Iadevaio v. LTD Financial Services, LP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _____________________ No 17-CV-4112 (JFB)(SIL) _____________________ GENINE IADEVAIO, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff, VERSUS LTD FINANCIAL SERVICES, L.P., Defendant. ___________________ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER August 29, 2019 ___________________ Joseph F. Bianco, Circuit Judge (sitting by “creditor” is “Show Master Card” rather than designation): Bryant State Bank. Plaintiff Genine Iadevaio (“plaintiff”) For the reasons that follow, the Court brings this putative class action against LTD grants defendant’s motion for summary Financial Services, L.P. (“defendant”), for judgment on this claim, and denies plaintiff’s alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection cross-motion. In particular, the Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 uncontroverted evidence clearly et seq. Although the complaint contains six demonstrates that “Show Master Card” is the causes of action, presently before the Court name under which Bryant State Bank are cross-motions for summary judgment transacts business in connection with the relating only to the fourth cause of action. credit card, that it did so since the beginning That claim alleges that a debt collection letter of the credit relationship with plaintiff, and (the “Collection Letter”) sent by defendant to that this would be understood by the least plaintiff did not properly identify the sophisticated consumer. Accordingly, the “creditor” in violation of FDCPA Sections use of that trade name in the Collection Letter 1692g(a)(2), 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), and in this case to identify the actual creditor does 1692e(10). In particular, plaintiff asserts not violate 1692e or 1692g. that, notwithstanding that Bryant State Bank is the creditor to whom plaintiff owes the I. BACKGROUND debt, the Collection Letter refers to the name A. Facts of the creditor as “Show Master Card.” Therefore, the question is whether defendant The Court has taken the facts set forth violated the FDCPA by setting forth in the below from the parties’ declarations, Collection Letter that the name of the affidavits, and exhibits, and from the parties' respective Rule 56.1 statements of facts. proceeding, plaintiff identified a nonpriority Upon consideration of creditor as “Show Master Card” with the the motions for summary judgment, the amount due as approximately $450. (Id. ¶¶ Court shall construe the facts in the light most 20-23.) favorable to the non-moving party. See Capobianco v. City of New The Collection Letter reads, in York, 422 F.3d 47 , 50 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005). relevant part: Unless otherwise noted, where a party’s 56.1 statement is cited, that fact is undisputed or the opposing party has pointed to no evidence CREDITOR: in the record to contradict it.1 SHOW MASTER CARD BALANCE: $419.08 Defendant LTD Financial Services, L.P. is a debt collector. (Def.’s 56.1 ¶ 5.) Plaintiff Dear Genine Iadevaio, is a consumer, as defined under 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (a)(3), and the alleged debt arose out of Your account with the above named a transaction primarily for personal, family, creditor has been placed with LTD or household purposes, and is therefore a debt Financial Services, L.P., a debt defined by 15. U.S.C. § 1692(a)(5). (Id. ¶ 3.) collector. This is an attempt to collect Defendant sent the Collection Letter (Pl. a debt and any information obtained Mot., Collection Letter, ECF No. 19-4) to will be used for that purpose. collect the past due debt on February 21, Unless you notify this office within 2016. The Collection Letter is the “initial 30 days after receiving this notice that communication” from defendant to plaintiff you dispute the validity of the debt or mandated by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). (Def.’s any portion thereof, this office will 56.1 ¶¶ 4-5.) The Collection Letter sets forth assume this debt is valid. If you the name of the “creditor” as “Show Master notify this office in writing within 30 Card.” (Id. ¶ 6.) However, Bryant State Bank days after receiving this notice you is the actual entity to which plaintiff owed the dispute the validity of this debt or any “Balance” set forth in this communication. portion thereof, this office obtain (Id. ¶ 7.) Prior to receiving the “Show Master verification of the debt or obtain a Card” credit card, plaintiff would have been copy of a judgment, if any, and mail sent a solicitation which includes terms and you a copy of such verification or conditions and statements that Bryant State judgment. If you request this office Park is the entity that issues the Show in writing within 30 days after MasterCard. (Id. ¶¶ 8-13.) Monthly account receiving this notice, this office will statements (Def. Mot., Ex. 5-7), were sent to provide you with the name and plaintiff from April to March of 2015 with address of the original creditor, if plaintiff’s name and account number on each different from the current creditor. (Id. ¶¶ 14-18). On June 15, 2016, plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy in the Eastern District of New York. As part of this 1 Although the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements contain record, when utilizing the 56.1 statements for purposes specific citations to the record to support their of this summary of facts. statements, the Court has cited to the Rule 56.1 statements, rather than the underlying citation to the The total amount of the debt due as of October 16, 2018. (ECF No. 25.) On May charge-off: 23, 2019, the Court heard supplemental oral $419.08 argument. (ECF No. 27.) On May 31, 2019, plaintiff submitted a letter with supplemental The total amount of interest accrued authority. (ECF No. 28.) On June 8, 2019, since charge-off: defendant submitted a letter in response, $.00 which included exemplars of the credit card. (ECF No. 29.) The total amount of non-interest charges or fees accrued since chargeThis matter is fully submitted and the off: Court has fully considered the submissions of $.00 the parties. The total amount of payments and II. STANDARD OF REVIEW credits made on the debt since the charge-off: The standards for summary judgment are $.00 well settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court may not grant As discussed further below, plaintiff alleges a motion for summary judgment unless “the that the Collection Letter violated the pleadings, depositions, answers to FDCPA by falsely identifying “Show Master interrogatories, and admissions on file, Card” as the creditor, rather than Bryant State together with affidavits, if any, show that Bank. there is no genuine issue as to any material B. Procedural History fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on Civ. P. 56(c); Globecon Grp., LLC v. November 2, 2017. (ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 434 F.3d 165, 170 (2d initially asserted six causes of action against Cir. 2006). “The moving party bears the defendant. Defendant answered on burden of showing that he or she is entitled November 15, 2017. On April 23, 2018, the to summary judgment.” See Huminski v. parties filed a joint pre-motion conference Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir. 2004). letter seeking leave to file motions for The Court “is not to weigh the evidence but summary judgment on the Fourth Cause of is instead required to view the evidence in the Action, relating to the narrow issue as to light most favorable to the party whether defendant violated the FDCPA by opposing summary judgment, to draw all setting forth the name of the “creditor” as reasonable inferences in favor of that party, “Show Master Card” rather than Bryant State and to eschew credibility assessments.” Bank. (ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff stated that she Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 intended to withdraw the five remaining F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2004); see causes of action. On July 2, 2018, plaintiff also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 filed her motion for summary judgment. U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment is (ECF No. 19.) On July 18, 2018, defendant unwarranted if “the evidence is such that a filed its cross-motion for summary judgment. reasonable jury could return a verdict for the (ECF No. 21.) On August 17, 2018, plaintiff nonmoving party”). filed her reply in support of her motion. (ECF No. 24.) The Court held oral argument on Once the moving party has met its “Creditor” as “Show Master Card.” (Pl. burden, the opposing party “must do more Mem. at 1, ECF No. 19-7.) than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... For the reasons set forth below, The nonmoving party must come forward defendant’s motion for summary judgment with specific facts showing that there is on the Fourth Cause of Action is granted, and a genuine issue for trial.” Caldarola v. plaintiff’s cross-motion is denied. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156 , 160 (2d Cir. 2002) Specifically, the Court concludes that the (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. uncontroverted facts demonstrate the use of Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 , 586–87 “Show Master Card” as the creditor in the (1986)). As the Supreme Court stated Collection Letter did not violate the FDCPA. in Anderson, “[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly A. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act probative, summary judgment may be The FDCPA was created to respond to granted.” 477 U.S. at 249–50 (citations the “use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair omitted). Indeed, “the mere existence debt collection practices by many debt of some alleged factual dispute between the collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (a). Finding that parties will not defeat a properly “[a]busive debt collection practices supported motion for summary judgment.” contribute to the number of personal Id. at 247-48 (emphasis in original). Thus, bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere of jobs, and to invasions of individual conclusory allegations or denials, but must privacy,” the Act aims “to eliminate abusive set forth “concrete particulars” showing that debt collection practices by debt collectors, to a trial is needed. R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & insure that those debt collectors who refrain Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 1984) from using abusive debt collection practices (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, it are not competitively disadvantaged, and to is insufficient for a party promote consistent State action to opposing summary judgment “merely to protect consumers against debt collection assert a conclusion without supplying abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (e). supporting arguments or facts . . . .” BellSouth Telecommc'ns, Inc. v. W.R. To determine whether a debt collector’s Grace & Co.- Conn., 77 F.3d 603, 615 (2d communication violates the FDCPA, courts Cir. 1996) (quoting SEC v. Research apply an objective test based on the Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31 , 33 (2d Cir. understanding of the “least sophisticated 1978)). consumer.” Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. III. DISCUSSION 1993); see Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993); Vu v. Diversified Plaintiff contends that defendant violated Collection Servs., Inc., 293 F.R.D. 343 , 359 Sections 1692g(a)(2), 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), (E.D.N.Y. 2013). According to the Second and 1692e(10) of the FDPCA. Specifically, Circuit, the “least sophisticated consumer” plaintiff argues that the Collection Letter standard is “an objective analysis that seeks failed to identify the actual entity to which to protect the naive from abusive practices plaintiff owed the “Balance,” as the initial while simultaneously shielding debt communication set forth the name of the collectors from liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of debt collection letters.” Greco v. Trauner, Cohen 2. Section 1692g(a) & Thomas, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 360, 363 (2d Cir. 2005). “Deceptiveness within the meaning of Section 1692g(a) sets forth required this subsection includes ambiguity; a disclosures for a debt collector’s initial collection notice may be deceptive when it communication to a consumer. As relevant can reasonably be read to have two or more here, this section requires that the initial different meanings, one of which is communication include “the name of the inaccurate.” Barrientos v. Law Offices of creditor to whom the debt is owed.” 15 Mark L. Nichter, 76 F. Supp. 2d 510 , 513 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996)). “The B. Application fact that a notice's terminology was vague or uncertain will not prevent it from being held The parties do not dispute that plaintiff is deceptive under § 1692e(10).” Id. This is a a “consumer” and defendant is a “debt question of law. Shami v. Nat’l Enters. Sys., collector,” as those terms are defined by the 914 F. Supp. 2d 353, 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). FDCPA, and that the instant dispute is therefore covered by the statute. Moreover, it Here, plaintiff alleges claims under is uncontested that Exhibit A to plaintiff’s FDCPA Sections 1692e and 1692g, and complaint is the “initial communication” specific subsections thereunder, which the from defendant to plaintiff mandated by 15 Court will briefly address in turn. U.S.C. § 1692g(a). Finally, defendant concedes that Bryant State Bank is “the 1. Section 1692e actual entity to which [p]laintiff owed the “Balance” set forth in [the Collection Section 1692e establishes a general Letter].” (Def.’s 56.1 ¶ 7.) Therefore, the prohibition against a debt collector’s use of question is whether defendant violated the “any false, deceptive, or misleading above-described FDCPA provisions by representation or means in connection with identifying Show Master Card, rather than the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § Bryant State Bank, as plaintiff’s creditor. For 1692e. The section then includes a non- the reasons that follow, the Court concludes exhaustive list of prohibited conduct, that the Collection Letter does not. including (1) “the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any The Court will first address defendant’s debt,” id. § 1692e(2)(A); and (2) “[t]he use of contention that plaintiff’s claim is timeany false representation or deceptive means barred before turning to the merits of to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to plaintiff’s claims.2 obtain information concerning a consumer,” id. § 1692e(10). 2 In its summary judgment motion, defendant also discharge of her debt where she identified it as Show raises the affirmative defense that plaintiff’s action is Master Card and now allow her to seek damages based barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel. (Def. Mem. on a claim that Show Master Card was not her creditor. at 6-8.) In particular, defendant notes that plaintiff (Id. at 7.) However, given that the Court has identified Show Master Card on her Chapter 7 concluded that summary judgment in favor of the Bankruptcy petition and plaintiff “would have this defendant is warranted on this claim on the merits, the Court ignore the fact that she received the benefit of Court need not address this alternative argument. 1. Timeliness to removal on July 11, 2107. Moreover, plaintiff served defendant in a timely manner a. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) with the summons with notice on June 14, 2017, as mandated by state law. See N.Y. Defendant argues that plaintiff’s cause of C.P.L.R. 306-b (“Service of the summons action is time-barred under FDCPA Section and complaint, summons with notice, third1692k(d). (See Def. Mot. at 5.) As set forth party summons and complaint, or petition below, the Court denies defendant’s motion with a notice of petition or order to show for summary judgment on this ground. cause shall be made within one hundred twenty days after the commencement of the Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (k)(d), an action action or proceeding . . . .”). to enforce may be brought in “any appropriate United States district court . . . or Defendant argues that the absence of a in any other court of competent jurisdiction, complaint until November 2, 2017 renders within one year from the date on which the the action untimely. The Court disagrees. “A violation occurs.” (emphasis added). On federal court to which a state action is February 21, 2016, plaintiff received the removed takes the action in the posture in Collection Letter, which allegedly violates which it existed when removed from a state the FDCPA. Plaintiff then filed a summons court’s jurisdiction and must give effect to all and notice in Nassau County Supreme Court procedures accomplished in a state court on February 17, 2017—within the prescribed prior to removal.” Istituto Per Lo Sviluppo one-year window. (Rep., Ex. A, ECF No. 24Economico Dell’ Italia Meridionale v. Sperti 2.) The New York Supreme Court is Prod., Inc., 47 F.R.D. 310, 312 (S.D.N.Y. recognized as a court of competent 1969). Here, New York State procedure does jurisdiction. See Kagen v. Kagen, 21 N.Y.2d not require the filing of a complaint in order 532, 53 (1968) (holding that, within the New to properly institute an action and comply York State court system, the “Supreme Court with applicable statute of limitation is a court of original, unlimited and provisions. Thus, at the time of removal to unqualified jurisdiction”) (citations omitted); this Court on July 11, 2017, plaintiff had see also N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 7 (a) (“The satisfied the applicable statute of limitations supreme court shall have general original under New York State procedure. The jurisdiction in law and equity and the removal of the case to the federal court does appellate jurisdiction herein provided.”). not vitiate that compliance. Once a case is Further, in New York “[a]n action may be removed, there is no requisite time frame by commenced ‘by filing a … summons with which a complaint must be filed, although the notice.’” Ryan v. High Rock Dev., LLC, 2 Court can certainly order the filing of such a N.Y.S.3d 519, 520 (2d Dep’t 2015) (quoting pleading under Rule 81 of the Federal Rules N.Y. C.P.L.R. 304-a); see also Bumpus v. of Civil Procedure. No such order was issued New York City Tr. Auth., 883 N.Y.S.2d 99 , in this case. Thus, the filing of the complaint 104 (2d Dep’t 2009) (“The filing of the on November 2, 2017 did not violate the summons with notice or summons and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, nor does complaint fixed the point at which an action the absence of such a complaint impact a case was commenced for statute of limitations that was timely filed for statute of limitations purpose[s].”) (emphasis added) (internal purposes under New York State procedural citation omitted). Therefore, the action was rules prior to removal. timely brought in accordance with the applicable New York State procedures prior Accordingly, this action was timely Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki & Assocs., P.C., brought under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d), and the 897 F.3d 75, 87 (2d Cir. 2018) (“The identity Court denies defendant’s motion on the of the creditor in debt collection grounds of timeliness. communications can be a ‘serious matter.’) (quoting Bourff v. Rubin Lublin, LLC, 674 2. The Merits F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Eun Joo Lee v. Forster & Garbus LLP, 926 Plaintiff argues that the Collection Letter F. Supp. 2d 482, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) fails to adequately identify Bryant State Bank (holding that “entity to which a debtor owes as her creditor in violation of Section money potentially affects the debtor in the 1692g(a)(2)’s requirement that a debt most basic ways, such as what the debtor collection letter include “the name of should write after ‘pay to the order of’ on the the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” 15 payment check to ensure that the debt is U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). Plaintiff also alleges satisfied”). Moreover, “[u]nder the least that this same failure renders the Collection sophisticated consumer standard, ‘[t]o Letter misleading and deceptive under satisfy § 1692g(a), the debt collector's notice Sections 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10). must state the required information As explained supra, defendant does not clearly enough that the recipient is likely to dispute that Bryant State Bank is the actual understand it.’” Datiz v. Int’l Recovery entity to which plaintiff owed the balance. Assocs. Inc., No. 15-CV-3549 (ADS)(AKT) (Def.’s 56.1 ¶ 7.) However, defendant argues 2016 WL 4148330 at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, that naming Show Master Card as the creditor 2016) (quoting Janetos v. Fulton Friedman & was sufficient as this “name [is] commonly Gullace, LLP, 825 F.3d 317, 321 (7th Cir. associated with the account.” (Def. Mem. at 2016)). 10.) As set forth below, the Court agrees with the defendant and holds that, under the However, a debt collector, in identifying least sophisticated consumer standard, the the creditor, need not use the creditor’s full use of “Show Master Card” as the name of business name or name of incorporation so the creditor in the Collection Letter does not long as it uses the name under which the violate the FDCPA. creditor regularly transacts business, or the name used with the consumer from the Under the FDCPA a “creditor” is defined inception of the credit relationship. The as: Second Circuit made this point clear in the context of determining how a creditor can any person who offers or extends avoid triggering coverage under the “false credit creating a debt or to whom a name exception” of the FDCPA because it debt is owed, but such term does not used a name other than its own. See Maguire include any person to the extent that v. Citicorp Retail Servs., Inc., 147 F.3d 232 , he receives an assignment or transfer 235 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Although a creditor of a debt in default solely for the need not use its full business name or its purpose of facilitating collection of name of incorporation to avoid FDCPA such debt for another. coverage, it should use the name under which it usually transacts business, or a commonly15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). The Second Circuit used acronym, or any name that it has used has held that proper identification of the from the inception of the credit relation.”) creditor is critical under the FDCPA. See (citations and quotations omitted); see also Berk v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Civil affiliates and he would be unable to Action No. 11-2715, 2011 WL 4467746 , at determine which entity had his debt). *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2011) (“No reasonable person would find that ‘Chase Auto Loans’ is Plaintiff makes two principal legal a false identification of any of the named arguments in response to this case authority. Chase defendants – JPMorgan Chase Bank, First, plaintiff suggests that the name of the JPMorgan Chase & Co., or Chase Auto creditor used by the debt collector must be Finance Corporation.”). similar to the corporate name. (See Pl.’s Reply at 8-9, ECF No. 24.) (“The use of Other courts have applied this same ‘Show Master Card’ instead of ‘Bryant State standard to claims against debt collectors Bank’ … is not the same as using a shortened under Section 1692g and similar provisions. or short-hand version of a creditor’s legal See, e.g., Leonard v. Zwicker & Assoc., P.C., name such as AMEX.”) Second, plaintiff 713 F. App’x 879, 883 (11th Cir. 2017) (“we seems to assert that allowing the debt agree with the district court that no bright- collector to identify the “creditor” by the line requires a debt collector to always brand name is not permitted under the identify the creditor by its full business name FDCPA. (See id. at 8-9.) (“Identifying the in order to avoid liability under § 1692g. ‘creditor’ as the brand name ‘Show Master Rather, consistent with the FTC’s Card’ as opposed to the actual creditor as commentary, a debt collector may use the defined by the FDCPA, ‘Bryant State Bank’, creditor’s full business name, the name under also runs contrary to the purpose of the which it usually transacts business, or a FDCPA.”). commonly-used acronym”); Campbell v. American Recovery Servs. Inc., Case No. The Court disagrees with plaintiff’s 2:15-CV-09079-ODW-AGR, 2016 WL assertions. Although companies often use a 3219866, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2016) variation of their corporate name or an (“Under the FDCPA it is sufficient to avoid acronym in identifying themselves to the confusion if the debt collector uses the full public, that is not the relevant inquiry for business name of the creditor, the name purposes of the FDCPA. Instead, the under which it usually transacts business, or question is whether the least sophisticated a commonly-used acronym.”); Eul v. consumer would recognize the name in the Transworld Systems, No. 15 C 7755, 2017 Collection Letter and understand, from that WL 1178537, at *30-31 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, name, with whom the debt originated. As the 2017) (rejecting claim that identifying the Second Circuit and other courts have creditor as “National Collegiate Trust” emphasized, that recognition of the creditor violated Section 1692e because that was not by the debtor may come from not just an the particular NCT entity that held the acronym, but from “the name under which it recipient’s loan); Hammett v. AllianceOne usually transacts business” and/or “any name Receivables Mgmt., Inc., Civil Action No. that it has used from the inception of the 11-3172, 2011 WL 3819848 , at *4-5 (E.D. credit relation.” Maguire, 147 F.3d at 235 Pa. Aug. 30, 2011) (rejecting Section 1692e (citation omitted); accord Leonard, 713 F. claim where plaintiff asserted identifying App’x at 883. Obviously, a brand or trade PNC Bank as the original creditor, rather than name (regardless of whether it is similar in the full corporate name, was misleading wording to the corporate name) would often because PNC Bank had many business fall within that standard. Any rule that disallowed the use of a brand or trade name to identify the creditor if dissimilar to the Mastercard Assistance Line.” (Id.) The corporate name would run contrary to the website also prominently utilizes the trade purpose of the FDCPA because it would name “Show MasterCard Credit Card.” potentially create more confusion for the (ECF No. 21-4.) The promotional materials least sophisticated consumer. See Leonard, also contain references to the actual creditor, 713 F. App’x at 883 (“As the district court Bryant State Bank, but the trade name would recognized, requiring a debt collector to be more familiar to the least sophisticated identify the creditor by its full business name consumer from reading these materials, given would not always result in greater clarity to a the prominent use of the term “Show Master naïve consumer, who may be more familiar Card” in the credit relationship. (See, e.g., with a commonly used trade name.”). Thus, ECF No. 21-4 (website) (noting in small print if the least sophisticated consumer would “2018 Show MasterCard. Issued by Bryant understand from a brand or trade name who State Bank, pursuant to a license from the creditor is (because it is the name under MasterCard International Inc.”); ECF No. 21which the company usually transacts 5 (solicitation form) (same); ECF No. 21-6 business and/or it is a name that has been (Terms and Conditions Package) (referring to used since the inception of the credit Bryant State Bank as the creditor).3 relationship), the use of that brand or trade Moreover, the least sophisticated consumer name to identify the creditor in a collection would undoubtedly understand from the letter does not run afoul of the FDCPA. monthly statements for their credit card that “Show Master Card” is the trade name used Having reviewed the record in this case, by Bryant State Bank. In fact, the payment it is clear from the uncontroverted facts that slip in the monthly statement combines the the least sophisticated consumer would names and states at the top, “Bryant State understand the identity of the creditor from Bank Show.” (ECF No. 21-7.) the use of the trade name “Show Master Card” in the Collection Letter. The card that In short, the uncontroverted evidence plaintiff was using was called the “Show clearly demonstrates that “Show Master Master Card” and that trade name was used Card” is the name under which Bryant State from the beginning of the credit relationship. Bank transacts business in connection with For example, the Solicitation Form for the the credit card at issue, and that it did so since credit card states, “You’re Pre-Approved*! the beginning of the credit relationship with The Show Mastercard credit card is easy to plaintiff, and that the identity of the creditor understand with No Hidden Fees. What are would be understood by the least the benefits of becoming a Show sophisticated consumer under these Mastercard Member?” (ECF No. 21-3.) It circumstances. In other words, upon also references the ability to respond online receiving the Collection Letter in this case, at www.showcardcc.com/accept and can ask the least sophisticated consumer would questions by contacting the “Show understand who the creditor was from the 3 In a supplemental submission, defendants attach a this was submitted after the oral argument and is sample credit card which demonstrates that the trade unnecessary to the Court’s decision because the other name “Show” is displayed in big letters on the front of materials in the record clearly demonstrate that the the card, with the following statement in small letters least sophisticated consumer would recognize the on the back of the card: “This card is issued by Bryant creditor in this case by the trade or brand name, “Show State Bank, pursuant to a license from MasterCard Master Card.” Thus, the Court has not considered this International….” (ECF No. 29-1.) However, because supplemental exhibit as part of its analysis. reference to “Show Master Card” as the CONCLUSION. - creditor (using the familiar trade name), and would further understand that defendant was For the foregoing reasons, the Court the debt collector of the debt owed to that grants defendant’s motion for summary original creditor given that the letter clearly judgment on the Fourth Cause of Action and states: “Your account with the above named denies plaintiff's cross-motion for summary creditor has been placed with LTD Financial judgment. Services, L.P., a debt collector.” (ECF No. 61.) Thus, from the Collection Letter, the least SO ORDERED. sophisticated consumer could certainly understand the debt at issue, the identity of the original creditor (by its trade name), and the identity of the debt collector. JOZEPH F. BIANCO In sum, the uncontroverted facts ited States Circuit Judge demonstrate that the least sophisticated (Sitting by designation) consumer would be able to properly identify the creditor through the use of the brand/trade Dated: August 29, 2019 name in the Collection Letter. Accordingly, Central Islip, NY the Collection Letter does not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). For the same reasons, +e the Collection Letter does not violate 15 □ U.S.C. § 1692e. In particular, the least Plaintiffs represented by Mitchell L. Pashkin, . sophisticated consumer would not find the 775 Park Avenue, Suite 255, Huntington, NY language of the letter, as it relates to the 11743. Defendant is represented by Mitchell identity of the creditor, to be confusing or Lee Williamson, Barron & Newburger, P.C., misleading under Section 1692e. 458 Elizabeth Ave, Suite 5371, Somerset, NJ 08873.