Smith v. Clark County

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Jonathan Lee Smith, Case No.: 2:21-cv-01062-JAD-EJY 4 Plaintiff Order Adopting Report 5 v. and Recommendation and Dismissing Case 6 Clark County District Attorney Family Division; Inskeep, [ECF No. 7] [7] Defendants [8] 9 Pro se plaintiff Jonathan Lee Smith brings this civil-rights lawsuit against the Clark 10 County District Attorney and one of its Child Support Enforcement employees, alleging that they 11 violated his due-process rights by extracting past-due child-support obligations from his prison 12 account.1 Because Smith applies to proceed in forma pauperis, the magistrate judge screened his 13 complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2). And because the targets of this complaint are immune 14 from this suit under the law, the magistrate judge recommends that I dismiss this action and close 15 this case.2 Smith objects to that recommendation.3 16 Unfortunately, Smith’s objections do not overcome the reason that this case must be 17 dismissed. As the Nevada Supreme Court recognized in County of Washoe, on relation of its 18 Office of the District Attorney, Nonsupport Division v. Second Judicial District Court, a district 19 attorney is immune from damages for actions related to the performance of civil obligations 20 related to child-support enforcement.4 And the Ninth Circuit has recognized that enforcement of [21] 1 ECF No. 1-1. [22] 2 ECF No. 7 (report and recommendation). 23 3 ECF No. 8 (objections to report and recommendation). 4 County of Washoe v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 652 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Nev. 1982). 1 child-support orders by a district attorney is an integral part of the judicial process that warrants 2 prosecutorial immunity.5 That immunity “is essential if prosecutors are to be able independently 3 to perform their public duties free from fear that their actions might give rise to civil liability.”6 4 And “a prosecutor’s post-adjudication activities also enjoy absolute immunity.”7 So the law 5 immunizes the defendants here from Smith’s suit. 6 Smith argues that he isn’t suing for monetary damages—he’s couched his claim as one 7 “for a reparitive [sic] injunction”8—so that immunity does not apply. But characterizing his 8 claim this way doesn’t make it a true equitable-relief claim. Smith’s complaint makes it clear 9 that he is seeking “the return of . . . funds” collected from his account, “with interest.”9 That’s 10 money damages, not equitable relief. Plus, the request for relief in his complaint does not 11 mention an injunction or any other type of equitable relief.10 So the true nature of Smith’s suit is 12 monetary damages, and the defendants are immune from it.11 13 Smith also “finds it strange that the magistrate did not elaborate on the issue of due[-] 14 process violations or the fact the D.A.’s office intentionally violated federal regulations that [15] 16 5 See, e.g., Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154 , 1156–59 (9th Cir. 1987). 17 6 Coverdell v. Dept. of Soc. & Health Svcs., 834 F.2d 758 , 762 (9th Cir. 1987). 18 7 Cash v. Los Angeles County Dist. Atty., 50 F.3d 13 , *1 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished); see also Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 1984). 19 8 ECF No. 8 at 2. [20] 9 ECF No. 1-1 at 6. 10 Id. at 15. [21] 11 Smith cites to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in LeClerk v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (2005), for the proposition that a judge, acting in an enforcement role, is not immune from suit. But the LeClerk [22] court held that this was true only for equitable-relief clams, not monetary-damages suits, so LeClerk does not support Smith’s objection here. See LeClerk, 419 F.3d at 414 (“When acting in [23] its enforcement capacity, the Louisiana Supreme Court, and its members, are not immune from suits for declaratory or injunctive relief.”) (emphasis added). resulted in the violation of [his] due process” so “this is not a suit solely based on a D.A. 2|| enforcing a child[-]support order.”!? And he objects that, here, the district attorney “was not carrying out a state order”—the order wasn’t even in his name. But these are distinctions without a difference for immunity purposes. As the Ninth Circuit has held, prosecutors are absolutely immune from all theories of claims based on quasi-judicial activities taken within the 6|| scope of their authority, even when “grave procedural errors” are made. ! 7 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Smith’s objections [ECF No. 8] are OVERRULED 8|| and the Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 7] is ADOPTED. This action is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT accordingly and CLOSE THIS CASE. Jn forma pauperis status should not continue on appeal. 1] U.S. District Judge Jerimifer A. Dorsey 13 Dated: July 12, 2022 [22] 23}? ECF No. 8 at 1. 13 Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1986).