Reed v. Williams

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA [3] 4 Dashod Reed, Case No. 2:23-cv-00858-CDS-EJY 5 Plaintiff Order Dismissing and Closing Case 6 v. 7 Julie Williams, 8 Defendant [9] 10 Pro se plaintiff Dashod Reed brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 11 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at High Desert 12 State Prison. ECF No. 1-1. After initiating this case, Reed filed a notice indicating that he was no 13 longer incarcerated and providing the Court with his current address. On January 24, 2024, this 14 court ordered denied Reed’s application to proceed in forma pauperis for prisoners and directed 15 Reed to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis for non-prisoners or pay the 16 full $402 filing fee on or before February 29, 2024. ECF No. 6. The court warned Reed that the 17 action could be dismissed if he failed to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis 18 for non-prisoners or pay the full $402 filing fee for a civil action by that deadline. Id. at 1 . That 19 deadline expired and Reed did not file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis for 20 non-prisoners, pay the full $402 filing fee, or otherwise respond. 21 I. Discussion 22 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 23 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 24 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an 25 action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, [26] 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule 27 requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 28 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether 2 expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of 3 prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and 4 (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 5 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130 ). 6 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and 7 the court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Reed’s claims. The third 8 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of 9 injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 10 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth 11 factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by 12 the factors favoring dismissal. 13 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 14 correct the party’s failure that brought about the need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. 15 Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983 , 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives 16 before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, [17] 291 F.3d 639 , 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of 18 dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” 19 Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this court cannot operate without 20 collecting reasonable fees, and litigation cannot progress without a plaintiff’s compliance with 21 court orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But issuing a 22 second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the court’s finite resources. 23 Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth 24 factor favors dismissal. Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they 25 weigh in favor of dismissal. 26 II. Conclusion 27 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Reed’s 28 failure to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis for non-prisoners or pay the 1 full $402 filing fee in compliance with this court’s January 24, 2024, order. The Clerk of Court is 2 ||directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in 3 ||this now-closed case. If Reed wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case 4 |land either pay the required filing fee or properly apply for in forma pauperis status. 5 Dated: May 8, 2024 /, ) Lh 7 athe Unjed States District Judge [10] ll