Williams v. Desert Palace LLC

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 * * * 4 Nathaniel M. Williams, Case No. 2:20-cv-02021-GMN-BNW 5 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER AND 6 v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 7 Desert Palace LLC, 8 Defendant. [9] 10 Pro se Plaintiff Nathaniel Williams brings this employment-discrimination case related to 11 events that occurred while he was employed at Caesars Palace Hotel and Casino. Williams 12 submitted the affidavit required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a) showing an inability to prepay fees or 13 costs or give security for them. ECF No. 2. Accordingly, the Court will grant his request to 14 proceed in forma pauperis. 15 The Court now screens Plaintiff’s complaint. ECF No. 2-1. 16 I. Analysis 17 A. Screening Standard 18 Upon granting a request to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must screen the complaint 19 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2). In screening the complaint, a court must identify cognizable claims 20 and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, file to state a claim on which relief may be 21 granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard 23 for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, [24] 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 25 To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 26 true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 , 27 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court liberally construes pro se 1 set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 2 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ). 3 In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, all allegations of 4 material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wyler 5 Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 F.3d 658 , 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 6 Although the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff 7 must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 8 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. 9 Unless it is clear that the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured through amendment, a pro 10 se plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with notice regarding the complaint’s 11 deficiencies. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 12 B. Screening the Complaint 13 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he was wrongfully terminated from Cafe Americano (a 14 restaurant located at Caesars Palace) on September 24, 2018. Soon thereafter, he applied for 15 employment at several restaurants within Caesars Palace. These included Mesa Grill, Bacchanal, 16 and Rao’s. 17 Williams eventually interviewed with Chef Richard Leggett for the position at Bacchanal. 18 Chef Richard told him that position was no longer available but wanted to set up a “tasting-skills 19 exam” for the following week. Chef Richard asked Williams if there was anyone he could contact 20 at Cafe Americano for references. Williams explained he did not wish for Cafe Americano to be 21 contacted but stated that he would provide references from previous employments. In addition, 22 when he filled out his application, he made clear that he did not wish Cafe Americano to be 23 contacted. 24 Nevertheless, Chef Richard never called him back. This is because, according to 25 Williams, a former colleague of his—Jose Levin—called Chef Richard and provided false 26 information about Williams. For example, Levin stated that Williams, among other things, had 27 warrants and would not pass the background check, was homeless, and was a devil worshipper. 1 In short, Williams alleges Caesars should not have had any conversations with anyone at 2 Cafe Americano because he did not consent to it. He further alleges that Caesars’ failure to hire 3 him constitutes discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and the violation of several Nevada 4 statutes. 5 1. Discrimination under Title VII 6 Title VII makes it “unlawful . . . for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 7 any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such 8 individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). To state a 9 claim for discrimination, a plaintiff must allege she (1) belongs to a protected class; (2) was 10 qualified for the position; (3) was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly 11 situated individuals outside her protected class were treated more favorably, or that a 12 discriminatory reason motivated the employer. Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Prod., 847 F.3d 678 , 13 690–91 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). If the 14 plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, 15 nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Id. at 691. If the defendant does so, then the plaintiff 16 must show that the employer’s proffered reasons were “a mere pretext for unlawful 17 discrimination.” Id. 18 Here, Williams fails to state a Title VII claim for discrimination because he does not 19 allege sufficient facts to show how the first or fourth elements are met. He alleges he was 20 qualified for employment (based on his studies and previous jobs) and that he was not hired. But 21 his complaint lacks facts that show which protected class he alleged he belongs to or how others 22 similarly situated outside his protected class were treated more favorably. 23 2. Retaliation 24 To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, plaintiffs must show that they (1) 25 “undertook a protected activity under Title VII,” (2) defendants subjected them to an adverse 26 employment action, and (3) “a causal link between the two.” Vasquez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 349 27 F.3d 634, 646 (9th Cir. 2003). Protected activities under Title VII include opposing allegedly 1 making informal complaints to one’s supervisor. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 , 1240 n.3 2 (9th Cir. 2000). 3 Here, Williams fails to state a claim for retaliation. He alleges facts to meet the second 4 element as he states Caesars failed to hire him. But he does not allege sufficient facts to show 5 how the first or third elements are met. That is, he does not allege what protected activity under 6 Title VII he undertook. Neither does he explain what the link is between that protected activity 7 and not being hired. 8 Given these deficiencies, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint but with leave to 9 amend. 10 C. State Law Claims 11 Williams alleges violation of several state statutes: Blacklisting, Prevention of 12 Employment, Stalking, and Harassment. 13 The supplemental jurisdiction statute provides that “in any civil action of which the 14 district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction 15 over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction 16 that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States 17 Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a). Courts in this circuit have explained that where state law 18 claims arise from the same nucleus of operative fact as federal claims, a district court may 19 properly invoke its supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See Bahrampour v. 20 Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). 21 Since Williams must successfully state a federal claim to proceed with his case, this Court 22 will not screen his potential state court claims at this time. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, [23] 484 U.S. 343 , 350 n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated 24 before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine— 25 judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise 26 jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”). 27 // 1 D. Instructions for Amendment 2 Williams is advised that if he files an amended complaint, the original complaint (ECF 3 || No. 2-1) will no longer serve any function in this case. This is because the Court cannot refer to a 4 || prior pleading or to other documents to make Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Hal 5 || Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding 6 || that “[t]he fact that a party was named in the original complaint is irrelevant; an amended 7 || pleading supersedes the original”). The amended complaint must be complete in and of itself 8 || without reference to prior pleadings or to other documents. 9 || IL. Conclusion 10 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff Nathaniel Williams’ Application for 11 || Leave to Proceed Jn Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. Plaintiff is permitted to 12 || maintain this action to conclusion without prepaying fees or costs or giving security for them. 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court must detach and separately file 14 || Plaintiffs complaint (ECF No. 2-1). 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED without 16 || prejudice and with leave to amend. 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have until October 20, 2022 to file an 18 || amended complaint. If Plaintiff chooses not to file an amended complaint, the Court shall dismiss 19 || this action without prejudice. [20] 21 DATED: August 19, 2022. 22 Ar batn, BRENDA WEKSLER 23 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE