Adkins 307529 v. Setzer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______ MELVIN CHRISTOPHER ADKINS, Plaintiff, Case No. 1:22-cv-276 v. Honorable Phillip J. Green P. SETZER et al., Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 4.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 5.) This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 , 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350 . “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351 . Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”). Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to the action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1 Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. 1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500 , 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198 , 207 n.26 (3d Cir. Feb. 10, 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Baraga Correctional Facility (AMF) in Baraga, Baraga County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Muskegon Correctional Facility (MCF) in Muskegon, Muskegon County, Michigan and the Oaks Correctional Facility (ECF) in Manistee, Manistee County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues MDOC Director Heidi E. Washington; Warden Les. Parish; Assistant Deputy Wardens J. Clouse, J. Spencley, J. Thomas, J. Miller, and M. Steward; Assistant Deputy Directors Jeremy Bush and Shawn Brewer; Field Operator Russ Marlan; Prison Counselors P. Setzer and C. Wilson; Resident Unit Managers K. Johnson, J. McCurry, and B. West; and several Unknown Parties, named as John Does. Plaintiff alleges that during his incarceration at MCF and ECF, he was “placed in jeopardy twice under the same facts” and was placed in administrative segregation for over a year “without any reason for the MDOC under procedure.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) He avers that he has suffered mental distress and PTSD. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that his placement in administrative segregation is “inhuman[e] treatment” and that Defendants are “violating [his] privileges to be allowed to be removed from administrative segregation.” (Id.) He alleges that at the time he filed his complaint, he had been on the transfer list for ten months. (Id., PageID.16.) Although Plaintiff does not explain the reason for his placement and retention in administrative segregation, the MDOC’s Offender Tracking Information System provides a clue.2 On September 9, 2021, the Muskegon County Circuit Court sentenced Plaintiff to an additional term of imprisonment of 7 months to 10 years following his guilty plea to committing or procuring gross indecency between two males in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.338 . See https://mdocweb.state.mi.us/otis2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=307529 (visited June 29, 2022). Based on Plaintiff’s description of the duration of his stay in administrative segregation, his placement in segregation occurred after he committed the offense, as did his transfer to ECF and, eventually, AMF. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff asserts violations of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id., PageID.7.) As relief, he seeks $1,500.00 for each day he has spent in administrative segregation. Failure To State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft 2 This Court takes judicial notice of the information provided by a search of the OTIS website with regard to Plaintiff. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 543 F.3d 819, 824 (6th Cir. 2008); Carpenter v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr. Time Computation Unit, No. 1:13-cv-313, 2013 WL 1947249 , at *1 n.1 (W.D. Mich. May 9, 2013); Ward v. Wolfenbarger, 323 F. Supp. 2d 818 , 821–22 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 2004). v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 . “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 . Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 ). “[W]here the wellpleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468 , 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). A. Fifth Amendment Claims Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ actions violated the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause because he asserts that he was “placed in jeopardy twice under the same facts.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that, no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Although the language “jeopardy of life or limb” suggests the protection only applies to the most serious infractions, “the Clause has long been construed to mean something far broader than its literal language.” Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 , 527–28 (1975) (citing Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 , 170–73 (1874)). The Clause prohibits “a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense.” Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 , 769 n.1 (1994) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). The Double Jeopardy Clause, however, does not apply to all punishments. “[J]eopardy describes the risk that is traditionally associated with a criminal prosecution.” Breed, 421 U.S. at 528 (citing Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326, 329 (1970)). For that reason, the Supreme Court has determined that the Double Jeopardy Clause “protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense and then only when such occurs in successive proceedings.” United States v. Beaty, 147 F.3d 522, 524 (1998) (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997)). In other words, the risk that jeopardy describes “is not present in proceedings that are not ‘essentially criminal.’” Breed, 421 U.S. at 528 (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 , 398 (1938)). “The Double Jeopardy Clause was not intended to inhibit prison discipline.” United States v. Simpson, 546 F.3d 394, 398 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 , 555–56 (1974) (concluding that “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply”). Because “[p]rison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution . . . [they] do not implicate double jeopardy concerns.” Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347, 1351 (10th Cir 1994). Plaintiff’s contention that any prison disciplinary proceedings and subsequent placement in administrative segregation violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment fails because the Clause is not implicated by prison disciplinary proceedings. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claims will be dismissed. B. Eighth Amendment Claims Plaintiff also contends that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by keeping him in administrative segregation for a year. (ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene society's “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 , 345–46 (1981). The Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 ). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347 ; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596 , 600–01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954 . In the MDOC, security classifications, from least to most secure, are as follows: Levels I, II, IV, V, and administrative segregation. MDOC Policy Directive 05.01.130 ¶ B (Oct. 10, 2011). There are three types of segregation: temporary segregation, administrative segregation, and punitive segregation. MDOC Policy Directive 04.05.120 ¶¶ M, Q, Z (June 1, 2019). Administrative segregation is the most restrictive and is imposed for institutional security, e.g., when a prisoner poses a serious escape risk. Id. ¶ Q. Detention, or “punitive segregation,” can be imposed as a sanction for committing a major misconduct, if ordered by the hearing officer. Id. ¶ Z. If possible, detention is served in a designated detention cell rather than in a cell designated for administrative segregation. Id. A prisoner may not remain in detention for a period longer than that ordered by the hearing officer, id. ¶ Z, but a prisoner classified to administrative segregation remains in that classification until he is reclassified, id. ¶ I. The “behavioral adjustment” of a prisoner in segregation is reviewed periodically by the Security Classification Committee (SCC). Id. ¶ FFF. Reclassification from administrative segregation occurs only with the approval of the SCC and the Warden (or designee). Id. ¶ KKK. The Eighth Amendment prohibits any punishment which violates the civilized standards of humanity and decency or involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 , 102–03 (1976). To prove an Eighth Amendment violation, an inmate must show that he has been deprived of the minimum civilized measures of life’s necessities. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347 . Because placement in segregation is a routine discomfort that is a part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, it is typically insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). The Sixth Circuit has held that without a showing that basic human needs were not met, the denial of privileges as a result of administrative segregation cannot establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See Evans v. Vinson, 427 F. App’x 437, 443 (6th Cir. 2011); Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Lacey v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., No. 95-1097, 1995 WL 564301 (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 1995) (placement in detention did not violate Eighth Amendment); Eaddy v. Foltz, No. 85-1419, 1985 WL 14065 (6th Cir. Dec. 18, 1985) (whether an Eighth Amendment claim is stated for placement in segregation depends upon severity or pervasiveness of conditions). Here, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations do not allow the Court to infer that Plaintiff’s basic human needs were not met in administrative segregation. Moreover, Plaintiff’s scant allegations do not permit the Court to infer that any one of the Defendants is responsible for the duration of Plaintiff’s stay in administrative segregation. “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 . Conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 . Plaintiff’s scant complaint simply does not permit an inference that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by confining Plaintiff in administrative segregation. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims will, therefore, be dismissed. C. Fourteenth Amendment Claims Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by keeping him in administrative segregation for a year. (ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) The Supreme Court long has held that the Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having an impact on a prisoner. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), the Court set forth the standard for determining when a prisoner’s loss of liberty implicates a federally cognizable liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. According to the Sandin Court, a prisoner is entitled to the protections of due process only when a deprivation “will inevitably affect the duration of his sentence” or imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 486–87; see also Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998); Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789 , 790–91 (6th Cir. 1995). Confinement in administrative segregation “is the sort of confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983) (superseded by statute on other grounds). Thus, it is considered atypical and significant only in “extreme circumstances.” Joseph v. Curtin, 410 F. App’x 865, 868 (6th Cir. 2010). Generally, courts will consider the nature and duration of a stay in segregation to determine whether it imposes an “atypical and significant hardship.” Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 794 (6th. Cir. 2008). In Sandin, the Supreme Court concluded that the segregation at issue in that case (disciplinary segregation for 30 days) did not impose an atypical and significant hardship. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484–86. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held that mere placement in administrative segregation, and placement for a relatively short period of time, do not require the protections of due process. Rimmer-Bey, 62 F.3d at 790–91; see also Joseph v. Curtin, 410 F. App’x 865, 868 (6th Cir. 2010) (61 days in segregation is not atypical and significant). The Sixth Circuit has also held, in specific circumstances, that confinement in segregation for a relatively long period of time does not implicate a liberty interest. See, e.g., Baker, 155 F.3d at 812–23 (two years of segregation while the inmate was investigated for the murder of a prison guard in a riot); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 1997) (one year of segregation following convictions for possession of illegal contraband and assault, including a 117day delay in reclassification due to prison crowding). But see Selby v. Caruso, 734 F.3d 554, 559 (6th Cir. 2013) (13 years of segregation implicates a liberty interest); Harden-Bey, 524 F.3d at 795 (remanding to the district court to consider whether the plaintiff’s allegedly “indefinite” period of segregation, i.e., three years without an explanation from prison officials, implicates a liberty interest); Harris v. Caruso, 465 F. App’x 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2012) (eight years of segregation implicates a liberty interest). Here, Plaintiff merely states that he was placed in administrative segregation for a year. His complaint, however, is devoid of any allegations suggesting that his confinement therein was “atypical and significant.” The length of Plaintiff’s placement in administrative segregation standing alone is not determinative for whether a liberty interest has been implicated, particularly where Plaintiff has pleaded guilty to an offense which suggests he should be removed from the general population for institutional security reasons. See Jones, 155 F.3d at 812 . Again, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 . Consequently, the Court concludes that no liberty interest was implicated by his placement in administrative segregation, and his Fourteenth Amendment claims will be dismissed. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court does not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610–11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum. This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (g). A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered. Dated: July 13, 2022 /s/ Phillip J. Green PHILLIP J. GREEN United States Magistrate Judge