Cobbin-Richardson v. Workforce Connections, Southern Nevada's Local Workforce Development Board

[3] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT [4] DISTRICT OF NEVADA [5] 6 ERICA KENADIE COBBINRICHARDSON, Case No. 2:20-cv-02278-JCM-NJK [7] Plaintiff, ORDER [8] v. [Docket No. 20] [9] WORKFORCE CONNECTIONS, 10 SOUTHERN NEVADA’S LOCAL WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT BOARD, [11] Defendant. [12] 13 Pending before the Court is the parties’ stipulation to extend discovery deadlines. Docket 14 No. 20. The parties request a 90-day extension of discovery deadlines. Id. at 2–3. 15 A request to extend deadlines in the Court’s scheduling order must be supported by a 16 showing of good cause for the extension. LR 26-3; see also Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, 17 Inc., 975 F.2d at 608–09.1 The “good cause” inquiry focuses mostly on the movant’s diligence. 18 Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271 , 1294–95 (9th Cir. 2000). Good cause to extend a 19 discovery deadline exists “if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking 20 the extension.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. While prejudice to the opposing party may also be 21 considered, when the movant “fail[s] to show diligence, ‘the inquiry should end.’” Coleman, 232 22 F.3d at 1295 (quoting Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609). Further, to seek an extension of an expired 23 discovery deadline, a movant must make “a showing of good cause” and “demonstrate that the 24 failure to act [before the deadline expired] was the result of excusable neglect.” LR 26-3. The 25 Court has broad discretion in supervising pretrial litigation. Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 26 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002). [27] 1 The “good cause” standard in Local Rule 26-3 is the same as the standard governing 28 modification of the scheduling order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). ] The parties submit that good cause exists to grant the requested extension because they 2|| “have spent significant time attempting to agree on the terms for a stipulated protective order[.]” 3} Docket No. 20 at 2. The parties further submit that they “did not want to engage in more time4] consuming and cost-intensive forms of discovery until after the Early Neutral Evaluation . . . has been completed.” /d. at 2. The Court is not persuaded that the parties require three months to 6] finalize a stipulated protective order. Further, parties may not unilaterally stay discovery pending 7|| settlement discussions. See Zaic v. Giddens, 2017 WL 2259766 , at *1 (D. Nev. May 23, 2017) 8|| (finding parties are “not entitled to unilaterally stay discovery without an order from the court’); 9| see also Corbett v. Pub. Ret. Sys. ex rel. Nevada, 2021 WL 297564 , at *1 (D. Nev. Jan. 28, 2021) 10] (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Tracinda Corp., 175 F.R.D. 554, 556 (D. Nev. 1997)) 11] (‘Discovery should proceed absent a ‘strong showing’ to the contrary”). In addition, the deadlines for amending pleadings/adding parties and disclosing initial experts expired on April 12, 2021 and May 12, 2021, respectively. See Docket No. 12. The parties, however, fail to address, let alone 14] demonstrate, whether excusable neglect exists to extend these deadlines. See LR 26-3. 15 Accordingly, the parties’ stipulation, Docket No. 20, is hereby DENIED without prejudice 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 Dated: May 18, 2021 18 7 as Son Nancy J. Koppe 19 United states\Magistrate Judge