Sanchez v. Albertson's LLC

[2] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT [3] DISTRICT OF NEVADA [4] * * * [5] Victor Sanchez, Case No. 2:19-cv-02017-JAD-DJA [6] Plaintiff, 7 Order v. [8] Albertson’s LLC, [9] Defendant. [11] 12 This is a personal injury action arising out of an umbrella that fell on Plaintiff Victor 13 Sanchez’s head while he was shopping at Defendant Albertson’s store. Plaintiff sues Defendant 14 for damages, claiming that it was negligent in maintaining its premises. After the Court granted 15 Defendant’s motion for sanctions, it ordered the parties to meet and confer and reach an 16 agreement on the appropriate attorneys’ fees and costs to award to Defendant. (ECF No. 73 at 17 21-22). The Court asked Defendant to file an affidavit of reasonable expenses and fees if the 18 parties could not reach an agreement. (Id.). 19 Defendant filed an affidavit. (ECF No. 78). Plaintiff objected to certain of Defendant’s 20 time entries and amounts. (ECF No. 81). Defendant replied that Plaintiff’s objections were not 21 developed and that the fees were reasonable. (ECF No. 82). Because the Court finds that the 22 rates Defendant’s attorneys and paralegal charged were reasonable, but that certain of the time 23 spent was not, it grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s requested attorneys’ fees and costs. 24 The Court finds these matters properly resolved without a hearing. LR 78-1. 25 I. Discussion. 26 The court should only award attorneys’ fees that it deems reasonable. Moreno v. City of 27 Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008). Reasonableness is generally determined using 1 that method, the Court multiplies the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by 2 the reasonable hourly rate. Id. After making that computation, the court then assesses whether it 3 is necessary to adjust the presumptively reasonable lodestar figure based on the Kerr factors1 that 4 are not already subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation. Id. Adjustments are proper only in 5 rare and exceptional cases. Fifty-Six Hope Road Music, Ltd. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 915 F.Supp.2d 6 1179, 1188 (D. Nev. 2013) (citing Jordan v. Multnomah Cnty., 815 F.2d 1258 , 1262 (9th Cir. 7 1987)).2 8 First, the Court finds that the hourly rate requested by Defendant’s attorneys and paralegal 9 is reasonable. Second, the Court determines that, while much of the time spent on the litigation 10 was reasonable, certain hours were not. It thus conducts the lodestar computation based on the 11 reasonable rate and reasonable hours. The Court need not reach the Kerr factors in adjusting the 12 lodestar. [15] 16 1 The Kerr factors include: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion [17] of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, 18 (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, 19 and ability of the attorneys, (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. Kerr v. Screen Extras [20] Guild, Inc., 526 F.3d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975). 21 2 Additionally, under Local Rule 54-14, in moving for attorneys’ fees, a party must include a brief summary of: (1) the results obtained and the amount involved; (2) the time and labor required; [22] (3) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (4) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (5) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the [23] case; (6) the customary fee; (7) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (8) the time limitations 24 imposed by the client or the circumstances; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney(s); (10) the undesirability of the case, if any; (11) the nature and length of the 25 professional relationship with the client; (12) awards in similar cases; and (13) any other information the court may request. Here, although Defendant included the required summary in [26] its reply but not the initial affidavit, the Court nonetheless finds the summary sufficient. The 27 Court has already concluded that Defendant is entitled to attorneys’ fees and is still able to analyze the reasonableness of those fees using the summary. Thus, Defendant’s error of not 1 1. Defendant has demonstrated a reasonable hourly rate. 2 The court determines a reasonable hourly rate by reference to the “prevailing market rates 3 in the relevant community” for an attorney of similar experience, skill, and reputation. Gonzalez 4 v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). The relevant 5 community generally is “the forum in which the district court sits.” Prison Legal News v. 6 Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 454 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). “For the Las Vegas 7 market, this court has regularly awarded fees where the hourly rates at issue were between $250 8 and $400.” Scott v. Smith’s Food and Drug Centers, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-303-JCM-VCF, 2020 WL 9 343642, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 21, 2020) (compiling cases). An attorneys’ fees award may include 10 paralegal fees. See Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 284 (1989); see also Agarwal v. 11 Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:11-cv-01384-LDG-NJK, 2013 WL 5882710 , at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 30, 12 2013) (awarding fees for paralegal work). For the Las Vegas market, paralegals typically charge 13 between $75 to $125 per hour. See Watson v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., No. 14-cv-1755-JAD-VCF, [14] 2015 WL 1959163 , at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 29, 2015) (finding a $125 hourly rate to be 15 reasonable); Tallman v. CPS Sec. (USA), Inc., 23 F.Supp.3d 1249, 1260 (D. Nev. 2014) (finding a 16 $90 hourly rate to be reasonable); Agarwal, 2013 WL 5882710 , at *2 (finding a $75 hourly rate to 17 be reasonable); Plaza Bank v. Alan Green Family Trust, No. 2:11-cv-00130-MMD-VCF, 2013 18 WL 1759580 , at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 24, 2013) (finding a $100 hourly rate to be reasonable). 19 Defendant has established a reasonable hourly rate for its attorneys and paralegal. 20 Plaintiff explains that he has no specific objection to the $168 per hour requested by attorneys 21 Jaquelyn Franco and Jessica Brown. However, he asserts that he objects to the “lack of support 22 establishing the ability to seek fees for paralegals and the lack of support showing $110 an hour is 23 a reasonable rate for any paralegal.” (ECF No. 81 at 4). In reply, Defendant provides this 24 support by citing to a Ninth Circuit case in which the court awarded $115 an hour for the services 25 of a paralegal and explaining that Katri Ching has five years of experience and a master’s degree. 26 (ECF No. 82 at 2-3) (citing Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 977-78 (9th Cir. 27 2008)); (ECF No. 82-2 at 6). The Court finds that this is sufficient to support Ms. Ching’s hourly 1 thus demonstrated a reasonable hourly rate of $168 an hour for Jaquelyn Franco and Jessica 2 Brown and a rate of $110 an hour for Katri Ching. 3 2. Plaintiff’s attorneys have expended reasonable hours except for certain entries. [4] 5 The requesting party “has the burden of submitting billing records to establish that the 6 number of hours it has requested are reasonable.” Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202 . The court should 7 exclude from the lodestar calculation hours that were not “reasonably expended,” including hours 8 that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 , 9 434 (1983); see also Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2006). If the court 10 determines some requested fees should be excluded as unreasonable, the court may exclude bill 11 entries under an hour-by-hour analysis. Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1203 . The court has “a great deal 12 of discretion” in determining the reasonableness of the fee, “including its decision regarding the 13 reasonableness of the hours claimed by the prevailing party.” Prison Legal News v. 14 Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 2010). 15 Attorneys’ fees are generally not awarded in this District for time spent meeting and 16 conferring because the local rules require counsel to meet and confer before filing any discovery 17 motion to resolve disputes. See Aevoe Corp. v. AE Tech Co., Ltd., No. 2:12-cv-00053, 2013 WL 18 5324787, at *6 (D. Nev. Sept. 20, 2013). Courts have awarded fees for meeting and conferring in 19 limited circumstances. See id. at *6 n.12 (citing Matlink, Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 20 07-cv-1994-DMS-BLM, 2008 WL 8504767 , at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2008) (noting that such 21 hours should generally not be included in a fee award, but awarding fees for half of such hours 22 where opposing party “stonewalled” the meet and confer process)); see also Allstate v. Balle, No. 23 2:10-cv-02205-APG-NJK, 2013 WL 4458791 , at *7 (D. Nev. Aug.15, 2013) (awarding fees 24 for meet and confer based on the circumstances of that case); Grimsley v. Charles River 25 Labs., No. 3:08-cv-00482-LRH-VPC, 2010 WL 3238950 , at *1–3 (D. Nev. Aug.13, 2010) 26 (affirming award of fees for time spent on meet and confer efforts for party opposing motion to 27 compel where movant failed to comply with a court order to make a “sincere effort to resolve 1 Here, Plaintiff has objected to certain of Defendant’s counsel’s paragraphs in her affidavit. 2 Those paragraphs describe the work Defendant’s counsel conducted on the motion for sanctions. 3 As outlined below, the Court disagrees with certain of Plaintiff’s objections but agrees with 4 others. The paragraphs to which Plaintiff does not object, the Court does not address but finds 5 reasonable and includes in the lodestar computation. [6] 6. On September 30, 2021, Ms. Brown received, analyzed, and [7] responded to an email from opposing counsel stating that Plaintiff 8 no longer has communications between his former fiancé despite recent texts. The time sent on that activity was 0.5 hours. [9] (ECF No. 78 at 2). [10] 11 Plaintiff objects to this statement because the email at issue is only 3 lines long and the 12 time spent appears to relate to the meet and confer process. The Court disagrees. This statement 13 encompasses two time entries. Brown only spent 0.2 hours reviewing the email at issue. (ECF 14 No. 78-2 at 4). She spent 0.3 hours corresponding with Plaintiff’s counsel about the missing text 15 messages. (Id.). The Court finds this time reasonably spent. Additionally, while attorneys’ fees 16 are not typically awarded for meet and confer efforts, the Court does not find this time to be 17 related to the meet and confer. Instead, it finds the time spent related to the motion for sanctions 18 because Brown was confirming the existence of the text messages on which the motion was 19 based.3 20 7. On October 8, 2021, [Ms. Franco] corresponded with Plaintiff’s counsel regarding compliance with court Order. (ECF No. 49). The [21] time spent on that activity was 0.3 hours. [23] 3 The Court recognizes that these entries appear to have occurred before the meet and confer, 24 which is likely why Plaintiff argues that they are related to the meet and confer. However, it appears to the Court that these entries are related to counsel determining the basis for the motion 25 for sanctions before bringing it. And while part of the process of bringing the motion for sanctions is conducting a meet and confer, the Court does not find Defendants efforts to be in [26] furtherance of the meet and confer, but in furtherance of the underlying motion for sanctions. It 27 thus finds that these entries—which are not directly related to the pre-motion meet and confer— were “incurred in bringing [the] second motion for sanctions” as the Court ordered. (ECF No. 73 1 (ECF No. 78 at 2). 2 Plaintiff objects to this time as excessive for just a few emails and related to the meet and 3 confer process. The Court disagrees. Working with the IT company was a complicated process 4 and ultimately, the result of the IT search formed the basis for the motion for sanctions. And just 5 because Plaintiff paid for the IT search does not mean that counsel is not entitled to fees in 6 analyzing whether the results of that search warranted a motion for sanctions. 7 8. Also on October 8, 2021, [Ms. Franco] met with Ms. Ching to review the status of the outstanding discovery. The time spent on [8] that activity was 0.2 hours. [9] 9. Also on October 8, 2021, Ms. Ching met with [Ms. Franco] to 10 review the status [of] the production [] by the I.T. company. The time spent on those activities was 0.3 hours. [11] 12 (ECF No. 78 at 2). 13 Plaintiff objects to these time expenditures because Defendant does not explain how 14 meeting with a paralegal is appropriate. However, Defendant has explained that Ms. Ching was 15 responsible for keeping track of the discovery in this case. (ECF No. 82-2 at 6). The Court is not 16 convinced by Plaintiff’s objections that this time spent relates to the meet and confer process or 17 should be excluded because they are related to the IT search for which Plaintiff already paid. 18 These are reasonable. 19 10. On October 11, 2021, [Ms. Franco] drafted correspondence to Plaintiff’s counsel requesting meet and confer regarding failure to [20] comply with the Court Order to produce the requested discovery 21 (ECF No. 49). The time spent on that activity was 0.1 hours. 22 11. Also on October 11, 2021, Ms. Ching reviewed the email communication from Plaintiff’s counsel regarding the outstanding 23 discovery. The time sent on that activity was 0.1 hours. 24 (ECF No. 78 at 3). 25 Plaintiff’s objection to these has merit. These are directly related to the meet and confer, 26 rather than to determining the basis for the motion for sanctions. The Court thus excludes this 27 time from the lodestar figure. 12. On October 12, 2021, [Ms. Franco] corresponded with [1] Plaintiff’s counsel regarding retention of the Cornerstone I.T. firm. 2 The time spent on that activity was 0.2 hours. (Id.). [3] Plaintiff objects to this time expenditure because it is related to the IT search and part of [4] the meet and confer process. For the same reasons outlined above regarding those arguments, the [5] Court disagrees. This is reasonable. [6] 14. Also on October 20, 2021, Ms. Brown drafted pages 1-6 of the 7 Albertsons, LLC’s Second Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions. (ECF No. 51). The time spent on that activity was 4.6 hours. [8] (Id.). [9] Plaintiff objects to this time expenditure because a “majority of pages 1-6 consist of stock [10] pages and portions of a declaration substantially similar” to the first motion for sanctions. (ECF [11] No. 81 at 5). But the Court disagrees. Pages 1-6 consist of a declaration by Ms. Franco regarding [12] the status of discovery and the basis of the motion. The declaration in the second motion for [13] sanctions is quite different than that in the previous motion for sanctions. Pages 1-6 are also [14] detailed, citing and attaching numerous exhibits and outlining the timeline at issue. The Court [15] does not find Plaintiff’s cited reasons sufficient to reduce this time. [16] 15. On October 21, 2021, Ms. Brown drafted pages 7-18 of the 17 Albertson’s LLC’ Second Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions, (ECF No. 51). The time spent on that activity was 9.9 hours. [18] (ECF No. 78 at 3). [19] 20 This statement references four bill entries. The first was for pages 7-10 of the motion, 21 totaling 3.2 hours. (ECF No. 78-2 at 8). The next was for pages 11-12, totaling 2.3 hours. (Id.). 22 The next, for pages 13-16, totaling 2.5 hours. (Id. at 9). And finally, for pages 17-18, totaling 1.9 23 hours. (Id.). 24 Plaintiff objects to these time expenditures because “Pages 7-11 are IDENTICAL to the 25 background set forth in [Defendant’s first motion for sanctions] except that the new document 26 contained headings separating out the facts.” (ECF No. 81 at 5). Plaintiff adds that the legal 27 arguments section is largely a copy and paste of the first motion for sanctions. (Id.). Defendant 1 regarding the technical mechanisms available to retrieve social media messaging, reorganized the 2 fact section, and provided the Court with a Table of Contents…” (ECF No. 82 at 5). 3 The Court agrees with Plaintiff regarding pages 7-10 of the motion. These pages are 4 nearly identical—except for headings—to the prior motion to compel. It is unclear why these 5 pages took 3.2 hours to draft. The Court thus reduces this entry by half to 1.6 hours. 6 The Court also agrees with Plaintiff regarding pages 11-12, which have new facts related 7 to the instant motion, along with the same facts contained in the previous motion. Because it 8 spans two pages and only includes about a page of new material, the Court does not find 2.3 9 hours to be reasonable for this entry. It thus reduces it to 1.5 hours. 10 Pages 13-16 are a different matter. They include new material and facts related only to 11 the second motion to compel. The Court finds the 2.5 hours Defendant’s counsel expended on 12 these pages to be reasonable. The same is true for pages 17-184 and the 1.9 hours counsel 13 expended on those pages. 14 16. Also on October 21, 2021, [Ms. Franco] reviewed correspondence from Plaintiff’s counsel clarifying an email [15] memorialization of a phone [sic] regarding the Court Order. (ECF 16 No, 49). The time spent on that activity was 0.1 hours. 17 (ECF No. 78 at 3). 18 Plaintiff argues that this is related to the meet and confer process and should be excluded. 19 The Court disagrees. For the same reasons outlined above, the Court finds this time expenditure 20 related to the underlying motion for sanctions. 21 17. Also on October 21, [Ms. Franco] reviewed a second correspondence from Plaintiff’s counsel memorializing a meet and [22] confer. The time spent on that activity was 0.1 hours. [23] 24 (Id.). [27] 4 The motion for sanctions is twenty pages. (ECF No. 51). It is unclear where these final two pages are incorporated in the billing. However, because neither side addresses it, neither will the 1 Plaintiff objects to this time expenditure as related to the meet and confer process. The 2 Court agrees. This is excluded. 3 18. Also on October 21, [Ms. Franco] drafted correspondence to Plaintiff’s counsel identifying issues with Plaintiff’s contentions [4] concerning the Court Order. (ECF No. 49). The time spent on that 5 activity was 0.3 hours. 6 (ECF No. 78 at 3). 7 Plaintiff objects to this time expenditure as related to the meet and confer process. 8 However, that is not apparent from the statement. Without more, the Court will not exclude this 9 time expenditure based on Plaintiff’s belief that it relates to a meet and confer. 10 20. On October 22, 2021, Ms. Brown prepared the Albertson’s LLC’s Second Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions for filing. The time [11] spent on that activity was 0.9 hours. [12] (Id.). [13] Plaintiff argues that this time expenditure appears to be clerical work and thus, the Court [14] should exclude it. However, while “prepare” is not as clear a verb as is ideal, it still does not, on [15] its own, indicate clerical work. Without more, the Court will not reduce this time expenditure. [16] 17 21. On November 8, 2021, [Ms. Franco] corresponded with Plaintiff’s counsel regarding a stipulation and order to extend 18 briefing for Plaintiff’s response to Albertson’s LLC’s Second Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions. The time spent on that activity was 0.3 hours. [19] (ECF No. 78 at 4). [20] 21 Plaintiff objects to this time expenditure because it “appears related to briefing schedules, 22 which is similar to meeting and conferring and should be excluded.” (ECF No. 81 at 6). But 23 Plaintiff provides no other argument on this point. Defendant responds that it was required to 24 extend briefing time because Plaintiff requested more time to respond. (ECF No. 82 at 6). 25 Defendant has the better argument here. This entry is related to Defendant’s work on the motion 26 for sanctions, even though the issue is slightly tangential. Additionally, Plaintiff has provided no 27 authority for why an entry like this should be excluded. Without more, the Court will not exclude 22. Also on November 8, 2021, [Ms. Franco] reviewed and [1] analyzed Plaintiff’s Albertson’s LLC’s Second Motion for Rule 37 2 Sanctions. The time spent on that activity was 0.2 hours. 3 (ECF No. 78 at 4). 4 Plaintiff argues that this time expenditure is duplicative because Defendant had another 5 attorney draft the motion and there is no indication that Ms. Franco was the supervising attorney 6 on file. The Court disagrees. Ms. Franco’s review occurred the same day that the parties agreed 7 to extend Plaintiff’s briefing schedule. Thus, the time spent does not appear related to the 8 drafting of the motion but related to the parties’ agreement to extend the briefing schedule. The 9 Court will not reduce this time expenditure. 10 23. On November 9, 2021, [Ms. Franco] corresponded with Plaintiff’s Counsel regarding a stipulation and order to extend [11] briefing for Plaintiff’s response to Albertson’s LLC’s Second Motion 12 for Rule 37 Sanctions. The time spent on that activity was 0.3 hours. 13 (Id.). 14 Plaintiff objects to this time expenditure as related to the briefing schedule. For the 15 reasons outlined above, the Court disagrees. It will not reduce this time. 16 Plaintiff objects to Defendant’s paragraphs 25-30—discussing time spent drafting 17 Defendant’s reply in support of its second motion for sanctions—for being “excessive given the 18 length of the reply and the fact that it contained some copying and pasting from [Defendant’s 19 reply in support of its first motion for sanctions].” (ECF No. 81 at 6). The Court disagrees. 20 These bill entries appear reasonable. In total Defendant’s attorney spent 7.8 hours on the reply. 21 And while initially that amount seems high, each of the entries—broken down into smaller 22 increments—are supported and within a reasonable limit. (ECF No. 78 at 4). Without more, the 23 Court will not reduce these entries. 24 31. Also on November 29, 2021, [Ms. Franco] reviewed and finalized the Reply. The time sent on that activity was 0.5 hours. [25] 26 (Id.). 27 Plaintiff objects to this time expenditure as duplicative because Ms. Brown—not Ms. 1 reviewed the motion before Ms. Brown filed it. Having a second person review a document 2 before submitting it is common. Moreover, it does not appear that Ms. Franco spent hours 3 recreating the work done by Ms. Brown on the motion. Instead, she spent half an hour, which the 4 Court finds consistent with the “reviewing and finalizing” she asserts to have done. The Court 5 will not reduce this time expenditure. 6 32. On March 3, 2021, Ms. Brown reviewed the Court’s Order regarding the Albertson’s LLC’s Second Motion for Rule 37 [7] Sanctions. (ECF No. 73) The time spent on that activity was 0.4 8 hours.5 9 33. On March 18, 2021, Ms. Brown reviewed time billed in preparation for discussions with Opposing Counsel in compliance 10 with ECF No. 73. The time spent on that activity was 0.8 hours. 11 34. On March 21, 2021, Ms. Brown redacted bills in preparation for discussions with Opposing Counsel in compliance with ECF No. 73. [12] The time sent on that activity was 0.4 hours. [13] 14 (ECF No. 78 at 4-5). 15 Plaintiff objects to these time expenditures because they are not part of the motion for 16 sanctions, but instead relate to the instant affidavit and Court-ordered meet and confer in advance. 17 Defendant does not address these in reply. The Court does not find these expenditures to be 18 included in its order. They do not relate to the motion for sanctions but instead occurred after the 19 Court had granted that motion. The Court will thus exclude these. 20 The Court calculates the lodestar figure—excluding the above reductions—below: [21] 22 Biller Date Rate Hours Total 23 Brown 9/30/2021 $168 0.5 $84.00 24 Franco 10/8/2021 $168 0.3 $50.40 25 Franco 10/8/2021 $168 0.2 $33.60 [27] 5 Plaintiff does not object to this. However, for the same reasons the Court excludes the time Defendant’s counsel incurred after the Court decided the motion for sanctions, the Court excludes 1 Ching 10/8/2021 $110 0.3 $33.00 2 Franco 10/12/2021 $168 0.2 $33.60 3 Brown 10/20/2021 $168 2.2 $369.60 4 Brown 10/20/2021 $168 4.6 $772.80 5 Brown 10/21/2021 $168 1.6 $268.80 6 Brown 10/21/2021 $168 1.5 $252.00 7 Brown 10/21/2021 $168 2.5 $420.00 8 Brown 10/21/2021 $168 1.9 $319.20 9 Franco 10/21/2021 $168 0.1 $16.80 10 Franco 10/21/2021 $168 0.3 $50.40 [11] Brown 10/21/2021 $168 2.9 $487.20 [12] Brown 10/22/2021 $168 0.9 $151.20 [13] Franco 11/8/2021 $168 0.3 $50.40 [14] Franco 11/8/2021 $168 0.2 $33.60 [15] Franco 11/9/2021 $168 0.3 $50.40 [16] Brown 11/12/2021 $168 0.4 $67.20 [17] Brown 11/12/2021 $168 1.2 $201.60 [18] Brown 11/18/2021 $168 0.5 $84.00 [19] Brown 11/22/2021 $168 3.7 $621.60 [20] Brown 11/24/2021 $168 0.5 $84.00 [21] Brown 11/27/2021 $168 0.5 $84.00 [22] Brown 11/29/2021 $168 0.9 $151.20 [23] Franco 11/29/2021 $168 0.5 $84.00 [24] Total $4,854.60 [25] 26 Based on that calculation, the Court will award $4,854.60 in attorneys’ fees.6 [1] 2 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Court awards Defendant $4,854.60 in 3 attorneys’ fees. 4 DATED: June 24, 2022 [5] DANIEL J. ALBREGTS 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE