McDonald (ID 113183) v. Peterson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS SEAN E. MCDONALD, Plaintiff, v. CASE NO. 22-3197-JWL-JPO HAZEL M. PETERSON, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE Plaintiff Sean E. McDonald is hereby required to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why his Complaint should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Complaint that are discussed herein. Plaintiff is also given an opportunity to file a proper amended complaint to cure the deficiencies. 1. Nature of the Matter before the Court Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights case. Plaintiff is incarcerated at the El Dorado Correctional Facility in El Dorado, Kansas (“EDCF”). Plaintiff alleges that his claims occurred at the Norton Correctional Facility (“NCF”), the Lansing Correctional Facility (“LCF”), and the Hutchinson Correctional Facility (“HCF”). Plaintiff alleges that when he returned to NCF from the Hays Medical Center in August 2020, Defendant Brown violated the mask order by failing to wear a mask. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Brown failed to wear a mask on September 3, 2021, at 11:05 am and 1:05 pm. (Doc. 1, at 8.) Plaintiff feels like Defendant Brown puts staff and inmates at risk. Plaintiff filed grievances and is unsatisfied with the responses he received. Id. at 8–9. Plaintiff also alleges that he had the same bed sheets from October 29, 2020, until November 12, 2020, despite being diagnosed with Covid on October 31, 2020. Id. at 9. Plaintiff alleges that he was told he would be transferred to the Covid-19 unit and LCF and he should take his bedding with him because he would not get any at LCF. Id. Plaintiff alleges that this violates KDHE guidelines providing that clothing and linens should be exchanged at least twice weekly and more frequently if soiled. Id. at 10. Plaintiff also alleges that his KOP (keep on person) medication was not transferred with him to LCF, in violation of policies. Id. He claims he was in the Covid-19 unit at LCF from November 1, 2020, until November 11, 2020, without his KOP or DOT medications. Id. at 11. Plaintiff is dissatisfied with the responses he received to his grievances, because Centurion lied and said he received his DOT medications while at LCF. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Nelson was negligent when she failed to answer inmates that were attempting to notify her that an inmate was exhibiting Covid-19 symptoms. Id. at 10– 11. Plaintiff also alleges that policies were ignored and he filed grievances regarding the denial of hand soap from 11 am to 7 pm on August 10, 2021; and regarding Defendant Gitchel’s improper screening of an officer who was exhibiting Covid symptoms and allowed to remain at the facility on November 7, 2020. Id. at 12–13; see also Doc. 1–11, at 3. Plaintiff names as defendants: Hazel M. Peterson, NCF Warden; Sara Beth Collins, NCF Deputy Warden; Brandon Gitchel, NCF Corrections Supervisor III; Tom Brown, Jr., NCF Corrections Counselor II; Christina A. Nelson, NCF Corrections Supervisor I; Shannon L. Meyer, LCF Warden; Jenny L. Braun, UTM; Brett K. Peterson, UTM; (fnu) McCullough, Centurion Health Services Administrator at LCF; Centurion of Kansas, LLC; Steven Wheeler, CEO, Centurion of Kansas, LLC; and Michele L. Sill, CO II at HCF. Plaintiff seeks $2 million in punitive damages. Doc. 1, at 7. II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)– (2). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570 . The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974 ). III. Discussion 1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 Any amended complaint must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff’s Complaint attaches 350 pages of exhibits and fails to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Plaintiff references the exhibits and expects the Court to wade through the exhibits to find support for his claims. The exhibits include his grievances and responses, and KDOC policies and contracts. Plaintiff must comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8’s pleading standards. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to comply with this rule. “It is sufficient, and indeed all that is permissible, if the complaint concisely states facts upon which relief can be granted upon any legally sustainable basis. Only a generalized statement of the facts from which the defendant may form a responsive pleading is necessary or permissible.” Frazier v. Ortiz, No. 06-1286, 2007 WL 10765 , at *2 (10th Cir. Jan. 3, 2007) (emphasis omitted) (quoting New Home Appliance Ctr., Inc. v. Thompson, 250 F.2d 881 , 883 (10th Cir. 1957)); see also D. Kan. Rule 9.1(f) (setting forth the requirements for a § 1983 complaint, including “a brief statement of the facts.”) 2. Grievance Responses Plaintiff acknowledges that a grievance procedure is in place and that he used it. Plaintiff’s claims relate to his dissatisfaction with responses to his grievances. The Tenth Circuit has held several times that there is no constitutional right to an administrative grievance system. Gray v. GEO Group, Inc., No. 17–6135, 2018 WL 1181098 , at *6 (10th Cir. March 6, 2018) (citations omitted); Von Hallcy v. Clements, 519 F. App’x 521 , 523–24 (10th Cir. 2013); Boyd v. Werholtz, 443 F. App’x 331, 332 (10th Cir. 2011); see also Watson v. Evans, Case No. 13–cv–3035–EFM, 2014 WL 7246800 , at *7 (D. Kan. Dec. 17, 2014) (failure to answer grievances does not violate constitutional rights or prove injury necessary to claim denial of access to courts); Strope v. Pettis, No. 03–3383–JAR, 2004 WL 2713084 , at *7 (D. Kan. Nov. 23, 2004) (alleged failure to investigate grievances does not amount to a constitutional violation); Baltoski v. Pretorius, 291 F. Supp. 2d 807, 811 (N.D. Ind. 2003) (finding that “[t]he right to petition the government for redress of grievances . . . does not guarantee a favorable response, or indeed any response, from state officials”). Plaintiff’s claims regarding the grievance process and the failure to properly respond to grievances are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. 3. Violations of Policies and Guidelines Plaintiff must state a federal constitutional violation and cannot rely on the violation of a KDOC policy or the Governor’s Executive Order. The violation of a prison regulation does not state a constitutional violation unless the prison official’s conduct “failed to conform to the constitutional standard.” Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1329 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding prisoner must establish that violation of a prison policy necessarily stated a constitutional violation). As the Tenth Circuit has stated: [N]o reasonable jurist could conclude that [a plaintiff’s] claim that prison officials deprived him of due process by violating internal prison regulations rises to the level of a due process violation. Prison regulations are “primarily designed to guide correctional officials in the administration of a prison [They are] not designed to confer rights on inmates….” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 , 48182, 115 S.Ct. 2293 , 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). Brown v. Wyoming Dept. of Corrections, 234 F. App’x 874, 878 (10th Cir. 2007). Likewise, state statutes do not provide a basis for liability under § 1983 which only protects rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. D.L. v. United Sch. Dist. No. 497, 596 F.3d 768, 776 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding that “Plaintiffs’ citations to Kansas case law to support their claim .. . is unavailing, as § 1983 affords a remedy for violations of federal law and does not ‘provide a basis for redressing violations of state law.’”) (citation omitted). 4. Personal Participation Plaintiff must also show how each named defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff cannot rely on the supervisory status of a defendant. An essential element of a civil rights claim against an individual is that person’s direct personal participation in the acts or inactions upon which the complaint is based. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); Henry v. Storey, 658 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2011) (“But § 1983 imposes liability for a defendant’s own actions—personal participation in the specific constitutional violation complained of is essential.”’) (citing Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416 , 142324 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.”) (citation omitted)); Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1228 (10th Cir. 2006) (“In order for liability to arise under § 1983, a defendant’s direct personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation . . . must be established.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). Conclusory allegations of involvement are not sufficient. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”). As a result, a plaintiff is required to name each defendant not only in the caption of the complaint, but again in the body of the complaint and to include in the body a description of the acts taken by each defendant that violated plaintiffs federal constitutional rights. Mere supervisory status is insufficient to create personal liability. Duffield v. Jackson, 545 F.3d 1234, 1239 (10th Cir. 2008) (supervisor status is not sufficient to create § 1983 liability). An official’s liability may not be predicated solely upon a theory of respondeat superior. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976); Gagan v. Norton, 35 F.3d 1473 , 1476 FN4 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1183 (1995). A plaintiff alleging supervisory liability must show “(1) the defendant promulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 960 (2011). “[T]he factors necessary to establish a [supervisor’s] § 1983 violation depend upon the constitutional provision at issue, including the state of mind required to establish a violation of that provision.” Id. at 1204 (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 ). To the extent that Plaintiff asserts Defendants’ personal involvement through their failures to respond as desired to his grievances about staff noncompliance with a mask policy, an allegation that an official denied a grievance or failed to respond to a grievance is not sufficient to show personal participation. See Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009)(A “denial of a grievance, by itself without any connection to the violation of constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff, does not establish personal participation under § 1983.”); see Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d 1322, 1328 (10th Cir. 2012). 5. Deliberate Indifference “Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to ‘provide humane conditions of confinement,’ including ‘tak[ing] reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of . . . inmates.’” Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1214 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 800 (2019) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quotation marks omitted)). To prevail on a failure to protect claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) ‘that the conditions of his incarceration present an objective substantial risk of serious harm’ and (2) ‘prison officials had subjective knowledge of the risk of harm,’ ‘[i]n other words, an official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’” Requena, 893 F.3d at 1214 (citation omitted). Plaintiff has failed to show that defendants disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety or that they were both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed, and also drew the inference. Although Plaintiff generally alleges that he informed Defendants through the grievance procedures that prison staff were not complying with the mask policy, he has not alleged any facts that, if true, would show that Defendants drew the inference that a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff existed and that they then disregarded that risk. Plaintiff’s claims suggest, at most, negligence, and are subject to dismissal. Plaintiff alleges that: a staff member failed to wear his mask on several occasion; Plaintiff’s bed linens were not changed for two weeks; his medication was not provided for 10 days during his transfer to another facility; he was denied soup on one occasion; a staff member did not respond to inmates’ attempts to reach her to notify her that an inmate was exhibiting Covid-19 symptoms on one occasion; and a staff member was allowed to work with Covid symptoms on one day that Plaintiff was not in the facility. Plaintiff’s claims suggest, at most, negligence. Claims under § 1983 may not be predicated on mere negligence. See Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1500 (10th Cir. 1992)(“negligence and gross negligence do not give rise to section 1983 liability”). A claim of simple negligence must be brought in state rather than federal court as it is not an adequate basis for claiming cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 6. Standing Another problem with Plaintiff’s Complaint is that he seems to be making allegations and claims on behalf of the inmate population in general. Plaintiff alleges that on November 7, 2021, a staff member was allowed to remain at work while exhibiting Covid-19 symptoms at NCF. According to his allegations in his Complaint, Plaintiff was at LCF during that timeframe. It is well-settled that a § 1983 claim must be based on the violation of Plaintiff’s personal rights and not the rights of someone else. Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 497 (10th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). To the extent Plaintiff raises claims on behalf of others, a review of the allegations contained in his Complaint indicates he lacks standing to do so. To have standing, a prisoner must state “specific facts connecting the allegedly unconstitutional conditions with his own experiences [in the prison], or indicat[e] how the conditions caused him injury.” Swoboda v. Dubach, 992 F.2d 286, 289 (10th Cir. 1993). “[G]eneral observations” about prison conditions are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . Id. at 289–90. Such general grievances are best addressed to the legislative, not the judicial, branch. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Sweetwater Cty. v. Geringer, 297 F.3d 1108, 1112 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). Such claims should be dismissed for lack of prudential standing. See, e.g., Whitington v. Ortiz, 307 F. App’x 179, 191 (10th Cir. 2009) (pro se prisoner plaintiff “lack[ed] standing to attempt to re-regulate the entire CDOC system, or to sue directly or indirectly on behalf of anyone but himself”); Martinez v. Mesa Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 69 F.3d 548 (Table), 1995 WL 640293 at *1 (10th Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (court is not empowered to decide “generalized grievances concerning prison management”). Plaintiff should keep these principles in mind when drafting his amended complaint. His claims will be considered only to the extent they allege a violation of his constitutional rights. 7. Relief Requested Plaintiffs seeks punitive damages, which “are available only for conduct which is ‘shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’” Searles, 251 F.3d at 879 (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). Plaintiff presents no plausible basis for a claim of punitive damages because he alleges no facts whatsoever establishing that any defendant acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages is subject to dismissal. Any request for compensatory damages would be barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), unless Plaintiff alleges a physical injury. Section 1997e(e) provides in pertinent part that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). IV. Response and/or Amended Complaint Required Plaintiff is required to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein. Plaintiff is also given the opportunity to file a complete and proper amended complaint upon court-approved forms that cures all the deficiencies discussed herein.1 Plaintiff is 1 To add claims, significant factual allegations, or change defendants, a plaintiff must submit a complete amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. An amended complaint is not simply an addendum to the original complaint, and instead completely supersedes it. Therefore, any claims or allegations not included in the amended complaint are no longer before the court. It follows that a plaintiff may not simply refer to an earlier pleading, and the amended complaint must contain all allegations and claims that a plaintiff intends to pursue in the action, including those to be retained from the original complaint. Plaintiff must write the number of this case (22-3197-JWL-JPO) at the top of the first page of his amended complaint and he must name every defendant in the caption of the amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff should also refer to each defendant again in the body of the amended complaint, where he must allege facts describing the unconstitutional acts taken by each defendant including dates, locations, and circumstances. Plaintiff must allege sufficient additional facts to show a federal constitutional violation. given time to file a complete and proper amended complaint in which he (1) raises only properly joined claims and defendants; (2) alleges sufficient facts to state a claim for a federal constitutional violation and show a cause of action in federal court; and (3) alleges sufficient facts to show personal participation by each named defendant. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Plaintiff is granted until December 16, 2022, in which to show good cause, in writing, to the Honorable John W. Lungstrum, United States District Judge, why Plaintiff’s Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is also granted until December 16, 2022, in which to file a complete and proper amended complaint to cure all the deficiencies discussed herein. The clerk is directed to send § 1983 forms and instructions to Plaintiff. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated November 14, 2022, in Kansas City, Kansas. S/ John W. Lungstrum JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE