Frasch v. Moore

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. Section 8 of the act of February 9, 1893, c. 74, 27 Stat. 434, 436, provides: “That any final judgment or decree of the said Court of Appeals may be reexamined and affirmed, reversed, or modified by the Supreme Court of the United States, upon writ of error or appeal, in all causes in which the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the sum of five thousand dollars, in the same manner and under the same regulations as heretofore provided for in cases of writs of error on judgment or appeals from decrees rendered in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia; and also in cases, without regard to the sum or value of the matter in dispute, wherein is involved the validity of any patent or copyright, or in which is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of or an authority exercised under the United States.” The decision of the Court of Appéals sought to be reviewed in the present, case is not final, but merely ended an interlocutory stage of the controversy and- sent the applicant back to the Patent Office to conform to the meaning and effect of the rule on division of claims as construed by the Commissioner of Patents, and tp pursue the application in the form required to allowance or rejection. Section 780 of the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia reads thus: “The Supreme Court, sitting in banc, shall have jurisdiction of and shall hear and determine all appeals from the decisions of the Commissioner of Patents, in accordance with the provisions of sections forty-nine hundred and eleven to forty-nine hundred arid fifteen, inclusive, of Chapter one, Title LX, 'of the Revised Statutes, ‘Patents, Trade-marks, and'Copyrights.’” *8 Section 9 of the “Act to establish a Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, arid for other purposes,” approved February 9, 1893, c. 74, 27 Stat, 404, 436, is: “Sbo, 7. That the 'Jerf.rmraation of app; phi hum the decisions oí the Commissioner of' Patents, ;aow vosi/'-d hi the general term oí the Supremo Court of the District of CTrsimbia, m pursuance of the provisions of section seven, hundred and eighty of the .Devised Statutes of the United! States, relating to the District of Columbia, shall hereafter be and the same is hereby vested in the Court of Appeals created by this act; and in addition, any party aggrieved by a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in any interference case may appeal therefrom to said Court of Appeals.” Thus the special jurisdiction of the District Supreme Court in patent appeals was transferred to and vested in the Court of Appeals, and decisions in interference cases were also made ap-pealable, which had not been, previously the case. Rev. Stat. § 4911). The law applicable is § 4914, Rev, Stat., which provides: “The court, on petition, shall-hear and determine such appeal, and revise the decision appealed from in a summary way, on the evidence produced before the Commissioner, at such early and convenient time as the court may appoint; and the revision shall- be confined to the points set forth in the reasons of appeal.. After hearing the cage the court shall, return to the Commissioner a certificate of its proceedings and decision, which shall be entered of record in the Patent Office, and shall govern the further proceedings in. the case. But no opinion or decision! of the court in any such case shall preclude any person interested from the right to contest the validity of such patent in .any court wherein the same may be called in question.” By § 4915 a remedy by bill in equity is given where a pátent-is refused, and reads as follows: . “Sec. 4915. Whenever a patent on application is refused, either by the Commissioner of Patents or by the Supreme *9 Court of the District of Columbia upon appeal from the Commissioner, the applicant may have remedy by bill in equity; and the court having cognizance thereof, on notice to adverse parties and other due proceedings had, may adjudge that such applicant is entitled, according to law, to receive a patent for his invention, as specified in his claim, or for any part thereof, as the facts in the case may appear. And such adjudication, if it be in favor of the right of the applicant, shall authorize the Commissioner to issue such patent on the applicant filing in the Patent Office a copy of the adjudication, and otherwise complying with the requirements of law. In all cases, where there is no opposing party, a copy of the bill shall be served on the Commissioner; and all the expenses of the proceeding shall be paid by the applicant, whether the final decision is in his favor or not.” The final decision referred to is obviously the judicial de-cisión on the bill in equity, while in interference cases and in all others going up-from the Commissioner to the Court of Appeals there is no final judgment in the cause, but one interlocutory in its nature and binding only upon the Commissioner “to govern the further proceedings in thé case.” The opinion or decision of the court reviewing the Commissioner’s decision is not final, because it does not preclude any person interested from contesting the validity of the patent in court, and if the decision of the Commissioner grants the patent- that is the-end of. the matte/* as between the Government and the applicant; and lx he refuses It and the Court of Appeals sustains him, that is merely a qualified finality, for, as we have seen, the decision of that court may be challenged generally and a refusal of .potent may be reviewed and contested by bill as provided. The appeal giren to the Court of Appeals of the District from the decision of the Commissioner -“is not,” as Mr. Justice Matthews said in Butterworth v. Hoc, 112 U. S. 50, 60, “the exercise of'oidia&ry jurisdiction at law or in equity on the part of that court, but is one step in the statutory proceeding under; *10 the patent laws whereby that tribunal is interposed in aid of the Patent Office, though not subject to it. Its adjudication, though not binding upon any who choose by litigation in courts of general jurisdiction to question the validity of any patent thus awarded, is nevertheless conclusiye upon the Patent Office ■•itself, for, as the statute declares, Rev. Stat. §4914, 'it shall govern the further proceedings in the case.’ ” In Rousseau v. Browne, 21 App. D. C. 73, 80, which was an appeal from the Patent Office in the matter of an interference betweén two applications, the court affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Patents, ruling against one of the claims on the ground that priority of -invention must be awarded to the other claimant, declined to allow a writ of error or appeal, and said, through Chief Justice Alvey: ■ “There is no final judgment - of this court rendered in such cases, nor is there any such judgment required or authorized to be rendered, not even for costs .of the appeal. This court is simply required in such cases, after hearing and deciding the points as presented, instead of entering judgment here, to return to the Commissioner of Patents a certificate of the proceedings and decision of this court, to be entered of record in the Patent Office, to govern the further proceedings in the case. But it is declared by the statute that no opinion of this court in any such case shall preclude any person interested from the right to contest' the validity of any patent that may be granted by the Commissioner of- Patents.- Rev. Stat. §§ 780, 4914. . “There is no provision of any statute, within our knowledge, that authorizes1 a- writ of error or an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States in such case as the present. It would seem clear that the case is not within the purview of section 8 of the act of Congress of February 9, 18Ó3, providing for the establishment of this court. That section only applies •to cases where final judgments by this court have been entered, and not to decisions to be made and- certified to the Patent Office, under the special directions of the statute.” *11 We consider these observations as applicable to the present case, and the result is Appeal and writ of error dismissed,- and certiorari denied. Me. Justice White and Me. Justice McKenna dissent. Me. Justice Moody did not sit.