Antonetti v. Filson

— 2 — 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 JOSEPH ANTONETTI, Case No. 3:17-cv-00605-MMD-CLB 7 Plaintiffs, ORDER v. — 8 — FILSON, et al., — 9 — Defendants. — 10 — 11 I. SUMMARY 12 Plaintiff Joseph Antonetti asserted several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding 13 the conditions of his confinement at Ely State Prison (“ESP”) against Defendants, ESP 14 employees and officials. (ECF No. 6.) The Court adopted United States Magistrate Judge 15 Carla L. Baldwin’s recommendation (ECF No. 80) to grant summary judgment in favor of 16 Defendants over Plaintiff’s opposition to said motion and subsequent objection (ECF No. 17 88 (“Order”).) Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 92 (the 18 “Motion”)) of the Order. Primarily because Plaintiff reiterates arguments that both Judge 19 Baldwin and this Court already rejected, and as further explained below, the Court will 20 deny the Motion. 1 The Court will also deny Plaintiff’s motion to stay (ECF No. 93) as moot.2 21 II. BACKGROUND 22 The Court again incorporates by reference and adopts the facts as outlined in 23 Judge Baldwin’s recommendation (ECF No. 80 at 1-6), and does not recite them here. 24 /// — 25 — 26 1The Court also reviewed Defendants’ response (ECF No. 94). 27 2Plaintiff appears to have filed the same motion with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, who granted the motion Plaintiff filed with that Court, rendering the motion 28 Plaintiff directed at this Court moot. (ECF No. 95.) And the motion to stay would be moot regardless because the Court is herein ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion. 2 A motion to reconsider must set forth “some valid reason why the court should 3 reconsider its prior decision” and set “forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to 4 persuade the court to reverse its prior decision.” Frasure v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 5 2d 1180, 1183 (D. Nev. 2003) (citation omitted). Reconsideration is appropriate if this 6 Court “(1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the 7 initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling 8 law.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255 , 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). 9 But “[a] motion for reconsideration is not an avenue to re-litigate the same issues and 10 arguments upon which the court already has ruled.” Brown v. Kinross Gold, U.S.A., 378 11 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1288 (D. Nev. 2005) (citation omitted). 12 Motions to reconsider are generally left to the discretion of the district court. See 13 Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2001). A district court has discretion not to 14 consider arguments that were not raised until a motion for reconsideration without a good 15 excuse for the delay. See Rosenfeld v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 57 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 16 1995); N.W. Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918 , 925-26 (9th Cir. 17 1988). Moreover, motions for reconsideration are not justified on the basis of new evidence 18 that could have been discovered prior to a district court’s ruling. See Coastal Transfer Co. 19 v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 212 (9th Cir. 1987). 20 IV. DISCUSSION 21 Plaintiff has not set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature in his Motion 22 sufficient to persuade the Court it should reconsider its prior decisions included in the 23 Order. Plaintiff seeks reconsideration based on several arguments of general applicability 24 to the Order, and several arguments specific to the Court’s rulings on his particular claims. 25 (ECF No. 92.) While the Court does not find any of these arguments persuasive, the Court 26 will briefly address each of them below. 27 /// 28 /// 2 are not proof of bias or fraud.” In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 838 F.3d 1030 (9th 3 Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 4 Plaintiff also generally argues the Court erred in crediting the evidence Defendants 5 presented in support of their underlying summary judgment motion over statements he 6 made in his opposition to that motion, and his objection to Judge Baldwin’s 7 recommendation, “because he is fairly certain he stated that everything he has said in his 8 motions is true, factual, and based on his experience.” (ECF No. 92 at 1-2.) But the 9 opposition and objection to which he refers do not contain sworn statements that may 10 have required the Court to treat his arguments as evidence. (ECF Nos. 63, 84.) Apparently 11 aware this could be an issue, Plaintiff attempts to remedy it by attaching a declaration to— 12 and including sworn statements throughout—his Motion. For example, Plaintiff swears, 13 “[a]ll of my pleadings are true under penalty of perjury,” and “[a]ll facts are based on my 14 personal experiences.” (ECF No. 92 at 2; see also id. at 21 (making a similar declaration).) 15 However, it is too late. Plaintiff had two opportunities to present evidence sufficient to 16 oppose Defendants’ summary judgment motion (including his objection to Judge Baldwin’s 17 recommendation), but he did not. It would be improper and prejudicial to Defendants for 18 the Court to give him a third chance. See, e.g., Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404 , 19 1409 (9th Cir. 1991) (providing that, once the moving party has met its initial burden, the 20 nonmoving party “may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must produce specific 21 evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute 22 exists”). Moreover, to the extent the Court were to consider Plaintiff’s arguments supported 23 by retroactive sworn statements in his Motion ‘new evidence,’ the Court would still decline 24 to reconsider the Order on that basis because that evidence could have been discovered 25 prior to the Court issuing the Order. See Coastal Transfer Co., 833 F.2d at 212 . 26 Further, Plaintiff repeats several arguments he made both in his opposition to the 27 underlying summary judgment motion, and in his objection to Judge Baldwin’s 28 recommendation. (ECF No. 92 at 4-9 (arguing his classification hearings did not satisfy 1 || procedural due process requirements), id. at 9-12 (arguing prison employees interfered 2 || with his ability to send legal mail), id. at 12-13 (arguing prison employees’ use of normal3 || sized ankle shackles on him led to unnecessary pain and suffering), id. at 14-15 (arguing 4 || that delays in receiving pain medication also caused Plaintiff unnecessary pain and 5 || suffering).) But as noted, “[a] motion for reconsideration is not an avenue to re-litigate the 6 || same issues and arguments upon which the court already has ruled.” Brown, 378 F. Supp. 7 || 2d at 1288 (citation omitted). 8 Plaintiff finally argues the Court should not have entered summary judgment 9 || against him because he never received certain discovery he was entitled to. (ECF No. 92 10 || at 18-19.) However, on this point, the Court agrees with Defendants that Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 || 56(f) does not require the Court ‘dismiss’ Defendants’ underlying summary judgment 12 || motion because Plaintiff did not receive all of the discovery he believes he is entitled to 13 || (ECF No. 94 at 2), as Plaintiff appears to argue (ECF No. 92 at 18). Plaintiff received 14 || several extensions of time in this case, and was able to litigate several discovery issues. 15 || (ECF Nos. 57, 60, 62, 69, 73, 78, 81, 83.) Plaintiff also never directly moved for an 16 || extension of the discovery cutoff date. (ECF No. 34 (setting discovery cutoff).) Thus, he 17 || appears to have been given a sufficient opportunity to obtain any pertinent discovery. In 18 || any event, the Court will not reconsider its Order on the basis of purported outstanding 19 || discovery. 20 In sum, the Court is unpersuaded it should reconsider the Order. 21 || V. CONCLUSION 22 It is therefore ordered that Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 92) is 23 || denied. 24 It is further ordered that Plaintiff's motion to stay (ECF No. 93) is denied as moot. 25 DATED THIS 11* Day of December 2020. 26 ——~ 27 aabeln) _— MIRANDA M. DU 28 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE