) Lefranc neither moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis nor paid the full $402 filing fee. Nevertheless, under either 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e) (if proceeding in forma pauperis) or 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (if the full filing fee is paid), the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires a district court both to review the action and to dismiss the action if frivolous or malicious or for failing to state a claim upon “which relief may be granted.” Although Lefranc’s paper is entitled to a generous interpretation, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam), this pro se action lacks merit under this standard. To the extent that he requests this federal court to order Judge Fuson to decide a particular issue, Lefranc is advised that a federal court lacks jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to order a state agency, a state court, or the state’s judicial employees to perform a duty. Lamar v. 118th Judicial District Court of Texas, 440 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1971).1 See also Campbell v. Gersten, 394 F. App’x 654 (11th Cir. 2010)2 (“The district court also lacked authority to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the state court and its officers to reinstate his motions to vacate and consider those motions on the merits.”) (citing Lamar, 440 F.2d at 384); Lawrence v. Miami-Dade County State Att’y Office, 272 F. App’x 781, 781 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Because the only relief Lawrence sought was a writ of mandamus compelling action from state officials, not federal officials, the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief and did not err in dismissing the petition.”); Bailey v. Silberman, 226 F. App’x 922, 924 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Federal courts have no jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus directing a state court and its judicial officers in the performance of their duties where mandamus is the only relief sought.”). No authority exists to issue a writ of mandamus to Judge Fuson in this action. 1 Unless later superseded by Eleventh Circuit precedent, a Fifth Circuit decision issued before October 1, 1981, binds this court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 2 “Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. Rule 36-2. To the extent that he requests this federal court’s intervention into a criminal action pending in state court, Lefranc is advised that, because a federal court should almost always abstain from intrusion in a state proceeding, “the normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue such injunctions.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). Accord Lawrence v. Miami-Dade State Attorney, 272 F. App’x 781, 781-82 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[A] federal court may not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings except in the most extraordinary circumstances.”). Lefranc presents no compelling reason — or evena facially sufficient reason — to intervene in the state court proceeding. Lefranc’s paper (Doc. 1), construed as an application for a writ of mandamus, is DENIED. The clerk must enter a judgment against Lefranc and CLOSE this case. ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on November 29, 2023. STEVEND.MERRYDAY □□ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE -3-