Escobedo v. State of Nevada

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA [4] 5 CARLOS ESCOBEDO, Case No. 2:22-cv-00241-CDS-NJK 6 Plaintiff, ORDER v. [7] 8 STATE OF NEVADA, et al., 9 Defendants. [10] 11 Plaintiff Carlos Escobedo brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress 12 constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at High Desert State 13 Prison. ECF No. 5. On August 25, 2022, this Court ordered Plaintiff to (1) update his address and 14 (2) file a completed application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) for non-prisoners or pay the 15 filing fee of $402 by September 26, 2022. ECF No. 13. That deadline expired without an updated 16 address from Plaintiff or the filing of an IFP application or payment of the filing fee, and his mail 17 from the Court was returned as undeliverable. See ECF No. 15. 18 I. DISCUSSION 19 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 20 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 21 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss 22 an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 23 King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local 24 rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 25 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining 26 whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s 27 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the 28 risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 2 Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th 3 Cir. 1987)). 4 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and 5 the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. The 6 third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a 7 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading 8 ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 9 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is 10 greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 11 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be 12 used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider dismissal. See 13 Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983 , 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 14 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 15 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639 , 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 16 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 17 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial 18 granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have 19 been “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before 20 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. 21 Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed 22 without the ability for the Court and the defendants to send Plaintiff case-related documents, 23 filings, and orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But 24 without an updated address, the likelihood that the second order would even reach Plaintiff is 25 low, so issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the Court’s 26 finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 27 circumstances, so the fifth factor favors dismissal. [28] 2 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in 3 favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based 4 on Plaintiff’s failure to file an updated address or file an IFP application or pay the filing fee in 5 compliance with this Court’s August 25, 2022, order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter 6 judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed 7 case. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and provide 8 the Court with his current address. 9 DATED: October 3, 2022. [11] 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE