REXROAT v. BROWN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA TERRE HAUTE DIVISION BRANDON REXROAT, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) No. 2:20-cv-00280-JPH-MJD ) RICHARD BROWN, Superintendent, ) ) Respondent. ) Order Dismissing Action and Directing Entry of Final Judgment On June 1, 2020, Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) inmate Brandon Rexroat petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to vacate a prison disciplinary code conviction he received for an assault in disciplinary case number WVE 19-05-0008 on January 30, 2020. Dkt. 2. On initial review conducted pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, this Court noted that the IDOC sanctions imposed in the disciplinary matter had been vacated except for a $100 fine. Dkt. 6. Because Mr. Rexroat could not meet the custody requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a), the Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and ordered Mr. Rexroat to show cause why final judgment should not enter. Id. Mr. Rexroat responded and acknowledged that his disciplinary sanctions had been vacated except for a fine. Dkt. 7. However, he argues, the very fact of the conviction has placed him in segregation where he is unable to complete programs that could allow for an earlier release. Id. at 1 . Mr. Rexroat also argues that because of the nature of the disciplinary code violation (assault), he has become ineligible to have lost earned credit time restored. Id. Finally, he argues, because of this conviction he is less likely to obtain a sentence modification from the sentencing court. Id. at 2 . The Court is not unsympathetic to these arguments and understands how a simple nongrievous sanction could result in a decision extending an inmate's incarceration. However, each of the circumstances Mr. Rexroat describes that could or are likely to extend the length of his custody is acollateral effect, not a direct effect, of his disciplinary conviction. In a case concerning a criminal conviction, a collateral consequence that possibly extends the length of incarceration is sufficient to confer habeas corpus jurisdiction on a federal court. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-14 (1998); Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982); Tara Gold Res. Corp. v. S.E.C., 678 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 2012). But the same principle does not apply to prison discipline cases. Powell v. Galipeau, 808 F. App'x 386 , 387-88 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Spender, 523 U.S. at 7-16 ; Eichwedel v. Curry, 700 F.3d 275, 279 (7th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases)). The law is well-settled that potential collateral consequences are, as a general rule, simply too speculative to meet the custody requirement for habeas corpus actions. Eichwedel, 700 F.3d at 278 ; see also Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 611 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 custody requirement). These authorities unambiguously hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to consider Mr. Rexroat's petition challenging prison disciplinary case number WVE 19-05-0008. Therefore, this action is dismissed. Final judgment consistent with this Order shall now enter. SO ORDERED. Date: 10/9/2020 James Patrick Hanlon United States District Judge Southern District of Indiana Distribution: Brandon Rexroat 121033 Wabash Valley Correctional Facility - Inmate Mail/Parcels Electronic Service Participant – Court Only