Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio

Mr. Justice McKenna, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court. Complainant directs its argument to three propositions: (1) The statute in controversy imposes an unlawful burden on interstate commerce; (2) it violates the freedom of speech and publication guaranteed by § 11, art. 1, of the constitution of the State of Ohio; 1 and (3) it.attempts to delegate legislative power to censors and to other boards to determine whether the statute offends in the particulars designated. It is necessary to consider only §§ 3, 4 and 5. Section 3 makes it the duty of thé board to examine and censor motion picture films to be publicly exhibited and displayed *240 in the State of Ohio. The films are required to be exhibited to the board before they are delivered to the exhibitor for exhibition, for which a fee is charged. Section 4. “Only such films as are in the judgment and discretion of the board of censors of a moral, educational or amúsing and harmless character shall be passed and approved by such board.” The films are required to be stamped or designated in a proper manner. Section 5. The board may work in conjunction with censor boards of other States as a censor congress^ and the action of such congress in approving or rejecting films shall be considered as the action of the state board, and all films passed, approved, stamped and numbered by such congress, when the fees therefor are paid shall be considered approved by the board. By § 7 a penalty is imposed for each exhibition of films without the approval of the board, and by § 8 any person dissatisfied with the order of the board is given the same rights and remedies for hearing and reviewing, amendment or vacation of the order “as is provided in the case of persons dissatisfied with the orders of the industrial commission.'” The censorship, therefore, is only of films intended for exhibition in Ohio, and we can immediately put to one side the contention that it imposes a. burden on interstate commerce. It is true that according to the allegations of the bill some of the films of complainant are shipped from Detroit, Michigan, but they are distributed to exhibitors, purchasers, renters and lessors in Ohio, for exhibition in Ohio, and this determines the application of the statute. In other words, it is only films which are “to be publicly exhibited and displayed in the State of Ohio ” which are required to be examined and censored. It would be straining the doctrine of original packages to say that the films retain that form and composition even when unrolling and exhibiting to audiences, or, being ready for *241 renting for the purpose of exhibition within the State, could not be disclosed to the. state officers. If this be so, whatever the power of the State to prevent the exhibition of films not approved — and for the purpose of this contention we must assume the power is otherwise plenary— films brought from another State, and only because so brought, would be exempt from the power, and films made in the State would be subject to it. There must be some time when the films are subject to the law of the State, and necessarily when they are in the hands of the exchanges ready to be rented to exhibitors or have passed to the latter, they are in consumption, and mingled as much as from their nature they can be with other property of the State. It is true that the statute requires them to be submitted to the board before they are delivered to the exhibitor, but we have seen that the films are shipped to “exchanges” and by them, rented to exhibitors, and the “exchanges” are described as “nothing-more .or less than circulating libraries or clearing houses.” And one film “serves in many theatres from day to day until it is worn out.”. The next contention is that the statute violates the freedom of speech and publication guaranteed by the Ohio constitution. In its discussion- counsel have gone into á very elaborate description of moving picture exhibitions and their many useful purposes as graphic expressions of opinion and sentiments, as exponents of policies, as teachers of science and history, as useful, interesting, amusing, educational and moral. And a list of the “campaigns,” as counsel call them; which may be carried on is given. We. may concede the praise. It is not questioned by the Ohio statute and under its comprehensive description, “campaigns” of an infinite variety may be conducted. Films of a “moral, educational or amusing and harmless character shall be passed and approved” are the words of the statute. No exhibition, therefore, or “campaign” *242 of complainant will be prevented if its pictures have those qualities. Therefore, however missionary of opinion films are or may become, however educational or entertaining, there is no impediment to their value or effect in the Ohio statute. But they may be used for evil, and against that possibility the statute was enacted. Their power of amusement and, it may be, education, the audiences they assemble, not of women alone nor of men alone, but together, not of adults only, but of children, make them the more insidious in corruption by a pretense of worthy purpose or if they should degenerate from worthy purpose. Indeed, we may go beyond that possibility. They take their attraction from the general interest, eager and wholesome it may be, in their subjects, but a prurient interest may be excited and appealed to. Besides, there are some things which should not have pictorial representation in public places and to all audiences. And not only the State of Ohio but other States have considered it to be in the interest of the public morals and welfare to supervise moving picture exhibitions. We would have to shut our eyes to the facts of the world to regard the precaution unreasonable or the legislation to effect it a mere wanton interference with personal liberty. We do not understand that a possibility of an evil employment of films is denied, but a freedom from the censorship of the law and a precedent right of exhibition are asserted, subsequent responsibility only, it is contended, being incurred for abuse. In other words, as we have seen, the constitution of Ohio is invoked and an exhibition of films is assimilated to the freedom of speech, writing and publication assured by that instrument and for the abuse of which only is there responsibility, and, it is insisted, that as no law may be passed "to restrain the liberty of speech or of the press,” no law may be passed to subject moving pictures tó censorship before their exhibition. *243 We need not pause to dilate upon the freedom of opinion and its expression, and whether by speech, writing or printing. They are too certain to need discussion — of such conceded value as to need no supporting praise. Nor can there be any 'doubt of their breadth nor that their underlying safeguard is, to use the words of another, “that opinion is free and that conduct alone is amenable to the law.” Are moving pictures within the principle, as it is contended they are? They, indeed, may be mediums of thought, but so are many things. So is the theatre, the circüs, and all other, shows and spectacles,- and their performances may be thus brought by the like reasoning under the same immunity from repression or-supervision as the public press, — made the same agencies of civil liberty. Counsel have not shrunk from this extension of their contention and cite a case in this court where the title of drama was accorded to pantomime; 1 and such and other spectacles are said by counsel to be publications of ideas, satisfying the definition of the dictionaries, — that is, and we quote counsel, a means of making or announcing publicly something - that otherwise might have remained private or -unknown, — and this being peculiarly the purpose and effect of moving pictures they come directly, it is contended, under the protection of the Ohio constitution. The first impulse of the mind is to reject the contention. We immediately feel that, the argument is wrong or strained which extends the guaranties of free opinion and speech to the multitudinous shows which are advertised on the bill-boards of our cities and towns and which regards them as emblems of public safety, to use the words of Lord Camden, quoted by counsel, and which seeks to *244 bring motion pictures and other spectacles into practical and legal similitude to a free press and liberty of opinion. The judicial sense supporting the common sense of the country is against the contention. As pointed out by the District Coprt, the police power is fámiliarly exercised in granting or withholding licenses for theatrical performances as a means of their regulation. . The court cited the following cases: Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio, 63, 72, 73; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio St. 534; Commonwealth v. McCann, 213 Massachusetts, 213, 215; People v. Steele, 231 Illinois, 340, 344, 345. The exercise of the power upon moving picture exhibitions has been sustained. Greenberg v. Western Turf Ass’n, 148 California, 126; Laurelle v. Bush, 17 Cal. App. 409; State v. Loden, 117 Maryland; 373; Block v. Chicago, 239 Illinois, 251; Higgins v. Lacroix, 119 Minnesota; 145. See also State v. Morris, 76 Atl. Rep.479; People v. Gaynor, 137 N. Y. S. 196, 199; McKenzies. McClellan, 116 N. Y. S. 645, 646. It seems not to have occurred to anybody in the cited cases that freedom of opinion was repressed in the exertion of the power which was illustráted. The rights of property were only considered as involved. It cannot be put out .of view that the exhibition of moving pictures is a business pírre and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spectaclés, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio constitution; we think, as part of the press of the country or as organs of public opinion. They are mere representations of events, of ideas and sentiments, published and known, vivid, useful and entertaining no doubt, but, as we have said, capable of evil, having power for it, the greater because of their attractiveness and manner of exhibition. It was this capability and power, and it may be in experience of them, that induced the State of Ohio, in addition to prescribing penalties for immoral exhibitions, as it does in its Criminal *245 Code, to require censorship before exhibition, as it does by the act under review. We cannot regard this as beyond the power of government. It does not militate against the strength of these considerations that motion pictures may be used to amuse and instruct in other places than theatres — in churches, for instance, and in Sunday schools and public schools. Nor are we called upon to say on this record whether such exceptions would be within the provisions of the statute nor to anticipate that it will be so declared by the state courts or so enforced by the state officers. The next contention of complainant is that the Ohio statute-is a delegation of legislative power and void for that if not for the other reasons charged against it, which we have discussed. While administration and legislation are quite distinct powers, the line which separates exactly their exercise is not easy to define in words. It is best recognized in illustrations. Undoubtedly the legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to control in given cases; but an administrative body may be invested with the power to ascertain the facts and conditions to which the policy and principles apply. If this could not be done there would be infinite confusion in the laws, and in an effort to detail and to particularize, they would miss sufficiency both in provision and execution. The objection to the statute is that it furnishes no standard of what is educational, moral, amusing or harmless, and hence leaves decision to arbitrary judgment, whim and caprice; or, aside from those extremes, leaving it to the different views which might be entertained of the effect of the pictures, permitting the “personal equation” to enter, resulting “in unjust discrimination against some propagandist film,” while others might be approved without question. But the statute by its provisions guards ■ against such variant judgments, and its terms, like other *246 general terms, get precision from the sense and experience of men and become certain and useful guides in reasoning and conduct.' The exact specification of the instances of their application would be as impossible as the attempt would be futile. Upon such sense and experience, therefore, the law properly relies. This has many analogies and direct examples in cases, and we may cite Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183; Red “C" Oil Manufacturing Co. v. North Carolina, 222 U. S. 380; Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470. See also Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 86. If this were not so, the many administrative agencies created by the state and National governments would be denuded of their utility and government in some of its most important exercises become impossible. To sustain the attack upon the statute as a delegation of legislative power, complainant cites Harmon v. State; 66 Ohio St. 249. In that case a statute of the State committing to a certain officer the duty of issuing a license to one desiring to act as an engineer if “found trustworthy and competent,” was declared invalid because, as the court said, no standard was furnished by the General Assembly as to qualification, and no specification as to wherein the applicant should be trustworthy and competent, but all was “left to the opinion, finding and caprice of the examiner.” The case can be distinguished. Besides, later cases have recognized the difficulty of exact separation of the powers of government, and announced the principle that legislative power is completely exercised where the law “is perfect, final and decisive in all of its parts, and the discretion given only relates to its execution.” Cases are cited in illustration. .And the principle finds further illustration in the decisions of the courts of lesser authority but which exhibit the juridical sense of the State as to the delegation of powers. Section 5 of the statute, which provides for a censor *247 congress of the censor board and the boards of other States, is referred to in emphasis of complainant’s objection that the statute delegates legislative power. But, as complainant says, such congress is “at present nonexistent and nebulous,” and we are, therefore, not called upon to anticipate its action or pass upon the validity of § 5. We may close this topic with a quotation of the very apt comment of the District Court upon the statute. After remarking that the language of the statute “might have been extended by descriptive and illustrative words,” but doubting that it would have been the more intelligible and that probably by being more restrictive might be more, easily thwarted, the court said: “In view of the range of subjects which complainants claim to have already compassed, not to speak of the natural development that will ensue, it would be next to impossible to devise language that would .be at once comprehensive and automatic.” In conclusion we may observe that the Ohio statute gives a review by the courts of the State of the decision of the board of censors. Decree affirmed. Footnotes [1] “Section 11. Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or'of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted.” [1] Kalem v. Harper Bros., 222 U. S. 55.