Mule v. NDOC Staff

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA — 3 — 4 Joseph L. Mule, Case No. 2:23-cv-00083-CDS-DJA 5 Plaintiff Order Dismissing and Closing Case v. — 6 — [ECF Nos. 4, 5, 9] 7 NDOC Staff, et al., 8 Defendants — 9 — 10 Plaintiff Joseph L. Mule brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress 11 constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while in NDOC custody. ECF No. 1-1 at 1. On 12 April 5, 2023, I ordered Mule to file an amended complaint by May 5, 2023. ECF No. 12. I warned 13 Mule that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file an amended complaint by that 14 deadline. Id. at 11 . That deadline expired and Mule did not file an amended complaint, move for 15 an extension, or otherwise respond. 16 I. DISCUSSION 17 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 18 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 19 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss 20 an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 21 King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local 22 rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 23 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining 24 whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the court must consider: (1) the public’s 25 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the 26 risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 27 merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. 28 Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 2 the court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissing Mule’s claims. The third 3 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of 4 injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court 5 or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth 6 factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by 7 the factors favoring dismissal. 8 The fifth factor requires the court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be 9 used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See 10 Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983 , 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 11 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 12 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639 , 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 13 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 14 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial 15 granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have 16 been “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before 17 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. 18 Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until 19 and unless Mule files an amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second order 20 setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays 21 the inevitable and squanders the court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate 22 that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Mule needs additional time or evidence 23 that he did not receive my screening order. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful 24 alternative given these circumstances. Thus, the fifth factor favors dismissal. 25 II. CONCLUSION 26 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of 27 dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Mule’s 28 failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with my April 5, 2023, order. 2 denied as moot. 3 It is further ordered that the Nevada Department of Corrections’ motion to file 4 documents under seal [ECF No. 9] is granted. The Clerk of Court is instructed to maintain the 5 seal on the sealed, unredacted documents (ECF No. 10). 6 It is further ordered that Mule’s application to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 4] is 7 denied as moot. 8 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No 9 other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Mule wishes to pursue his claims, he 10 must file a complaint in a new case. 11 DATED: May 22, 2023 — 12 — — 13 — United States District Judge — 14 — — 15 — — 16 — — 17 — — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 — — 28 —