Engel v. CCA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION JOSEPH MICHAEL DEVON ENGEL, ) Plaintiff, V. No. 4:20-cv-01914-RLW CCA, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Joseph Michael Devon Engel for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee.' Based on the financial information provided by plaintiff, the motion will be granted, and the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(1). Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss plaintiff's complaint without prejudice. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(1) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. 28 ! Plaintiff has not submitted a separate motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, nor has he paid the filing fee. However, in the body of his complaint, plaintiff states: “Application to proceed in District Court without prepaying fees or costs[.] I only get $5.00 dollars a month.” (Docket No. I at 1). The Court has construed this as a motion for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is fully paid. Jd. Plaintiff has not submitted a prison account statement as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(2). Nevertheless, having reviewed the information provided by plaintiff, the Court will require him to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481 , 484 Cir. 1997) (explaining that when a prisoner is unable to provide the Court with a copy of his prison account statement, the Court should assess an amount “that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner’s finances”). If plaintiff is unable to pay the initial partial filing fee, he must submit a copy of his prison account statement in support of his claim. Legal Standard on Initial Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Jd. at 679. The court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8" Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8 Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”). When reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8" Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8" Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8 Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). The Complaint Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is currently incarcerated at the Missouri Eastern Correctional Center in Pacific, Missouri. At the time relevant to this complaint, however, he was an inmate at the Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center (ERDCC) in Bonne Terre.” Since September 9, 2020, he has filed over 130 cases in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. 2 In his handwritten complaint, plaintiff appears to indicate that he is a “civilly committed detainee.” (Docket No. 1 at 1). However, plaintiff has also provided his prison registration number, and has acknowledged that he is being held at the ERDCC, a state correctional facility. Moreover, review of the Missouri Department of Correction’s online records show that plaintiff is a convicted state prisoner serving a ten-year sentence for, among other things, second-degree burglary. Therefore, the Court has determined that plaintiff is actually a convicted and sentenced state prisoner, and not a civilly committed detainee, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 review. Plaintiff brings the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , naming sixteen separate defendants: (1) Corrections Classification Assistant; (2) CO1; (3) Sergeant; (4) Lieutenant; (5) Captain; (6) Functional Unit Manager; (7) Superintendent; (8) Assistant Warden; (9) Warden; (10) ERDCC; (11) Missouri Department of Corrections; (12) Director; (13) Assistant Attorney General; (14) Attorney General; (15) Lieutenant Governor; and (16) Governor. (Docket No. 1 at 2). Defendants are sued in both their official and individual capacities. (Docket No. 1 at 1). With regard to the “Statement of Claim,” plaintiff asserts a violation of the First Amendment. In particular, he alleges that his “1** Amendment Freedom of Religion [is] still [denied].” (Docket No. 1 at 2). Further, he states that the Missouri Department of Corrections is “pretty much saying [his] religion” is worthless. Plaintiff alleges that he still does not have religious material or his religious diet, and that people who “stick up for their religion” get “spit in their face.” With regard to his religion, plaintiff states that he practices “Astru/Odinism/[Catholicism]” and paganism. As aresult of this purported violation of his First Amendment rights, plaintiff seeks billions of dollars in damages, as well as thousands of shares of stock in various countries, currencies, and “top US [companies].” Discussion Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , accusing sixteen separate defendants of violating his First Amendment right to practice his religion. Two of the defendants are state departments or institutions, while the remaining fourteen are individuals. Because plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court reviewed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 . Based on that review, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). A. ERDCC and the Missouri Department of Corrections The Missouri Department of Corrections is a department of the State of Missouri, while the ERDCC is a state correctional facility. Thus, the claims against these defendants are treated the same as claims against the State of Missouri itself. The claims fail for two reasons. First, the State of Missouri is not a “person” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . Second, the State of Missouri is protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. i. State is Not a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “Person” “Section 1983 provides for an action against a ‘person’ for a violation, under color of law, of another’s civil rights.” McLean v. Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 618 (8" Cir. 2008). See also Deretich v. Office of Admin. Hearings, 798 F.2d 1147 , 1154 (8" Cir. 1986) (stating that “[§] 1983 provides a cause of action against persons only”). However, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). See also Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 872 (8"" Cir. 2017) (asserting that a “State is not a person under § 1983”); and Kruger v. Nebraska, 820 F.3d 295, 301 (8 Cir. 2016) (explaining that “a state is not a person for purposes of a claim for money damages under § 1983”). Here, as noted above, plaintiff has sued both the Missouri Department of Corrections and the ERDCC. These claims are treated as being made against the State of Missouri. However, a state is not a “person” for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for money damages, which is what plaintiff is seeking. Because plaintiff is missing an essential element of a § 1983 action, the claims against the Missouri Department of Corrections and the ERDCC must be dismissed. ii. Sovereign Immunity “Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its consent.” Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247 , 253 (2011). The Eleventh Amendment has been held to confer sovereign immunity on an un-consenting state from lawsuits brought in federal court by a state’s own citizens or the citizens of another state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). See also Webb v. City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d 483, 485 (8" Cir. 2018) (“The Eleventh Amendment protects States and their arms and instrumentalities from suit in federal court”); Dover Elevator Co. v. Ark. State Univ., 64 F.3d 442 , 446 (8" Cir. 1995) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars private parties from suing a state in federal court”); and Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 618-19 (8" Cir. 1995) (“Generally, in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment”). The Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state or its agencies for any kind of relief, not merely monetary damages. Monroe v. Arkansas State Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 594 (8" Cir. 2007) (stating that district court erred in allowing plaintiff to proceed against state university for injunctive relief, and remanding matter to district court for dismissal). There are two “well-established exceptions” to the sovereign immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment. Barnes v. State of Missouri, 960 F.2d 63, 64 (8" Cir. 1992). “The first exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is where Congress has statutorily abrogated such immunity by clear and unmistakable language.” Jd. The second exception is when a state waives its immunity to suit in federal court. Jd. at 65. A state will be found to have waived its immunity “only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction.” Welch v. Tex. Dep 't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473 (1987), Neither exception is applicable in this case. The first exception is inapplicable, because the Supreme Court has determined that § 1983 does not revoke a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. See Will, 491 U.S. at 66 (“We cannot conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard the well-established immunity of a State from being sued without its consent”); and Quern y. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979) (“[W]e simply are unwilling to believe...that Congress intended by the general language of § 1983 to override the traditional sovereign immunity of the States”). The second exception is also inapplicable, because the State of Missouri has not waived its sovereign immunity in this type of case. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.600 (explaining that sovereign immunity is in effect, and providing exceptions). In this case, plaintiff has named the Missouri Department of Corrections and the ERDCC as defendants. As noted above, however, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state or its agencies for both monetary and injunctive relief. Furthermore, no exceptions to sovereign immunity are present in this case. Therefore, for this reason as well, plaintiffs claims against the Missouri Department of Corrections and the ERDCC must be dismissed. B. Official Capacity Claims Aside from the Missouri Department of Corrections and the ERDCC, the remaining fourteen defendants are individuals who are employed by the State of Missouri. Ten of those individuals appear to work for the Missouri Department of Corrections, while the other four are state officials. In an official capacity claim against an individual, the claim is actually “against the governmental entity itself.” See White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1075 (8 Cir. 2017). Thus, a “suit against a public employee in his or her official capacity is merely a suit against the public employer.” Johnson, 172 F.3d at 535. See also Brewington y. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 800 (8™ Cir. 2018) (explaining that official capacity suit against sheriff and his deputy “must be treated as a suit against the County”); Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb., 813 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8" Cir. 2016) (stating that a “plaintiff who sues public employees in their official, rather than individual, capacities sues only the public employer”); and Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979 , 986 (8" Cir. 2006) (stating that a “suit against a public official in his official capacity is actually a suit against the entity for which the official is an agent”). Because the individuals in this case are all employed by the State of Missouri, the official capacity claims against them are actually claims against the state itself, their employer. The official capacity claims against the State of Missouri employees fail for two reasons. First, as noted above, plaintiff cannot bring a claim for damages against the State of Missouri under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , because the state is not a § 1983 “person.” See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (asserting that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons’ under § 1983”). Furthermore, “[a] claim for damages against a state employee in his official capacity is barred under the Eleventh Amendment.” See Andrus ex rel. Andrus v. Arkansas, 197 F.3d 953 , 955 (8" Cir. 1999). Since plaintiff is seeking damages, rather than prospective injunctive relief, sovereign immunity bars his claims. For these reasons, plaintiff's official capacity claims against the State of Missouri employees must be dismissed. C. Individual Capacity Claims Plaintiff has also sued the aforementioned fourteen defendants in their individual capacities. Liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case is personal. Frederick v. Motsinger, 873 F.3d 641, 646 (8" Cir. 2017). In other words, “[g]overnment officials are personally liable only for their own misconduct.” SM. v. Krigbaum, 808 F.3d 335 , 340 Cir. 2015). As such, § 1983 liability “requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128 , 1132 (8" Cir. 2006) (quoting Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8 Cir. 1990)). See also Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1149 (8" Cir. 1993) (dismissing plaintiff s excessive bail claims because none of the defendants set plaintiffs bail, and therefore, “there can be no causal connection between any action on the part of the defendants and any alleged deprivation” of plaintiffs rights). To that end, a plaintiff must allege facts connecting the defendant to the challenged action. See Bitzan v. Bartruff, 916 F.3d 716, 717 (8 Cir. 2019). Here, plaintiff has made no effort to connect each of the individual defendants he has identified with any action violating his constitutional rights. In point of fact, there are no allegations against the defendants whatsoever. Rather, each defendant is just listed in the complaint, alongside an enormous sum of damages. For instance, plaintiff has named an unidentified lieutenant as a defendant. Instead of presenting factual allegations as to what this lieutenant did or did not do to harm him, plaintiff notes only that he requests $400 million from this person. Plaintiff proceeds as though it is enough to merely list a defendant alongside the damages □ he is requesting. However, as noted above, this is not sufficient to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. In other words, simply naming a person as a defendant is not sufficient to assert their responsibility. See Allen v. Purkett, 5 F.3d 1151, 1153 (8" Cir. 1993) (agreeing with district court dismissal of two defendants who were identified as defendants in the complaint, but who had no factual allegations made against them); and Krych vy. Hvass, 83 Fed. Appx. 854, 855 (8 Cir. 2003) (agreeing with district court dismissal of defendants who were merely listed in his complaint, and who were not alleged to have been personally involved in the constitutional violations). Even leaving aside plaintiff's failure to demonstrate the personal responsibility of any of the defendants for harming him, plaintiffhas not stated a free exercise claim. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...” U.S. Const. amend I. Pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause, an individual has the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine he or she desires. In re Kemp, 894 F.3d 900, 907 (8 Cir. 2018). Moreover, the government may not compel religious belief, punish the expression of religious doctrines, impose special disabilities based on religious views or religious status, or lend its power to a particular side in controversies over religious authority or dogma. Idy Under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, a plaintiff must first raise a question of fact regarding whether the prison has placed a substantial burden on his ability to practice his religion. Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 813 (8 Cir. 2008). See also Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817, 820 (8" Cir. 1997) (stating that “[a]s an initial matter, a person claiming that a governmental policy or action violates his right to exercise his religion freely must establish that the action substantially burdens his sincerely held religious belief’). “To constitute a substantial burden, the government policy or actions must significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or expression that manifests some central tenet of a person’s individual religious beliefs; must meaningfully curtail a person’s ability to express adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a person reasonable opportunities to engage in those activities that are fundamental to a person’s religion.” Murphy v. Missouri Dep’t of Corrs., 372 F.3d 979, 988 (8" Cir. 2004). In this case, plaintiff broadly asserts that his rights have been violated, and then mentions the denial of “religious [material]” and a “religious diet.” This is inadequate, without more, to state a claim. There are no facts indicating the content of this religious material or diet, much less that a denial inhibits expression manifesting some central tenet of his religious beliefs, or that he has been meaningfully curtailed in expressing adherence to his faith, or that he has been denied reasonable opportunities to engage in the fundamental activities of his religion. Plaintiff's allegations amount to an unsupported conclusion, which the Court is not required to accept as true. See Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 870 (8" Cir. 2002) (“While the court must accept — 10 — allegations of fact as true...the court is free to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations”). For all these reasons, plaintiff has failed to state an individual capacity claim against any of the defendants. Therefore, the claims must be dismissed. D. Motion to Appoint Counsel In the body of his complaint, plaintiff moves for the appointment of counsel. (Docket No. 1 at 1). The motion will be denied as moot as this case is being dismissed without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00 within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) the statement that the remittance is for an original proceeding. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED AS MOOT. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). A separate order of dismissal will be entered herewith. — 11 — IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good faith. ° Dated this □□ of Le ¢ , 2021. RONNIE L. WHITE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE — 12 —