Vidana 482794 v. Brown

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION ______ MIGUEL ANGEL VIDANA, Petitioner, Case No. 2:20-cv-57 v. Honorable Paul L. Maloney MIKE BROWN, Respondent. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243 . If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court has the duty to “screen out” petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After 1 A state prisoner seeking post-conviction relief from a federal court has but one remedy: an application for a writ of habeas corpus. See Rittenberry v. Morgan, 468 F.3d 331, 336-37 (6th Cir. 2006). All such applications for writs of habeas corpus are governed by § 2241, which generally authorizes federal courts to grant the writ – to both federal and state prisoners. Id. Most state prisoners’ applications for writs of habeas corpus are subject also to the additional restrictions of § 2254. That is, if a state prisoner is “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,” his petition is subject to the procedural requirements of § 2254. Id.; see also Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 803 (11th Cir. 2004); Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 2000). Petitioner brings this action seeking relief from custody pursuant to a state court judgment. His action, therefore, is governed by § 2254. undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court will dismiss the petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust available state-court remedies. Discussion I. Factual allegations Petitioner Miguel Angel Vidana is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections at the Kinross Correctional Facility (KCF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan. According to the MDOC Offender Tracking Information System (OTIS), Petitioner is serving sentences of 22 to 50 years imprisonment for second-degree murder, 2 years for felony firearm, and 23 to 45 years for first-degree criminal sexual conduct. See http://mdocweb.state.mi.us/OTIS2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=482794. On May 29, 2020, Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition seeking early release from prison because his continued detention places him at risk of contracting the COVID-19 virus. Petitioner indicates that he has high blood pressure which places him at a higher risk of serious illness or death. In light of the risks of infection with the COVID-19 virus in the prison environment, Petitioner contends his continued detention violates his due process rights. II. Cognizability Petitioner’s request for relief is not a typical habeas petition. The Supreme Court has made clear that constitutional challenges to the fact or duration of confinement are the proper subject of a habeas corpus petition rather than a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973). Constitutional challenges to the conditions of confinement, on the other hand, are proper subjects for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . Id. The Preiser Court, [2] however, did not foreclose the possibility that habeas relief might be available even for conditions of confinement claims: This is not to say that habeas corpus may not also be available to challenge such prison conditions. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 , (1969); Wilwording v. Swenson, supra, at 251 of 404 U.S. . . . When a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal. See Note, Developments in the Law—Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038 , 1084 (1970).[] Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499 (footnote omitted). But, the Court has also never upheld a “conditions of confinement” habeas claim. Indeed, in Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004), the Court acknowledged that it had “never followed the speculation in Preiser . . . that such a prisoner subject to ‘additional and unconstitutional restraints’ might have a habeas claim independent of § 1983 . . . .” Id. at 751 n.1. The Sixth Circuit has concluded that claims regarding conditions of confinement are properly brought under § 1983 and are not cognizable on habeas review. See Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004) (“‘Petitioner in this case appears to be asserting the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws by state prison officials. Such a claim is properly brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .’”); In re Owens, 525 F. App’x 287, 290 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The criteria to which Owens refers involves the conditions of his confinement . . . This is not the proper execution of sentence claim that may be pursued in a § 2254 petition.”); Hodges v. Bell, 170 F. App’x 389, 392-93 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Hodges’s complaints about the conditions of his confinement . . . are a proper subject for a § 1983 action, but fall outside of the cognizable core of habeas corpus relief.”); Young v. Martin, 83 F. App’x 107, 109 (6th Cir. 2003) (“It is clear under current law that a prisoner complaining about the conditions of his confinement should bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .”). Petitioner’s claims regarding the [3] constitutionality of his custody in the jail because of his particular susceptibility to respiratory disease are principally claims regarding the conditions of his confinement. Such claims should be raised by a complaint for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . But, the relief Petitioner seeks—release from custody—is available only upon habeas corpus review. A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 484 (the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody and the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody). Undoubtedly, for that reason, Petitioner has sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . The Court will address Petitioner’s claim as he has raised it, as a claim for habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit has suggested it would be wrong to do otherwise. Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004). III. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies Before the Court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust remedies available in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). Exhaustion requires a petitioner to “fairly present” federal claims so that state courts have a “fair opportunity” to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon a petitioner’s constitutional claim. Id. at 844, 848 ; see also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-77 (1971); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). To fulfill the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must have fairly presented his federal claims to all levels of the state appellate system, including the state’s highest court. O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845 ; Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 414 (6th Cir. 2009); Hafley v. Sowders, 902 F.2d 4 480, 483 (6th Cir. 1990). The district court can and must raise the exhaustion issue sua sponte when it clearly appears that habeas claims have not been presented to the state courts. See Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418, 1422 (6th Cir. 1987); Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 138-39 (6th Cir. 1970). Petitioner bears the burden of showing exhaustion. See Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994). Petitioner fails to allege any facts showing that he has raised this claim in the state courts. An applicant has not exhausted available state remedies if he has the right under state law to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (c). As noted above, Petitioner does not appear to have raised this issue in the state courts by filing a motion for relief from judgment or a state habeas corpus petition. To properly exhaust his claim, Petitioner must file a motion for relief from judgment under Mich. Ct. R. 6.500 et seq, or a state habeas corpus petition under Mich. Ct. R. 3.303 et seq. Both a motion for relief from judgment and a habeas corpus petition are properly filed in the Kent County Circuit Court. If his motion or petition is denied by the circuit court, Petitioner must pursue available appeals of that decision. Under Michigan law, one motion for relief from judgment may be filed after August 1, 1995. Mich. Ct. R. 6.502(G)(1). It does not appear as if Petitioner has ever filed his allotted motion. Therefore, the Court concludes that he has at least one available state remedy. If Petitioner’s motion is denied by the circuit court, Petitioner must appeal that decision to the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court. O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845 ; Hafley, 902 F.2d at 483 (“‘[P]etitioner cannot be deemed to have exhausted his state court remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b) and (c) as to any issue, unless he has presented that issue both to the Michigan [5] Court of Appeals and to the Michigan Supreme Court.’”) (citation omitted). Relief under § 2254 is not available until after Petitioner has pursued his state court remedies. IV. Pending motions Petitioner seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) and the appointment of counsel (ECF No. 4). Since filing his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, Petitioner has paid the $5.00 filing fee applicable to habeas corpus actions. His motion therefore will be denied as moot. Moreover, because Petitioner has failed to exhaust available state court remedies, his pending motion to appoint counsel is properly denied as moot. V. Certificate of appealability Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a “substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(2). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Rather, the district court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine whether a certificate is warranted. Id. The Court concludes that Petitioner’s application is properly denied for lack of exhaustion. Under Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), when a habeas petition is denied on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability may issue only “when the prisoner shows, at least, [1] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and [2] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the [6] district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Both showings must be made to warrant the grant of a certificate. Id. The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not find it debatable whether Petitioner’s application should be dismissed for lack of exhaustion. Therefore, a certificate of appealability will be denied. Moreover, although I conclude that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief under § 2254 and has failed to make a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, I would not conclude that any issue Petitioner might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Conclusion The Court will enter a judgment dismissing the petition for lack of exhaustion, and an order denying Petitioner’s motions to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel (ECF Nos. 2 and 4) and denying a certificate of appealability. Dated: June 9, 2020 /s/ Paul L. Maloney Paul L. Maloney United States District Judge