Mathis v. Williams

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA [3] DONTAE MATHIS, Case No. 2:23-cv-00936-GMN-NJK [4] Plaintiff, ORDER 5 v. 6 JULIE WILLIAMS, et al., 7 Defendants. [9] Plaintiff Dontae Mathis brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to [10] redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated. (ECF No. [11] 9). On October 31, 2023, this Court ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint by [12] November 30, 2023. (ECF No. 8). The Court warned Plaintiff that the action could be [13] dismissed if he failed to file an amended complaint by that deadline. (Id. at 8). That [14] deadline expired and Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint, move for an extension, [15] or otherwise respond. [16] I. DISCUSSION [17] District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the [18] exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . [19] dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829 , 831 [20] (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court [21] order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. [22] 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to [23] keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th [24] Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to [25] dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s [26] interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; [27] (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of [28] cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 2 Malone, 833 F.2d at 130 ). 3 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 4 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissing Plaintiff’s 5 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 6 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 7 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 8 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 9 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 10 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 11 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 12 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983 , 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 13 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 14 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639 , 643 & n.4 (9th 15 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 16 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 17 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 18 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 19 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 20 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 21 F.2d 1421 , 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 22 unless Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second order 23 setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only 24 delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here 25 do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Plaintiff needs 26 additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s screening order. Setting 27 another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth 28 factor favors dismissal. 2 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 3 weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without 4 prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with this 5 Court’s October 31, 2023, order and for failure to state a claim. The Clerk of Court is 6 directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be 7 filed in this now-closed case. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a 8 complaint in a new case. 9 It is further ordered that Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 10 No. 4) without having to prepay the full filing fee is granted. Even though this case is 11 dismissed, the full filing fee will still be due, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 , as amended 12 by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 13 It is further ordered that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 , as amended by the Prison 14 Litigation Reform Act, the Nevada Department of Corrections will forward payments from 15 the account of Dontae Mathis, #1261532 to the Clerk of the United States District Court, 16 District of Nevada, 20% of the preceding month's deposits (in months that the account 17 exceeds $10.00) until the full $350 filing fee has been paid for this action. The Clerk of 18 the Court will send a copy of this order to the Finance Division of the Clerk’s Office. The 19 Clerk will send a copy of this order to the Chief of Inmate Services for the Nevada 20 Department of Corrections at formapauperis@doc.nv.gov. 21 It is further ordered that this Court certifies that any in forma pauperis appeal from 22 this order would not be taken “in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(3). [23] DATED THIS _8__ day of December 2023. [25] ___ 26 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE