Summerville v. Neckson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND ZYQUON QUONTAZ SUMMERVILLE, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No.: ELH-23-1290 CORRECTIONAL OFFICER NEEKSON, Defendant. MEMORANDUM Plaintiff Zyquon Quontaz Summerville, who is self-represented, is a Maryland prisoner who was confined at the Baltimore County Detention Center (“BCDC”) when he filed his Complaint against Correctional Officer Neekson. ECF 1. Neekson has moved to dismiss. ECF 7. It is supported by a memorandum (ECF 7-1) (collectively, the “Motion”). Summerville was informed by the Court, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that his failure to file a response in opposition to the Motion could result in dismissal of the Complaint. ECF 8. To date, Summerville has not filed a response. Upon review of the Motion and applicable law, the Court deems a hearing unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6. (D. Md. 2023). For reasons that follow, I shall deny Neekson’s Motion. I. Complaint Allegations Summerville alleges that on May 1, 2023, at approximately 6:35 p.m., he asked to talk to a sergeant during meal distribution at BCDC. ECF 1 at 3. According to Summerville, Officer Neekson was argumentative and aggressive, waiving his hand in Summerville’s face. Id. Summerville states that when he moved Neekson’s hand away from his (plaintiff’s) face, Neekson assaulted him, punching him in the face until he was on the ground. Id. Summerville asserts that Neekson, with the assistance of his partner, Koegla, also assaulted plaintiff while he was on the ground and could not defend himself. Id. Summerville seeks monetary damages. Id. at 4. II. Standard of Review Neekson moves for dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (e), Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). He also asserts qualified immunity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) governs motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Khoury v. Meserve, 268 F. Supp. 2d 600, 606 (D. Md. 2003), aff’d, 85 F. App’x 960 (4th Cir. 2004). Under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Demetres v. E. W. Const., Inc., 776 F.3d 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2015); see also Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., a Div. of Standex Int'l Corp., 166 F.3d 642 , 647 (4th Cir. 1999). A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) may proceed “in one of two ways”: either a facial challenge, asserting that the allegations pleaded in the complaint are insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction, or a factual challenge, asserting “‘that the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint [are] not true.’” Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (alteration in original); see also Buchanan v. Consol. Stores Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 730, 736 (D. Md. 2001). In a facial challenge, “the facts alleged in the complaint are taken as true, and the motion must be denied if the complaint alleges sufficient facts to invoke subject matter jurisdiction.” Kerns, 585 F.3d at 192 ; accord Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 22 F. Supp. 3d 519, 524 (D. Md. 2014). In a factual challenge, on the other hand, “the district court is entitled to decide disputed issues of fact with respect to subject matter jurisdiction.” Kerns, 585 F.3d at 192 . In that circumstance, the Court “may regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.” Velasco v. Gov't of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004); see also Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). A defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Nadendla v. WakeMed, 24 F.4th 299 , 304–05 (4th Cir. 2022); Fessler v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 959 F.3d 146, 152 (4th Cir. 2020); In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159 , 165–66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” See Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Mylan Lab'ys, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130 , 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)); Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473 (4th Cir. 1997). Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). See Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321 , 325–26 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with “fair notice” of the claims and the “grounds” for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 , 555–56 (2007). To survive a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 ; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (citation omitted) (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions’ . . .”); see also Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 276 (4th Cir. 2020); Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Weil, 918 F.3d 312 , 317–18 (4th Cir. 2019); Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). To be sure, a plaintiff need not include “detailed factual allegations” in order to satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 . Moreover, federal pleading rules “do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10 , 10 (2014) (per curiam). But, mere “‘naked assertions’ of wrongdoing” are generally insufficient to state a claim for relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a court ‘must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,’ and must ‘draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.’” Retfalvi v. United States, 930 F.3d 600, 605 (4th Cir. 2019) (alteration in Retfalvi) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011)); see Semenova v. Maryland Transit Admin., 845 F.3d 564, 567 (4th Cir. 2017); Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015). However, “a court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts.” Retfalvi, 930 F.3d at 605 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see Glassman v. Arlington Cnty., VA, 628 F.3d 140, 146 (4th Cir. 2010). “A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer” that the plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Society Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012). In connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts ordinarily do not “‘resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.’” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605 , 616 (4th Cir. 2020). But, “in the relatively rare circumstances where facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense are alleged in the complaint, the defense may be reached by a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6).” Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc); accord Pressley v. Tupperware Long Term Disability Plan, 553 F.3d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 2009). Because Rule 12(b)(6) “is intended [only] to test the legal adequacy of the complaint,” Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993), “[t]his principle only applies . . . if all facts necessary to the affirmative defense ‘clearly appear[ ] on the face of the complaint.’” Goodman, 494 F.3d at 464 (emphasis in Goodman) (quoting Forst, 4 F.3d at 250 ). “Generally, when a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), courts are limited to considering the sufficiency of allegations set forth in the complaint and the ‘documents attached or incorporated into the complaint.’” Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l, Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 606 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 637 F.3d at 448 ). Ordinarily, the court “may not consider any documents that are outside of the complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein[.]” Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155 (2015); see Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, 510 F.3d 442, 450 (4th Cir. 2007). But, under limited circumstances, when resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may consider documents beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. Goldfarb v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 791 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir. 2015). In particular, a court may consider documents that are “explicitly incorporated into the complaint by reference and those attached to the complaint as exhibits.” Goines, 822 F.3d at 166 (citation omitted); see also Six v. Generations Fed. Credit Union, 891 F.3d 508, 512 (4th Cir. 2018); Anand v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 754 F.3d 195, 198 (4th Cir. 2014); U.S. ex rel. Oberg v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 745 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 2014); Am. Chiropractic Ass’n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 979 (2004); Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609 , 618 (4th Cir. 1999). However, “before treating the contents of an attached or incorporated document as true, the district court should consider the nature of the document and why the plaintiff attached it.” Goines, 822 F.3d at 167 . “When the plaintiff attaches or incorporates a document upon which his claim is based, or when the complaint otherwise shows that the plaintiff has adopted the contents of the document, crediting the document over conflicting allegations in the complaint is proper.” Id. Conversely, “where the plaintiff attaches or incorporates a document for purposes other than the truthfulness of the document, it is inappropriate to treat the contents of that document as true.” Id. A court may also “consider a document submitted by the movant that [is] not attached to or expressly incorporated in a complaint, so long as the document was integral to the complaint and there is no dispute about the document’s authenticity.” Goines, 822 F.3d at 166 (citations omitted); see also Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 642 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 583 U.S. 1044 (2017); U.S. ex rel. Oberg, 745 F.3d at 136 ; Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty., Md., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012). To be “integral,” a document must be one “that by its ‘very existence, and not the mere information it contains, gives rise to the legal rights asserted.’” Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC, 794 F. Supp. 2d 602, 611 (D. Md. 2011) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”). Because Summerville is self-represented, his submissions are liberally construed. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f) (“All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice”); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (stating that claims of self-represented litigants are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); accord. Bala v. Commonwealth of Virginia Dep't of Conservation & Recreation, 532 F. App’x 332, 334 (4th Cir. 2013). But, the court must also abide by the “‘affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.’” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774 , 778– 79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 , 323–24 (1986)). III. Discussion As noted, Neekson seeks dismissal of the Complaint on several grounds. He asserts that Summerville has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction because “Plaintiff makes no allegation of a violation of Federal law.” ECF 7-1 at 3. At best, argues defendant, plaintiff alleges “an assault, which is a state claim.” Id. at 4. Therefore, Neekson maintains that plaintiff must show that he has complied with Maryland’s Local Government Tort Claims Act, which he has not done. Id.; see Md. Code, § 5-301(d) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. In addition, defendant claims that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Id. And, he contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 5. A. Subject matter Jurisdiction Neekson claims that Summerville has failed to establish on the face of the Complaint that there is a question of federal law at issue, so as to confer jurisdiction on this Court. ECF 7-1 at 34. At most, Neekson contends that Summerville has alleged a state law assault claim. Id. at 4. However, as stated above, this Court is obligated to liberally construe the pleadings of a pro se litigant. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 . Construed liberally, the Complaint asserts a claim for use of excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Therefore, this Court has federal question jurisdiction with regard to Summerville’s claim. B. Exhaustion Neekson asserts the affirmative defense that Summerville failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. ECF 7-1 at 4. The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides, in pertinent part: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). For purposes of the PLRA, “the term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). The phrase “prison conditions” encompasses “all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 , 1 Notably, Neekson acknowledges that Summerville’s claim falls under the Fourteenth Amendment in his argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity. See ECF 7-1 at 5. 532 (2002); see also Chase v. Peay, 286 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528 (D. Md. 2003), aff’d, 98 F. App’x 253 (4th Cir. 2004). The doctrine governing exhaustion of administrative remedies has been well established through administrative law jurisprudence. It provides that a plaintiff is not entitled to judicial relief until the prescribed administrative remedies have been exhausted. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 , 88–89 (2006). Therefore, a claim that has not been exhausted may not be considered by this Court. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 220 (2007). In other words, exhaustion is mandatory, and a court ordinarily may not excuse a failure to exhaust. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639 (2016); see also Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 337 (2000) (“‘The mandatory ‘shall’… normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion’”) (alteration in original)) (citation omitted). However, administrative exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is not a jurisdictional requirement and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement on the prisoner. Rather, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense to be pleaded and proven by defendants. See Bock, 549 U.S. at 215–216; Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674 , 682 (4th Cir. 2005). The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement serves several purposes. These include “allowing a prison to address complaints about the program it administers before being subjected to suit, reducing litigation to the extent complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and improving litigation that does occur by leading to the preparation of a useful record.” Bock, 549 U.S. at 219 ; see Griffin v. Bryant, 56 F.4th 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2022) (recognizing that the exhaustion requirement is “strict” but “does not operate as an absolute bar . . . .”); Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that exhaustion provides prison officials with the opportunity to respond to a complaint through proper use of administrative remedies). It is designed so that prisoners “pursue administrative grievances until they receive a final denial of their claim[s], appealing through all available stages in the administrative process” so that the agency reaches a decision on the merits. Chase, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 530 ; see Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 735 (2001) (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s claim for failure to exhaust where he “never sought intermediate or final administrative review after prison authority denied relief”); Gibbs v. Bureau of Prison Off., 986 F. Supp. 941 , 943–44 (D. Md. 1997) (dismissing a federal prisoner’s lawsuit for failure to exhaust where he did not appeal his administrative claim through all four stages of the BOP’s grievance process). Exhaustion applies in § 1983 cases. Williams v. Carvajal, 63 F.4th 279, 285 (4th Cir. 2023). Ordinarily, an inmate must follow the required procedural steps in order to exhaust his administrative remedies. Moore, 517 F.3d at 725, 729 ; see Langford v. Couch, 50 F. Supp. 2d 544, 548 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“The … PLRA amendment made clear that exhaustion is now mandatory.”). Exhaustion requires completion of “the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines ….” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88 . This requirement is one of “proper exhaustion of administrative remedies, which ‘means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).’” Id. at 90 (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)). But, the Court is “obligated to ensure that any defects in [administrative] exhaustion were not procured from the action or inaction of prison officials.” Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that “the inmate cannot be required to exhaust [administrative remedies] … when prison officials prevent inmates from using the administrative process”). Here, Neekson points to Summerville’s statement in his Complaint that he has “yet to receive an immediate action from the facility” in response to the form complaint’s question regarding the result of the grievance he filed through BCDC’s administrative remedy procedure. ECF 7-1 at 4; see ECF 1 at 3. Summerville further explains that BCDC is “very lax in taking a immedited [sic] action in situations like this.” ECF 1 at 3. According to Neekson, this demonstrates Summerville’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. ECF 7-1 at 4. However, as stated, exhaustion is not a jurisdictional requirement and therefore it is not Summerville’s burden at this stage to show that he has exhausted the available administrative remedies before filing a suit. Rather, it is Neekson’s burden to plead and prove this affirmative defense. As Neekson puts forth no facts to show that Summerville failed to use the administrative remedy procedure at BCDC before filing the suit, he has failed to meet the burden of this defense. C. Qualified Immunity Neekson generally asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity, on the ground that the alleged conduct does not reflect deliberate indifference or otherwise “shock[] the conscience. . . .” ECF 7-1 at 5. This is not the standard, however. Indeed, defendant makes only a general statement of the qualified immunity principles without any substantive analysis of the issue. “Qualified immunity bars § 1983 actions against government officials in their individual capacities ‘unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.’” Barrett v. Pae Gov't Servs., Inc., 975 F.3d 416, 428 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 , 62-63 (2018)) (cleaned up); see also Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1 (2021) (per curiam); City of Tahlequah, Okla. v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9 (2021) (per curiam); Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8 (2020); Atkinson v. Godfrey, 100 F.4th 498, 504 (4th Cir. 2024); Thurston v. Frye, 99 F.4th 665, 673 (4th Cir. 2024); Lewis v. Caraballo, 98 F.4th 521, 530 (4th Cir. 2024); Halcomb v. Ravenell, 992 F.3d 316, 319 (4th Cir. 2021); Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 866 F.3d 546, 555 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 584 U.S. 1013 (2018); Osborne v. Georgiades, 679 F. App’x 234, 237 (4th Cir. 2017); Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 235 (4th Cir. 2016); Hunter v. Town of Mocksville, N. Carolina, 789 F.3d 389, 401 (4th Cir. 2015). In Owens v. Baltimore City State's Att'ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 395 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Baltimore City Police Dep't v. Owens, 575 U.S. 983 (2015), the Fourth Circuit reiterated: “Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for ‘civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Defendants’ qualified immunity defense is unavailing at this stage of the litigation because it is well established that a detainee has a constitutional right to be free from excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment. And, plaintiff has alleged facts violative of the constitutional right. See Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2005). It would be premature to decide the issue at this juncture. VI. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, I shall deny Neekson’s Motion. Neekson shall answer the complaint within 30 days. An Order follows. June 14, 2024 /s/ Date Ellen L. Hollander United States District Judge