In the Interest of L.R.C., a Child v. the State of Texas

NUMBERS 13-24-00189-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN THE INTEREST OF L.R.C., A CHILD

ON APPEAL FROM THE 36TH DISTRICT COURT OF BEE COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Silva Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

Appellant S.C. 1 appeals the trial court’s judgment involuntarily terminating her parental rights with respect to minor child L.R.C.2 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001. We affirm.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

S.C.’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief stating that he has diligently reviewed the entire record but has concluded that “there are no non-frivolous arguments to advance on appeal.” See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Porter v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 105 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.) (“[W]hen appointed counsel represents an indigent client in a parental termination appeal and concludes that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, counsel may file an Anders-type brief.”). Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation showing why there are no arguable grounds for advancing an appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”).

Counsel has informed this Court in writing that he has: (1) notified S.C. that he has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided S.C. with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed S.C. of her rights to file a pro se response,3 to review the record before filing that response, and to seek review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) supplied S.C. with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. An adequate amount of time has passed, and S.C. has filed *3 neither a motion for pro se access to the record nor a pro se response.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988); see also In re G.M., No. 13-08-00569-CV, 2009 WL 2547493, at *¹ (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief and we have found no reversible error. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”). We have specifically reviewed the trial court’s findings under parts (D) and (E) of family code § 161.001(b)(1), and we have found no non-frivolous issues that could be raised on appeal with respect to those findings. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (holding that “due process and due course of law requirements mandate that an appellate court detail its analysis for an appeal of termination of parental rights under [§] 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) of the Family Code”).

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

S.C.’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 & n.17 (“[T]he defense attorney is required to file a motion to withdraw at the same time that he files an Anders brief . . . .”). However, when an Anders brief is filed in a parental termination appeal, the appellant’s right to appointed *4 counsel extends to “all proceedings in [the Supreme Court of Texas], including the filing of a petition for review.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013(a)(1)). Thus, in the absence of additional grounds for withdrawal, a motion to withdraw brought in the court of appeals may be premature. Id. Counsel is permitted to withdraw only for good cause, and counsel’s belief that the client has no grounds to seek further review from the court of appeals’ decision does not constitute good cause. Id.

Here, counsel’s motion does not show “good cause” for withdrawal other than his inability to identify any nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is denied. See id.⁴

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

GINA M. BENAVIDES Justice

Delivered and filed on the 20th day of June, 2024.

Footnotes

[1] We refer to appellant and the child by initials in accordance with the rules of appellate procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).

[2] The trial court’s judgment also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of L.R.C.’s biological father, who is not a party to this appeal.

[3] In the criminal context, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that pro se responses are not required to comport with all rules of appellate procedure “because its purpose is not to permit the court of appeals to decide the case on the merits; it is intended only to alert the appellate court to any matters that the defendant believes might be arguable in a brief on the merits.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding).

[4] The Texas Supreme Court has noted that, in cases such as this, “appointed counsel’s obligations [in the supreme court] can be satisfied by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam).