Mitchell v. Goings

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA GATOR MITCHELL CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NUMBER: 20-1333 SGT. ROBERT GOINGS, ET AL. O RDER A ND RE ASON S SECTION: “R”(5) Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s “Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial” of the undersigned’s Order and Reasons of August 31, 2020 dismissing this matter as barred by the three strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. §1915 (g). (Rec. doc. 64). The motion is opposed. (Rec. docs. 66, 67, 68). For the reasons that follow, it is ordered that Plaintiff’s motion is denied. Motions for reconsideration are not recognized by the Federal RuLleasv eosfp eCreiv vil. PNriaogcerad uMrea cbhuitn ea r&e nTeovoelr Wthoelreksss, Itnoc b.e considered under Rules 54(b), 59, aobrr 6o0g.a ted on other th grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 910 F.2d 167 , 173 (5 Cir. 1C9a9s0tr)i,l lo v. American Home th Mortgaging Service, Inc. , 37 F.3d 1069 (5 Cir. 1994); , No. 09-CV-4369, 2010 WL 142439M8i tacth *e3l-l4 v .( EA.m Dic. aL aM. Autpura. l5 I, n2s0. 1C0o).. Rules 59 and 60, however, apply only to final judgments. , No. 14-CV-2766, 2015 WL 9488457 at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 30, 2015). Thus, when a party seeks reconsideration of anG ourldf eFrle tehta Tt iagdejru Adcicqautiessi tfioewn evr. Tthhaonm aal-lS oeaf tShhei pc lBaiumilds earmsong the parties, Rule 54(b) controls. , 282 F.R.D. 146, 152 (E.D. La. 2012). In the Eastern District, the general practice has been to evaluate Rule 54(b) motions to reconsider interlocutory orders undeIrd .the same stanCdaasrtdrsi lltohat govern Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend a final judgment. at 152 n. 40; , 2010 WL and courtsG uhlfa vFel eceotnsiderable discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny such a motion. , 282 F.R.D. at 152 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In exercising this discIrde.tion, courts must carefully balance the interests of justice with the need for finality. Courts in the Eastern District generally consider the following four factors in deciding a motion under the Rule 59(e) standard: 1) the motion is necessary to correct a manifest error of law or fact upon which the judgment is based; 2) the movant presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; 3) the motion is necessary in order to prevent manifest injustice; or 4) the motion is justified by an intervening change in cGounltfr Follelientg law. Castrillo , 282 F.R.D. at 152 -53 (citing , 2010 WL 1424398 at *4) Rule 59(e) serves the narrow purpAodsveo ocfa creo rIrnetc’lt,i nLgP m va. nHifoersitz oenrr oLrasb os,f Ilanwc. or fact or presenting newly discovered evidence. , 524 F.3d th 679, 691 (5 Cir. 2008). “’Manifest error’ is one that ‘is pGlauiyn va.n Cdr oinwdnis Epuqtuaibplme,e nant dC otrhpa.t amounts to a complete disregard of the cVoenntergoallsin-Hg elranwa.n’”d ez v. Sonolux Records , th 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5 Cir. 200)(quoting , 370 F.3d st 183, 195 (1 . Cir. 2004)). In the Fifth Circuit, altering, amending, or reconTseidmeprlientg va. jHuyddgrmoCenhte m“,… I nics. an extraordinary remedy that ceshrto. udlde nbieed used sparingly.” th , 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5 Cir.), , 543 U.S. 976 , 125 S.Ct. 411 (2004)(citations omitted). While district courts are vested with “… considerable discrCertaioinn ivn. Sdcehcliudminbge wrgheert Theerc htnoo glroagnyt Coor. deny a motion to alter a judgment,” denial is favored. , No. 15-CV-1777, 2016 WL 4508335 at *1 n. 9 (E. D. La. Aug. Hale v. Townley th 2016)(citing , 45 F.3d 914, 921 (5 Cir. 1995)). “When there exists no independent reason for reconsideration other than mere disagreement with a prior order, rBelyctohnes ivd. eOrfafsthioonr ei sS ear viwcea sVtees soefl s,j uLd.Li.cCi.al time and resources and should not be granted.” , 423 F.Supp.3d 299 , 304 (E.D. La. 2019). Plaintiff’s reliance on Rules 59(a) and 60 is unavailing here as no trial has been held in this case nor has a final judgment been entered that adjudicates all claims among the parties. Plaintiff argues that the Court’s previous order dismissing this matter was based on “… three faulty premise[s]”: 1) that he violiant efodr m28a pUa.Su.Cp.e r§i1s915 by bringing a case in federal court in which he attempted to proceed ; 2) that he sought pauper status in violation of 28 U.S.C. §1915 ; and 3) that he owes a filing fee because “… the party which is removed to federal court pays the filing fee on removal.” (Rec. docs. 64, p. 1; 64-2, p. 1). A casual reading of the Court’s opinion, however, reveals that iint fmoramdae pnaou psuercihs findings. The Court did not find that Plaintiff had attempted to proceed (“IFP”) in this forum, that he did so in violation of 28 U.S.C. §1915 , or that he, as the nonremoving party, is responsible for the filing fee upon this action being removed from state court to federal court. To the contrary, in the second paragraph of the Court’s opinion it noted that Plaintiff had originally filed this case IFP in the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court for the Parish of Washington. Under 28 U.S.C. §1450 , the order of the state court 1/ aDlelomwpisntge rP lva. inLtaifmf otora sko Ipnrso. cCeoe.d at the inception of this suit remains in full force and effect. , No. 20-CV-0095, 2020 WL 2197900 at *6-7 (E.D. La. May 6, 2020). In a slightly different context, various courts have found that 28 U.S.C. §1915 (e), 1/ In pertinent part, that statute provides that “[a]ll injunctions, orders, and other proceedings had in such another subsection of the pauper statute which allows for the dismissal of cases that are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which reliefP chailnli pbse v g. rCaitnyt eodf , Daaplplalises to lawsuits filed IFP in state court and removed to federal court. appeal dis’d , No. 14-CV-3131, 2015 WcLer t2. 3d3i3s’3d6 at *4 (N. D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2015), Tsuchiya v,. 6T4e4xa Fsed.Appx. th 368 (5 Cir. 2016), , ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 2119 (2017); , No. 14aCdVo-0p0te6d4, 2014 WL 1329127 at *1 (N. D. Tex. Mar. s5ee, a2l0s1o4 R)(uasntodn cva. sDeas llcaiste Cdo uthnetyrein), , 2014 WL 12859928 (N. D. Tex. Apr. 1, 2014); , No. a0p7p-CeVa-l 10d7is6’d, 2008 WL 958076 at *1-2 (N. D. Tceexr. t.A pdri.s ’9d, 2008)(and cases cited therein), th , 320 Fed.Appx. 262 (5 Cir.), , 558 U.S. 807 , 130 S.Ct. 267 (2009)(applying 28 U.S.C. §1915A to IFP case removed from state court to federal court). The Court can think of no principled reason why one subsection of the pauper statute would apply to prisoner lawsuits brought IFP in state court and later removed to federal court but another subsection of the same statute would not. The Court thus returns to the basis of its previous decision in this matter, whether §1915(g) applies to lawsuits that were originally filed IFP Hbayl eth ve. pCloalilnietriff in state court and thereafter removed to federal court by the defendant. In , 690 Fed.Appx. 247 th (5 Cir. 2017), a panel of the Fifth Circuit was called upon to address the appropriateness of a district court’s decision to dismiss a prisoner’s complaint under §1915(g) where the case had originally been filed IFP in state court and was removed to federal court by the defendants on the basis of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 . The panel ultimately vacated the decision of the district court and remanded the matter for further consideration not because §1915(g) does not apply to prison lawsuits that were brought IFP in state court and removed to federal court but because one of the “strikes” upon which the §1915(g) dismissal was based was not a qualifying sItdr.ike as some of the claims in that earlier suit had been dismissed on summary judgment. at 248-49. In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit implicitly found that §1915(g) applies to IFP cases removed to federal court from state court. Other courts have reached this same conclusion based on the rationale that prisoners could attempt to avoid the intent of Congress and the statutory requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) by originally filing in stRaitgeg icnosu vr.t Kau coiyvil rights lawsuit that would almost invariably be removed to federal couRrti.g gins v. Corizon , MNeod. i1c4a-l SCeVr-v0i2c1es5, 2014 WL 3764156 at *2-3 (S. D. Ala. Jul. 30, 2014); adopted , No. 12-CV-0578, 2012 WL 547C1r2o4o8k eart v*1. -G2l o(bSa. Dl T. Aell aL. iOnkct. 19, 2012), , 2012 WL 5470892 (S. D. Ala. Nov. 9a,d 2o0p1t2ed); , No. 11-CV-022F9a, r2n0s1w2o WrthL v6.5 W16a4s4h i(nDg.t oRn. IS. tJaante. 6D, e2p0t1. 2o)f , Corr. , 2012 WL 651641 (D. R. I. Feb. 28, 2012); , No. 07-CV-0206, 2007 WL 1101497 (W. D. Wash. Apr. 9, 2007). By way of three separate but nearly identical reply memoranda (rec. docs. 7G5ra, y7e6r, 7v.7 )V aPnlanionytiff alerts the Court to two additional cases. The first case cited by Plaintiff, th , ___ Fed.Appx. ___, 2020 WL 5667845 (5 Cir. 2020), is unhelpful here as it has nothing to do with the applicability of §1915(g) to cases removed to federal court from state court. The second case cited by Plaintiff is a case emanating from the Tenth Circuit which is not binding upon the Court and is not as persuasive as the other authorities upon which the Court relied. As Plaintiff has not established a manifest of error of law or fact or pointed to newly discovered evidence, his motion for reconsideration is denied. 30th September New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of , 2020. MICHAEL B. NORTH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE