Turner v. Louisiana State Penitentiary

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA OLLANDIS TURNER (#549743) CIVIL ACTION VERSUS 22-698-SDD-SDJ LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY ORDER The pro se Plaintiff, an inmate confined at the Louisiana State Penitentiary, Angola, Louisiana, filed this proceeding pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Louisiana State Penitentiary, complaining that his constitutional rights were violated when he was attacked by another inmate. Plaintiff’s allegations are limited to the details of the attack. Juridical Person Section 1983 only imposes liability on a “person” who violates another’s constitutional rights under color of law. In accordance with Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Louisiana law governs whether a person or entity can be sued. Under Louisiana law, to possess such a capacity, an entity must qualify as a “juridical person.” This term is defined by the Louisiana Civil Code as an “entity to which the law attributes personality, such as a corporation or partnership.” See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 24. Personal Involvement In order for a prison official to be found liable under § 1983, the official must have been personally and directly involved in conduct causing an alleged deprivation of an inmate's constitutional rights or there must be a causal connection between the actions of the official and the constitutional violation sought to be redressed. Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir. 1983). Any allegation that the defendant is responsible for the actions of subordinate officers or co-employees under a theory of vicarious responsibility or respondeat superior is alone insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009), citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). See also Bell v. Livingston, 356 F. App’x. 715, 716–17 (5th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that “[a] supervisor may not be held liable for a civil rights violation under any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability”). Further, in the absence of direct personal participation by a supervisory official in an alleged constitutional violation, an inmate plaintiff must allege that the deprivation of his constitutional rights occurred as a result of a subordinate's implementation of the supervisor's affirmative wrongful policies or as a result of a breach by the supervisor of an affirmative duty specially imposed by state law. Lozano v. Smith, supra, 718 F.2d at 768 . Failure to Protect Under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a prisoner has a constitutional right to be sheltered from the threat of harm or violence at the hands of other inmates. Johnston v. Lucas, 786 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1373 (5th Cir. 1981). Specifically, prison officials “have a duty ... to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). “Deliberate indifference” is the appropriate standard to be applied in this context, and this term has been defined as including an element of “subjective recklessness” as used in the criminal law. Id. at 837 . A prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with deliberate indifference to an inmate's health or safety only if he knows that the inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Id. at 847 . The official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must draw the inference. Id. at 837 . However, a prison official may not “escape liability for deliberate indifference by showing that, while he was aware of an obvious, substantial risk to inmate safety, he did not know that the complainant was especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who eventually committed the assault.” It is irrelevant whether a risk comes from “a single source or multiple sources” or whether the risk is borne by a single prisoner for personal reasons or by all similarlysituated prisoners. Id. Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege facts sufficient to establish liability under the above theory. Plaintiff has not named any person as a defendant, nor has Plaintiff alleged that the actions or inactions of any person violated his constitutional rights. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff shall, within 21 days from the date of this Order, amend his Complaint by: (1) Naming as defendant(s) the person(s) who allegedly failed to protect Plaintiff from harm; (2) Stating facts indicative of deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health or safety; and (3) Stating how each defendant was personally involved. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that failure to amend the Complaint, as ordered, may result in dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e) and 1915A. Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on December 15, 2022. S SCOTT D. JOHNSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE