Jones v. State of Nevada

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA — 3 — ADRIAN JONES, Case No. 3:23-cv-00237-RCJ-CSD — 4 — Plaintiff, ORDER 5 v. 6 STATE OF NEVADA, et al., 7 Defendants. — 8 — 9 Plaintiff Adrian Jones brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 10 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Northern 11 Nevada Correctional Center. (ECF No. 7). On December 11, 2023, this Court ordered 12 Jones to file an amended complaint by January 10, 2024. (ECF No. 6). The Court warned 13 Jones that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file an amended complaint by that 14 deadline. (Id. at 7.). That deadline expired and Jones did not file an amended complaint, 15 move for an extension, or otherwise respond. 16 I. DISCUSSION 17 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 18 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 19 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829 , 831 20 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court 21 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 22 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 23 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th 24 Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 25 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s 26 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; 27 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 28 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 2 Malone, 833 F.2d at 130 ). 3 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 4 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissing Jones’s 5 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 6 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 7 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 8 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 9 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 10 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 11 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 12 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983 , 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 13 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 14 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639 , 643 & n.4 (9th 15 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 16 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 17 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 18 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 19 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 20 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 21 F.2d 1421 , 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 22 unless Jones files an amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second order 23 setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only 24 delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here 25 do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Jones needs 26 additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s screening order. Setting 27 another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth 28 factor favors dismissal. 1 |/ I. CONCLUSION 2 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 3 || weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without 4 || prejudice based on Jones's failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with this 5 || Court's December 11, 2023, order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment 6 || accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed 7 || case. If Jones wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 8 It is further ordered that Jones's application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 9 || 4) is denied as moot. — 10 — 11 DATED THIS _7th__ day of February 2024. 12 - / : 13 . OBERT C. ES 14 UNITED STAITES DISTRICT JUDGE — 15 — — 16 — — 17 — — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 — — 28 —