Love v. Job North America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION RAYMOND LOVE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CV423-015 ) JOB NORTH AMERICA, and ) JOSEPH DUMOULIN, ) ) Defendants. ) ORDER Plaintiff Raymond Love filed a Complaint asserting a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Doc. 1. He seeks leave to procced in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Doc. 2. Because more financial information is needed, Plaintiff is DIRECTED to supplement his IFP request within 14 days from the date of entry of this Order. Although Plaintiff’s IFP application indicates that he does not currently have income, doc. 2 at 1, he left the entire second page of the IFP application blank except for the date and signature lines. Id. at 2. He did not respond to the IFP form’s prompts to disclose, e.g., the amount of money he has in cash or in a checking or savings account, assets, expenses, and debts. These omissions make it impossible for the Court to determine whether he is indigent. Wary of indigency claims where information appears to have been omitted, and cognizant of how easily one may consume a public resource with no financial skin in the game,1 this Court demands supplemental information from dubious IFP movants. See, e.g., Kareem v. Home Source Rental, 986 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Ga. 2013); Robbins v. Universal Music Grp., 2013 WL 1146865 at *1 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2013).2 To that end, it 1 “[A] litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public . . . lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). Courts thus deploy appropriate scrutiny. See Hobby v. Beneficial Mortg. Co. of Va., 2005 WL 5409003 , at *7 (E.D. Va. June 3, 2005) (debtor denied IFP status where, although she was unable to find employment as a substitute teacher, she had not shown she is unable to work and earn income in other ways); In re Fromal, 151 B.R. 733, 735 (E.D. Va. 1993) (denying IFP application where debtor was licensed attorney and accountant and she offered no reason why she cannot find employment), cited in In re Zow, 2013 WL 1405533 at *2 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 2013) (denying IFP to “highly educated” bankruptcy debtor who, inter alia, had “not shown he is physically unable to work or earn income in other ways.”); Nixon v. United Parcel Service, 2013 WL 1364107 at *12 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 3, 2013) (court examined income and expenses on long-form IFP affidavit and determined that plaintiff in fact had the ability to pay the court’s filing fee); Swain v. Colorado Tech. Univ., 2014 WL 3012730 at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ga. May 14, 2014). 2 See also Lister v. Dep’t of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1313 (10th Cir. 2005) (court did not abuse its discretion by denying status to Social Security benefits claimant seeking judicial review of Commissioner's benefits denial; claimant, after having been specifically instructed on how to establish IFP status, failed to fill out proper forms or otherwise provide court with requisite financial information); Mullins v. Barnhart, 2010 WL 1643581 at *1 (D. Kan. Mar, 30, 2010) (denying, after scrutinizing IFP affidavit’s financial data, leave to proceed IFP on financial ability grounds). tolerates no lies. Ross v. Fogam, 2011 WL 2516221 at *1 (S.D. Ga. June 23, 2011) (“Ross, a convicted criminal, chose to burden this Court with falsehoods, not honesty. The Court thus rejects Ross's show cause explanation, as it is clear that he purposefully chose to disguise his filing history and financial status.”); Johnson v. Chisolm, 2011 WL 3319872 at *1 n.3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2011) (“This Court does not hesitate to invoke dismissal and other sanctions against inmates who lie to or otherwise deceive this Court.”); see also Moss v. Premiere Credit of North America, LLC, 2013 WL 842515 (11th Cir. Mar. 6, 2013) (“Moss's [IFP on appeal] motion is denied because her allegation of poverty appears to be untrue in light of her financial affidavit and filings in the district court.”). Plaintiff’s application for IFP status omits material details. He, therefore, must clarify why he lacks the ability to meet his financial obligations for this case.3 3 Several important points must be underscored here: First, proceeding [IFP] in a civil case is a privilege or favor granted by the government. Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 198 , 113 S.Ct. 716 , 121 L.Ed.2d 656 (1993). Second, the statute reads that the court “may authorize the commencement” of an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(1). The grant, denial, or other decision concerning an [IFP] application requires the court to exercise discretion. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 , 112 S.Ct. 1728 , 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992); see also Lee v. McDonald's Corp., 231 F.3d 456, 458 (8th Cir. 2000) (explaining the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Providing this information will better illuminate Plaintiff’s true financial condition. He is therefore DIRECTED to file a supplemental application to proceed IFP within 14 days from the date of entry of this Order. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to include with this Order a copy of the long-form Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (AO239), and Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file his supplemental application using this long form. In completing the supplemental application, he must answer every question to the best of his ability. If he lacks the requested information, he should reflect the stating the decision of whether to grant or deny in [IFP] s status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is discretionary). Lafontaine v. Tobin, 2013 WL 4048571 at *1 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 9, 2013) (emphasis added); see also Marceaux v. Democratic Party, 79 F. App’x 185, 186 (6th Cir. 2003) (no abuse of discretion when court determined plaintiff could afford to pay the filing fee without undue hardship because he has no room and board expenses, owns a car, and spends the $250.00 earned each month selling plasma on completely discretionary items). Lafontaine also extended to non-prisoner IFP movants a pay-to-play, installment payment plan analogous to what Congress imposed upon prisoners under its Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which is expressed in statutory provisions like § 1915 (a)(1), (b)(1)(2). Lafontaine, 2013 WL 4048571 at *2; see also Kelner v. Harvin, 2010 WL 2817262 at *1 n.5 (D. Kan. July 16, 2010) (It has been held that the exhaustion, full/initial partial payment, and three-strikes provisions of the current [IFP] statutes do not apply to [IFP] litigants who are not prisoners. Nevertheless, several courts including the Tenth Circuit have applied this subsection which does not refer to prisoners, to suits brought by non prisoners.”). The Court is considering likewise here, since cost-free litigation too easily enables recreational, if not nuisance, litigation. That further necessitates more detailed financial data from the plaintiff. lack of knowledge in his response and provide his best estimation of the requested amount. Failure to comply with this Order may result in a recommendation that his case be dismissed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). SO ORDERED, this 20th day of January, 2023. CHRISTO fee L. RAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA