Baham v. Graham

[2] 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 DENNIS BAHAM, Case No. 2:23-cv-00822-ART-BNW 7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. [8] ELENA LEE GRAHAM, et al., [9] Defendants. [10] 11 I. SUMMARY 12 Pro se Plaintiff Dennis Baham brings this action concerning the foreclosure 13 of his home. (ECF No. 1.) Before the Court are multiple motions by Plaintiff and 14 Defendants, including (1) Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Emergency Motion for Relief (ECF 15 No. 20), (2) Defendant New Rez, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 23), (3) 16 Defendant Akerman, LLP’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 43), (4) Defendant New 17 Rez, LLC’s Motion to Declare Dennis Baham A Vexatious Litigant and for Entry 18 of a Prefiling Order (ECF No. 51), (5) Plaintiff’s Motions to Extend Time (ECF Nos. 19 54, 55), (6) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Pleadings (ECF No. 20 57), (7) Defendant New Rez, LLC’s Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens (ECF No. 59), 21 and (8) Defendant New Rez, LLC’s Motion for Attorney Fees (ECF No. 60). Because 22 the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over this case based on the Rooker23 Feldman Doctrine, the Court will dismiss the case. 24 II. BACKGROUND 25 Plaintiff disputes the foreclosure of his home in Clark County Justice 26 Court. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) At a hearing on April 19, 2023, Judge Elena Lee Graham 27 rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the Justice Court lacked jurisdiction to issue a 28 Writ of Restitution evicting Plaintiff from the home. (Id.) 2 Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), Plaintiff’s claims include the following causes 3 of action: 1) wrongful foreclosure; 2) libel; 3) forgery; 4) violations of the FDCPA; 4 5) slander of title; and 6) infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at 9-10.) Plaintiff 5 asserts various issues with the foreclosure, including Shellpoint Mortgage 6 Servicing (Shellpoint) not having the mortgage note, the justice court evicting 7 plaintiff despite the existence of a title dispute, and the mortgage lien no longer 8 existing because it had been extinguished under NRS 106.240 since the balance 9 had been due for more than 10 years. (ECF No. 2 at 7-8.) 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. 12 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes this federal action. Under the 13 Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review 14 decisions of state courts or to reverse or modify state court judgments. See Rooker 15 v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 , 415–16 (1923); District of Columbia Court of 16 Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine 17 precludes federal district courts from hearing cases in which the “federal plaintiff 18 asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court and 19 seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision.” Benavidez v. 20 County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1142 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation 21 marks and citation omitted). Review of such state court decisions may be 22 conducted only by the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 ; see 23 also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indust. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005). 24 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies beyond direct challenges to state 25 court decisions. “The doctrine also precludes constitutional claims that are 26 ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the forbidden appeal.’” Ignacio v. Judges of U.S. 27 Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit, 453 F.3d 1160 , 1167 (citing Noel v. Hall, 341 28 F.3d 1148 , 1157 (9th Cir. 2003)). “Rooker-Feldman may also apply where the 2 ‘prohibits a federal district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over 3 a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.’” Reusser v. Wachovia 4 Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., [5] 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004)). 6 This Court must determine whether the present action operates as a de 7 facto appeal. To determine whether an action functions as a prohibited de facto 8 appeal, courts “pay close attention to the relief sought by the federal-court 9 plaintiff.” See Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772 , 777–78 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 10 Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2003)). Where the form of 11 relief would constitute a reversal or “undoing of the prior state-court judgment,” 12 Rooker–Feldman dictates that the lower federal courts lack jurisdiction. Bianchi, [13] 334 F.3d at 900 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 14 If the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the case. 15 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, meaning they can only hear 16 cases authorized by the United States Constitution or federal statutes. Owen 17 Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). As a result, if a court 18 lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. See Arbaugh v. Y&H 19 Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (“[W]hen a federal court concludes that it lacks 20 subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety.”) 21 When resolving this facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the Court 22 assumes the factual allegations of the complaint to be true and draws all 23 reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117 , 24 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). 25 Plaintiff’s claims are precluded under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Here, 26 Plaintiff alleges various due process violations in connection with the Justice 27 Court’s foreclosure of his home. (See ECF No. 1 at 8-9.) Because Plaintiff seeks 28 to reverse his eviction and the foreclosure of his home, which would necessarily 2 Reusser, 525 F.3d at 859-860 (finding extrinsic fraud claims by mortgagors who 3 had been foreclosed upon during pendency of their bankruptcy proceeding were 4 barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). 5 B. Judicial Immunity 6 While the Court will dismiss this action on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman 7 doctrine, it also notes that Judge Graham is entitled to absolute judicial 8 immunity. Judges and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely 9 immune from Section 1983 monetary liability for acts performed in their judicial 10 capacities. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978). Plaintiff alleges 11 Judge Graham is not entitled to any immunity because she allegedly violated the 12 law during the April 19, 2023, hearing in which she granted a Writ of Restitution 13 in the underlying unlawful detainer case (ECF No. 1 at 15.) However, Nevada 14 justice courts have jurisdiction over unlawful detainer actions pursuant to NRS 15 4.370, so Judge Graham was acting pursuant to her judicial capacity. NRS 16 4.370(h). Since Plaintiff’s claims relate to actions by Judge Graham in her judicial 17 capacity, the Court finds the claims against Judge Graham cannot proceed 18 anyways. 19 IV. CONCLUSION 20 The Court notes that Plaintiff and Defendants made several arguments and 21 cited to several cases not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these 22 arguments and cases and determines that they do not warrant discussion as they 23 do not affect the outcome of the issues before the Court. 24 It is therefore ordered that Defendant New Rez, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss 25 (ECF No. 23), Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Pleadings (ECF No. 26 57), and Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens (ECF No. 59) are granted. 27 It is further ordered that the following motions are denied: Ex Parte 28 Emergency Motion for Relief (ECF No. 20), Motion to Dismiss Complaint by 1 || Akerman LLP (ECF No. 43), Motion to Declare Dennis Baham a Vexatious Litigant 2 || and for Entry of a Prefiling Order (ECF No. 51), Motions to Extend Time (ECF Nos. 3 || 54 and 55), and Motion for Attorney Fees (ECF No. 60). 4 It is further ordered that the case is dismissed without prejudice. 5 It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment 6 || accordingly and close this case. [8] 9 DATED THIS 13t Day of March 2024. [10] 11 Ares jlosead Ten 12 ANNE TRAUM = =———C<a™ 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE