Jackson v. Clark County Detention Center

[2] 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 TAIJAH JACKSON, Case No. 2:23-cv-01584-MMD-EJY 7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. [8] CLARK COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, 9 et al., 10 Defendants. [11] 12 I. SUMMARY 13 Plaintiff Taijah Jackson brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 14 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated or detained 15 at Clark County Detention Center. (ECF No. 1-1.) On October 23, 2023, this Court 16 ordered Jackson to either pay the full $402 filing fee or file a fully complete application to 17 proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) by December 22, 2023. (ECF No. 3.) Jackson timely 18 filed an IFP application in response, but it was incomplete. (ECF No. 4.) So the Court 19 considered alternatives to dismissal and, on January 23, 2024, ordered Jackson to either 20 pay the required filing fee or file a new fully complete IFP application by March 19, 2024. 21 (ECF No. 7.) 22 The Court warned Jackson that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file a 23 fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis with all three documents or pay 24 the full $402 filing fee for a civil action by that deadline. (Id. at 2.) That deadline expired 25 and Jackson did not file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis, pay the 26 full $402 filing fee, or otherwise respond. And the Court’s mail to Jackson has been 27 returned as undeliverable. (ECF No. 8.) [28] 2 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 3 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 4 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829 , 831 5 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court 6 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 7 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 8 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th 9 Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 10 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s 11 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; 12 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 13 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 14 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 15 Malone, 833 F.2d at 130 ). 16 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 17 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Jackson’s 18 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 19 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 20 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 21 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 22 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 23 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 24 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 25 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983 , 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 26 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 27 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639 , 643 & n.4 (9th 28 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 1 || “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 2 || order as satisfying this element[,]” /e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 3 || with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 4 || Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 5 || case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 6 || F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 7 || unless Jackson either files a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or 8 || pays the $402 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter a third order setting 9 || another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays 10 || the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. And because Jackson has not 11 || filed his updated address with the Court, the chance a third order would even reach him 12 || is low. (See ECF No. 8.) Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given 13 || these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 14 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 15 || weigh in favor of dismissal. 16 || Ill. CONCLUSION 17 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 18 || Plaintiff Taijah Jackson’s failure to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma 19 || pauperis or pay the full $402 filing fee in compliance with this Court’s October 23, 2023 20 || and January 23, 2024 orders. 21 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 22 || No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Jackson wishes to pursue 23 || his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and either pay the filing fee or file a 24 || complete application to proceed in forma pauperis. 25 DATED THIS Day of April 2024. [27] MIRANDA M. DU 28 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE