Crews v. The County of Nassau

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _____________________ N-o 06-CV-2610 (JFB)(GRB) _____________________ RAHEEM CREWS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PARENT OF SHAHEEM CREWS, Plaintiff, VERSUS COUNTY OF NASSAU, ET AL., Defendants. ___________________ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER December 18, 2019 ___________________ JOSEPH F. BIANCO, Circuit Judge (sitting by claim, in favor of Nassau County on the designation): Monell claim, and in favor of plaintiff on the malicious prosecution claims against Plaintiff Raheem Crews (“plaintiff”) Detective Lemma. The jury awarded brought this action against the County of plaintiff $175,000 in compensatory damages Nassau (“Nassau County”), Officer Ronald against Detective Lemma but did not award Annarumma (“Officer Annarumma”), and punitive damages. Nassau County agreed various other defendants employed by that it was also liable under the doctrine of Nassau County (collectively, the “County respondeat superior for the compensatory Defendants”), as well as Detective Nicholas damages awarded against Detective Lemma Lemma (“Detective Lemma”), under 42 on the state law malicious prosecution claim. U.S.C. § 1983 and New York State law, for alleged civil rights violations stemming from Presently before the Court are motions his arrest, detention, and prosecution for a for fees and costs filed by plaintiff’s former robbery he did not commit. counsel, Arshad Majid, of Majid & Associates, who represented plaintiff from Following discovery and summary the start of the case in May 2006 until January judgment motions, the case proceeded to trial 2007, and plaintiff’s current counsel, the Law on plaintiff’s claims against (1) Officer Offices of Frederick K. Brewington (“the Annarumma for battery, (2) Detective Brewington Law Firm”). Lemma for malicious prosecution under state and federal law, and (3) Nassau County for Nassau County argues that it is not liable municipal liability under Monell and under for attorneys’ fees or costs because the jury New York state law in connection with the found in its favor on the Monell claim, and malicious prosecution claim. The jury found because the Nassau County Police in favor of Officer Annarumma on the battery Indemnification Board (“the Board”) revoked Detective Lemma’s indemnification County and indemnification from Nassau in April 2009 (a decision that was ultimately County, provided that the act or omission affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals). complained of was within the scope of his duties. On July 28, 2006, the Board found In response, both plaintiff and Detective that Detective Lemma was entitled to Lemma argue that Nassau County should indemnification for his legal defense under indemnify Detective Lemma for any awarded New York General Municipal Law § 50-l. fees and costs under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. In addition, Detective Lemma On December 27, 2007, the Court granted argues that Mr. Majid’s application should be in part and denied in part defendants’ motion denied in its entirety for failure to submit for judgment on the pleadings under Federal contemporaneous time records or, in the Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). See generally alternative, that any award should be Crews v. County of Nassau, No. 06-CV-2610 reduced. Detective Lemma also asserts that (JFB)(WDW), 2007 WL 4591325 (E.D.N.Y. the Brewington Law Firm’s award should be Dec. 27, 2007). reduced. The case proceeded to discovery. As As explained below, the Court concludes relevant here, during Detective Lemma’s that Nassau County is not obligated to February 9, 2009, deposition, he testified indemnify Detective Lemma for attorneys’ that, at some point, he learned that plaintiff fees and costs. With respect to the award was incarcerated on the day of the charged against Detective Lemma, the Court robbery, but failed to notify prosecutors concludes that the fees and costs requested by about that exculpatory information. As a Mr. Majid and by the Brewington Law Firm result of this new information, Nassau should be reduced. County reconvened the Board. On April 17, 2009, the Board revoked Detective Lemma’s I. BACKGROUND indemnification and withdrew representation A. Factual Background by the Nassau County Attorney’s Office. The Court set forth the factual The County Defendants moved for background of this case in its February 11, summary judgment on July 11, 2011, and 2014 Order denying in part and granting in Detective Lemma moved for summary part defendants’ motions for summary judgment on July 20, 2011. Plaintiff crossjudgment and denying plaintiff’s motion for moved for summary judgment against summary judgment in its entirety, see Detective Lemma on September 15, 2011. generally Crews v. County of Nassau, 996 F. After hearing oral argument on the motions, Supp. 2d 186 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), and will not the Court allowed further discovery and repeat that background here. supplemental briefing by the parties, followed by additional oral argument. On B. Procedural History February 11, 2014, the Court granted in part and denied in part the motions by the County Plaintiff, represented by Mr. Majid, filed Defendants and Detective Lemma, and the complaint on May 25, 2006. On July 21, denied plaintiff’s motion. 2006, the Nassau County Attorney’s Office sent Detective Lemma a letter notifying him From March 9 through March 23, 2015, that he had been named as a defendant in the the Court held a jury trial. The jury found in case, and advising him that he was entitled to favor of Officer Annarumma and Nassau legal representation provided by Nassau County on the battery and Monell claims, respectively, and in favor of plaintiff on the In light of that decision, Detective malicious prosecution claims against Lemma advised the Court that there was no Detective Lemma. The jury awarded basis for a summary judgment motion on his plaintiff $175,000 in compensatory damages crossclaim for indemnification against but did not award any punitive damages. Nassau County, but requested permission to submit a statement of his present financial On May 8, 2015, plaintiff timely moved condition for consideration by the Court in to set aside the verdict and for a new trial connection with the pending application for under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). attorneys’ fees and costs against him. The The Court denied plaintiff’s motion on Court granted that request, and Detective December 16, 2015. See generally Crews v. Lemma submitted the additional information County of Nassau, 149 F. Supp. 3d 287 on August 15, 2018. On September 10, 2018, (E.D.N.Y. 2015). the Brewington Law Firm responded to that On December 30, 2015, the Brewington supplemental submission. Law Firm moved for attorneys’ fees and On January 22, 2019, the Court heard oral costs. On January 14, 2016, Mr. Majid also argument on the motions for attorneys’ fees moved for fees and costs. Nassau County and and costs, and requested additional briefing. Detective Lemma opposed the motions on On February 12, 2019, Detective Lemma February 12, 2016. On March 4, 2016, the submitted additional briefing, arguing that Brewington Law Firm and Mr. Majid Nassau County should be equitably estopped submitted replies. from denying indemnification from the date On March 16, 2016, Detective Lemma Detective Lemma entered into the advised the Court that he wished to move for representation agreement with Nassau summary judgment on his crossclaim for County on July 21, 2006, until it was revoked indemnification against Nassau County, as it by the Board on April 17, 2009. In particular, related to attorneys’ fees and costs. On May Detective Lemma argued that equitable 19, 2016, on consent of the parties, the Court estoppel should apply because the Nassau stayed Detective Lemma’s time for moving County Attorney’s Office failed to advise until the Appellate Division of the New York him of the inherent conflict of interest posed State Supreme Court, Second Department, by that Office representing him and Nassau decided Detective Lemma’s appeal from the County, and because the Nassau County dismissal of his Article 78 petition for Attorney’s Office failed to exercise due indemnification from Nassau County. After diligence in properly investigating the the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal allegations. On February 12, 2019, the of Detective Lemma’s Article 78 petition, Brewington Law Firm submitted a Detective Lemma requested that the Court supplemental memorandum of law joining in continue to stay his time for moving until the Detective Lemma’s arguments and, on New York Court of Appeals heard his appeal. February 14, 2019, Mr. Majid also joined in The Court granted that request. On June 14, those arguments. On March 5, 2019, Nassau 2018, the New York Court of Appeals County submitted a supplemental opposition affirmed the Board’s decision to deny and, on March 22, 2019, the Brewington Law indemnification. See generally Lemma v. Firm submitted a reply. Finally, on March Nassau Cty. Police Officer Indemnification 11, 2019, Detective Lemma submitted Bd., 31 N.Y.3d 523 (2018). updated financial information to the Court. The Court has fully considered the parties’ submissions and arguments. II. DISCUSSION indemnification agreement and that Nassau County is estopped from denying As noted earlier, presently before the indemnification. Court are applications for attorneys’ fees and costs submitted by both Mr. Majid and the The Court finds these arguments to be Brewington Law Firm. Mr. Majid requests without merit. As noted, after Detective $186,937.50 in fees and $2,351.97 in costs. Lemma testified that he learned that plaintiff The Brewington Law Firm requests was incarcerated on the day of the charged $411,841.75 in fees and $19,357.60 in costs. robbery, but failed to notify prosecutors about that exculpatory information, the As a threshold matter, Detective Lemma Board revoked its indemnification and plaintiff argue that Nassau County determination. The New York Court of should indemnify Detective Lemma in Appeals later affirmed that decision. See connection with any award of attorneys’ fees generally Lemma v. Nassau Cty. Police or costs against him. Moreover, Detective Officer Indemnification Bd., 31 N.Y.3d 523 Lemma argues that the Court should deny (2018). Notably, the Court of Appeals Mr. Majid’s fee request in its entirety, and concluded that the “legislature . . . left the substantially reduce the Brewington Law determination of whether the statutory Firm’s fees, on several grounds. One of the prerequisites [for indemnification] are met to grounds for the reduction of an award raised the discretion of the Board,” id. at 529 , and by Detective Lemma is his financial that “the Board did not err when it interpreted situation. The Court addresses each of these [General Municipal Law § 50-l] as permitting issues in turn. it to deny indemnification based on its A. Indemnification assessment of the propriety of [Detective Lemma’s] conduct,” id. at 532. In light of Detective Lemma and plaintiff1 argue that decision, there is no basis for this Court that Nassau County must indemnify to entertain arguments relating to the Board’s Detective Lemma under General Municipal interpretation and application of General Law § 50-l for any attorneys’ fees and costs Municipal Law § 50-l. awarded from the commencement of the lawsuit until the Board revoked Detective Notwithstanding the New York Court of Lemma’s indemnification in April 2009. Appeals decision, Detective Lemma and Specifically, Detective Lemma contends that plaintiff assert that this Court can and should Nassau County should be equitably estopped find in favor of Detective Lemma on his from denying indemnification during that indemnification claim on the basis of time frame and that the New York State Court equitable estoppel. Detective Lemma did not of Appeals decision does not preclude this raise an equitable estoppel argument in the relief. Plaintiff similarly contends that New York state courts, and has not explained Nassau County’s failure to exercise his failure to do so. Nor did plaintiff, at any reasonable diligence requires it to honor the point during those proceedings, seek to intervene to assert his objections on equitable 1 The Court notes that at least one New York State here. In any event, even assuming arguendo that such court has held that the victim of a county police standing existed, the Court concludes that there is no officer’s torts does not have standing to challenge the basis for Detective Lemma or plaintiff to challenge Board’s indemnification decisions. See Galvani v. that indemnification decision on grounds of equitable Nassau Cty. Police Indemnification Review Bd., 674 estoppel or any other grounds. N.Y.S.2d 690 (2d Dep’t 1998). Plaintiff has not cited any authority establishing that he has standing to do so estoppel grounds, or any other grounds. In infliction of unconscionable injury and loss any event, even assuming arguendo that this upon one who has relied on the promise of challenge can be made to this Court in this another.” Am. Bartenders Sch., Inc. v. 105 context, the Court concludes that no grounds Madison Co., 59 N.Y.2d 716, 718 (1983) for equitable estoppel exist in this case, nor (emphasis added). are there any other grounds to disturb the When equitable estoppel is invoked New York Court of Appeals’ decision on against the government, the bar is even indemnification. higher. “It is axiomatic that the doctrine of “Equitable estoppel is grounded on equitable estoppel cannot generally be notions of fair dealing and good conscience invoked against governmental agencies in the and is designed to aid the law in the exercise of their governmental function.” administration of justice where injustice Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. New York would otherwise result.” In re Ionosphere State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 991 Clubs, Inc., 85 F.3d 992, 999 (2d Cir. 1996). N.Y.S.2d 151, 153 (3d Dep’t 2014). “‘Estoppel’ generally means that one party in Accordingly, equitable estoppel against a a dispute should not be permitted to reap any government agency “is foreclosed ‘in all but benefit from its own misrepresentations.” the rarest cases,’” N.Y. Med. Transporters United States v. Schmitt, 999 F. Supp. 317 , Ass’n Inc. v. Perales, 77 N.Y.2d 126 , 130 360 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d, 28 F. App’x 63 (1990) (quoting In re Parkview Assocs. v. (2d Cir. 2002). Thus, to establish a claim for City of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 274 , 282 equitable estoppel under New York law, a (1988)), and requires “a showing of fraud, party must show: “(1) [a]n act constituting a misrepresentation, deception, or similar concealment of facts or a false affirmative misconduct, along with misrepresentation; (2) [a]n intention or reasonable reliance thereon,” In re Enf’t of expectation that such acts will be relied upon; Tax Liens ex rel. Cty. of Orange, 903 (3) [a]ctual or constructive knowledge of the N.Y.S.2d 60, 70 (2d Dep’t 2010); accord true facts by the wrongdoers; [and] Yassin v. Sarabu, 727 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (2d (4) [r]eliance upon the misrepresentations Dep’t 2001). which causes the innocent party to change its Under the circumstances of this case, the position to its substantial detriment.” Gaia elements of equitable estoppel have not been House Mezz LLC v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., satisfied. Plaintiff and Detective Lemma 720 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Gen. have not shown, with respect to the actions of Elec. Capital Corp. v. Eva Armadora, S.A., Nassau County, “[c]onduct which amounts to 37 F.3d 41 , 45 (2d Cir. 1994)). a false representation or concealment of As a general matter, equitable estoppel is material facts.” BWA Corp. v. Alltrans Exp. an “‘extraordinary remedy,’ which should be U.S.A., Inc., 493 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1st Dep’t invoked ‘sparingly and only under 1985). Although the Board could have exceptional circumstances.’” Twersky v. expected Detective Lemma to rely on its Yeshiva Univ., 579 F. App’x 7, 10 (2d Cir. initial indemnification decision and he could 2014) (first quoting Clark v. Ravikumar, 935 have, in fact, relied on it, his estoppel claim N.Y.S.2d 633, 635 (2d Dep’t 2011); then fails because there is no evidence (nor is it quoting In re Gross v. N.Y. City Health & alleged) that the Board made its initial Hosps. Corp., 505 N.Y.S.2d 678, 679 (2d decision with knowledge that Detective Dep’t 1986)). Indeed, “[t]he purpose of Lemma had failed to disclose exculpatory invoking the doctrine is to prevent the information to prosecutors. To the contrary, the evidence indicates that Nassau County’s to advise Detective Lemma of the potential decision to rescind indemnification was conflict support equitable estoppel in this based on the discovery of this material case on indemnification. Similarly, to the information (i.e., that Detective Lemma was extent it is argued that Nassau County was not acting within the proper discharge and negligent in their investigation of plaintiff’s scope of his duties when he knowingly allegations and thus failed to uncover withheld exculpatory information), which Detective Lemma’s misconduct sooner, such Detective Lemma disclosed for the first time negligence would not provide a basis for at his deposition. In short, there is no basis equitable estoppel. for equitable estoppel because Nassau In short, neither Detective Lemma nor County made no false representations to, nor plaintiff has demonstrated “fraud, concealed any material fact from, Detective misrepresentation, deception, or similar Lemma or plaintiff, but rather simply affirmative misconduct” by Nassau County, reassessed their initial indemnification In re Enf’t of Tax Liens, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 70, decision in light of new information nor an “unconscionable injury,” Am. uncovered during discovery (which was supplied by Detective Lemma).2 Bartenders Sch., Inc., 59 N.Y.2d at 718 , to invoke this exceptional doctrine in this case. None of the arguments raised by Accordingly, this Court finds no basis for Detective Lemma or plaintiff are persuasive equitable estoppel in this case, or any other on the issue of equitable estoppel. For grounds to preclude Nassau County from example, although Detective Lemma argues relying on the Board’s finding that Detective that Nassau County had an inherent conflict Lemma will not be indemnified. Therefore, of interest in representing him in this case the motions by Detective Lemma and under Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d plaintiff to find in favor of Detective Lemma 903 (2d Cir. 1984), that case provides no on his crossclaim for indemnification are support for equitable estoppel here because denied, and the cross-claim for the potential conflict that was raised in indemnification is dismissed based on the Dunton (where the municipality is claiming decision of the Board, as upheld by the New that the individual officer acted outside the York Court of Appeals. scope of his official duties) did not exist B. Attorneys’ Fees during the period of joint representation here. In fact, Nassau County did not dispute for “The general rule in our legal system is purposes of trial that Detective Lemma was that each party must pay its own attorney’s acting within the scope of his employment fees and expenses.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex and agreed to be subjected to respondeat rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 550 (2010). In superior liability for plaintiff’s state law Section 1983 actions, however, “the court, in malicious prosecution claim against its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, Detective Lemma. Moreover, the Monell other than the United States, a reasonable claim here was based on a failure to attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. adequately train and supervise detectives, § 1988(b). Here, plaintiff’s original counsel, and not on a municipal policy. Thus, there Mr. Majid, requests $186,937.50 in was no inherent conflict nor does any failure 2 For the same reasons, the Court finds plaintiff’s claim that he also relied on the Board’s 2006 decision for any award of damages provides no basis for equitable estoppel. attorney’s fees and $2,351.97 in costs. interrelated and required essentially the same Plaintiff’s successor counsel, the Brewington proof.” Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938 , 952 Law Firm, requests $411,841.75 in attorneys’ (2d Cir. 1997). Accordingly, “[t]he district fees and $19,357.60 in costs. court . . . has the discretion to award fees for the entire litigation where the claims are To calculate reasonable attorneys’ fees, ‘inextricably intertwined’ and ‘involve a the Court uses the “lodestar figure,” which is common core of facts or [are] based on determined by multiplying the number of related legal theories.’” Kerin v. U.S. Postal hours reasonably expended on a case by a Serv., 218 F.3d 185 , 194 n.6 (2d Cir. 2000) reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. (alterations in original) (quoting Dominic v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Consol. Edison Co., 822 F.2d 1249, 1259 (2d Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 109 F.3d 111 , 115 Cir. 1987)). (2d Cir. 1997). “Both [the Second Circuit] and the Supreme Court have held that the 1. Reasonable Hourly Rate lodestar . . . creates a ‘presumptively A “reasonable hourly rate” is “‘what a reasonable fee.’” Millea v. Metro–North R.R. reasonable, paying client would be willing to Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) pay,’ given that such a party wishes ‘to spend (quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens the minimum necessary to litigate the case Neighborhood Assoc. v. County of Albany, effectively.’” Bergerson v. N.Y. State Office 522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008)). “[T]he of Mental Health, Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of the 652 F.3d 277, 289 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting relevant factors constituting a ‘reasonable’ Simmons v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 575 F.3d attorney’s fee.” Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553 170, 174 (2d Cir. 2009)). This Court follows (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley the Second Circuit’s “forum rule,” which Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. “generally requires use of the hourly rates 546, 565-66 (1986)). Thus, the Supreme employed in the district in which the Court has recognized that “the lodestar reviewing court sits in calculating the method produces an award that roughly presumptively reasonable fee.” Id. at 290 approximates the fee that the prevailing (quoting Simmons, 575 F.3d at 174). In attorney would have received if he or she had Arbor Hill, the Second Circuit also instructed been representing a paying client who was district courts to consider the factors set forth billed by the hour in a comparable case.” Id. in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, at 551. “The burden is on the party seeking Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated attorney’s fees to submit sufficient evidence on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, to support the hours worked and the rates 489 U.S. 87 (1989). See 522 F.3d at 190 . The claimed.” Hugee v. Kimso Apartments, LLC, twelve Johnson factors are: 852 F. Supp. 2d 281, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). (1) the time and labor required; The Supreme Court has held that “the (2) the novelty and difficulty of the extent of a plaintiff’s success is a crucial questions; (3) the level of skill factor in determining the proper amount of an required to perform the legal service award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. properly; (4) the preclusion of § 1988.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440 . employment by the attorney due to However, a “plaintiff’s lack of success on acceptance of the case; (5) the some of his claims does not require the court attorney’s customary hourly rate; to reduce the lodestar amount where the (6) whether the fee is fixed or successful and the unsuccessful claims were contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or the the firm, and the expertise of its attorneys.’” circumstances; (8) the amount Houston, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 402 (quoting involved in the case and the results Siracuse v. Program for the Dev. of Human obtained; (9) the experience, Potential, No. 07-CV-2205 (CLP), 2012 WL reputation, and ability of the 1624291, at *30 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2012)). attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of 2. Hours Reasonably Expended the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the “The party seeking attorney’s fees also client; and (12) awards in similar bears the burden of establishing that the cases. number of hours for which compensation is sought is reasonable.” Custodio v. Am. Chain Id. at 186 n.3 (quoting Johnson, 488 F.2d at Link & Constr., Inc., No. 06-CV-7148 (GBD) 717-19). “The burden rests with the (HBP), 2014 WL 116147 , at *9 (S.D.N.Y. prevailing party ‘to justify the reasonableness Jan. 13, 2014) (citing Cruz v. Local Union of the requested rate.’” Hugee, 852 F. Supp. No. 3 of Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d 2d at 298 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 1148 , 1160 (2d Cir. 1994)). “Applications 886, 895 n.11 (1984)). for fee awards should generally be Courts in this district have concluded that documented by contemporaneously created $200 to $450 per hour is a reasonable hourly time records that specify, for each attorney, rate for partners, $200 to $325 per hour is the date, the hours expended, and the nature reasonable for senior associates, and $100 to of the work done.” Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., $200 per hour is reasonable for more junior 148 F.3d 149 , 173 (2d Cir. 1998). “Hours associates. See Houston v. Cotter, 234 F. that are ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise Supp. 3d 392, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing unnecessary,’ are to be excluded, and in Sass v. MTA Bus Co., 6 F. Supp. 3d 238 , 261 dealing with such surplusage, the court has (E.D.N.Y. 2014)); Ganci v. U.S. Limousine discretion simply to deduct a reasonable Service Ltd., No. 10-CV-3027 (JFB)(AKT), percentage of the number of hours claimed 2015 WL 1529772 , at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, ‘as a practical means of trimming fat from a 2015) (collecting cases); Hugee, 852 F. Supp. fee application.’” Id. (first quoting Hensley, 2d at 298-99; Pilitz v. Inc. Village of 461 U.S. at 434 ; then quoting N.Y. Ass’n for Freeport, No. 07–CV–4078 (ETB), 2011 WL Retarded Children, Inc., 711 F.2d at 1146); 5825138, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2011) see also Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d (citing Builders Bank v. Rockaway Equities, 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1994) (“We do not require LLC, No. 08–CV–3575 (MDG), 2011 WL that the court set forth item-by-item findings 4458851, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2011)); concerning what may be countless objections Olsen v. County of Nassau, No. 05–CV–3623 to individual billing items.”). Finally, when (ETB), 2010 WL 376642 , at *4 (E.D.N.Y. the Court makes this determination, it “does Jan. 26, 2010); Gutman v. Klein, No. 03–CV– not play the role of an uninformed arbiter but 1570 (BMC), 2009 WL 3296072 , at *2 may look to its own familiarity with the case (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2009). and its experience generally as well as to the evidentiary submissions and arguments of the Ultimately, however, “in light of the parties.” Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d numerous factors that courts in this circuit 858, 876 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting DiFilippo v. consider to determine a reasonable hourly Morizio, 759 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir. rate, ‘the range of “reasonable” attorney fee 1985)). rates in this district depends on the type of case, the nature of the litigation, the size of 3. Application U.S. at 433). Thus, fee applications must be supported by contemporaneous records that a. Mr. Majid “specify, for each attorney, the date, the hours Mr. Majid requests an hourly rate of expended, and the nature of the work done.” $375. Defendants argue that $375 per hour is N.Y. Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc., 711 unreasonable in light of Mr. Majid’s limited F.2d at 1148. This requirement is strictly experience with civil rights litigation, and enforced, which means that the records must propose an hourly rate of $200. be made “while the work is being done or, more likely, immediately thereafter. In light of the prevailing hourly rates in Descriptions of work recollected in this district, and all the other factors set forth tranquility days or weeks later will not do.” in Arbor Hill, the Court concludes that $250 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 727 F. Supp. per hour is a reasonable hourly rate for Mr. 2d 239, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Majid. Although Mr. Majid is an able lawyer, he does not have significant In the instant case, Mr. Majid submitted experience in civil rights litigation. Because records showing that he spent 498.5 hours on the upper range of rates is “reserved for this matter and a sworn statement that these expert trial attorneys with extensive records were compiled contemporaneously. experience before the federal bar, who The Court concludes that Mr. Majid’s sworn specialize in the practice of civil rights law statement, and the records themselves, are and are recognized by their peers as leaders sufficient to satisfy the contemporaneous and experts in their fields,” Hugee, 852 F. time records requirement. To the extent that Supp. 2d at 300, a reduction is appropriate. Detective Lemma challenges Mr. Majid’s The Court will use a rate of $250 per hour to submissions on this ground, Detective calculate the lodestar for Mr. Majid. Lemma’s arguments are insufficient for the Court to conclude that the records were not Mr. Majid has submitted a billing contemporaneously made. Thus, Detective summary of work performed on the case. Lemma’s motion on that ground is denied. Defendants contend that these hours should be denied in their entirety because the time However, the Court finds the number of records submitted were not made hours expended by Mr. Majid to be contemporaneously. Defendants further unreasonably excessive in several respects as argue that Mr. Majid’s hours should be discussed below. First, the Court agrees with reduced because they are excessive, defendants that, apart from fees incurred in redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. preparing the instant motion, Mr. Majid is not entitled to any fees after January 30, 2007, As a threshold matter, the Court when this Court granted Nassau County’s concludes that Mr. Majid’s time records, motion to disqualify him. As Mr. Majid was though not exemplary, meet the requirements no longer plaintiff’s attorney, he cannot for an award of attorney’s fees. As noted recoup fees after that date. Thus, for earlier, “[t]he burden is on the party seeking example, time that Mr. Majid spent opposing attorney’s fees to submit sufficient evidence defendants’ motion to implead him as a to support the hours worked and the rates defendant is not recoverable.3 The Court claimed.” Id. at 298 (citing Hensley, 461 similarly concludes that time spent on Mr. 3 The Court notes that, not only was this motion after underlying criminal case (and not on his representation Mr. Majid’s representation of the plaintiff ceased, but of plaintiff in this civil rights case). it was based on his conduct in connection with the Majid’s opposition to defendants’ successful 32 hours); see also Romeo & Juliette Laser disqualification motion is not recoverable. Hair Removal Inc. v. Assara I LLC, No. 08 Mr. Majid did not prevail in opposing that Civ. 442(TPG)(FM), 2013 WL 3322249 , at motion, and the time is severable from the *5-8 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2013) (reducing fees work he spent on behalf of his client.4 by 75% that were “grossly excessive relative to the nature of the work performed”); Lide v. Second, in its review of Mr. Majid’s Abbott House, No. 05 Civ. 3790(SAS), 2008 billing records, the Court finds numerous WL 495304, at *l-2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2008) instances of excessive time that warrant a (finding that “excessive and unnecessary reduction. For example, counsel spent over hours spent on indisputably straightforward three hundred hours drafting the complaint. tasks” warranted a thirty percent reduction). Having reviewed the complaint and billing entries, and having presided over this case Third, with respect to the remaining work (and many other Section 1983 cases), the (outside of the work on the complaint), the Court finds that such time was grossly Court finds that a reduction is also excessive and warrants a substantial appropriate based on vague and block-billed reduction. In particular, although the time entries, such that the reasonableness of complaint is lengthy and (as Mr. Majid noted each entry cannot be easily determined. at oral argument) required legal research “Courts frequently respond to vague and before drafting, the Court concludes that any difficult-to-decipher billing statements with preparation for, or drafting of, the complaint an across-the-board percentage reduction in beyond 40 hours is unreasonable under the the fees claimed, often in the range of 20-30 circumstances of this case. See, e.g., Hines v. percent.” Calvo v. City of New York, No. 141025 Fifth Ave. Inc., No. 14-CV-3661 SAS, CV-7246 (VEC), 2017 WL 4119280 , at *6 2015 WL 4006126 , at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2017) (quoting Thai-Lao 2015) (finding 58.2 hours drafting a 27-page Lignite (Thailand) Co. v. Gov’t of Lao complaint was excessive even though People’s Democratic Republic, No. 10 CIV. complaint covered 13 years of events where 05256 (KMW) (DF), 2012 WL 5816878 , at “nothing was achieved by tracing thirteen *11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2012)); see also, e.g., years and adding layers of detail when it Ass’n of Holocaust Victims for Restitution of [wa]s evident” that that was not needed to Artwork & Masterpieces v. Bank Austria render claims plausible); Simmonds v. N.Y.C. Creditanstalt AG, No. 04cv3600 (SWK), Dep’t of Corr., No. 06 CIV. 5298 (NRB), 2005 WL 3099592 , at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008 WL 4303474 , at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2005) (applying 25% reduction to account for 2008) (finding that over 142 hours drafting “block billing, vagueness, and excess”). complaint was “certainly an excessive Here, Mr. Majid’s time records are amount given that it corresponds to over one riddled with vague and block-billed entries. month of full time work by a single For example, Mr. Majid’s entry on February attorney”); Lynch v. Town of Southampton, 19, 2006 states that he spent 4.75 hours on 492 F. Supp. 2d 197, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) “Conf. w/ clients – Legal research (Malic. (finding 97.83 hours for 43 page civil rights Prosec.) – Outline Complaint.” (Majid Reply complaint unreasonable and reducing time to 4 Detective Lemma also argues that it would be Detective Lemma). However, the Court need not inequitable to require him to pay for Mr. Majid’s work address this issue because it finds that the time Mr. on the disqualification motion and the impleader Majid spent on those motions is unrecoverable for the motion because the Nassau County Attorney’s Office other reasons discussed above. made the decision to file those motions (rather than Decl. Ex. A at 2.) On September 6, 2006, Mr. rate to $400 due to the “uncontested facts of Majid’s entry states that he spent one hour on the case and the results achieved.” (Lemma “Rev. Def’s letter-Conf. w/ Arthur-Conf. w/ Opp. at 19.) clients (J. Bianco now has case).” (Id. at 4.)5 In light of the prevailing hourly rates in Given the frequency of such entries, the this district, and all other factors set forth in Court concludes that a 30% across-the-board Arbor Hill, the Court concludes that $450 is reduction in hours is warranted in order to a reasonable hourly rate for Mr. Brewington. “trim the excess from counsel’s billing As noted, courts in this district “award hourly entries.” Monette, 2016 WL 4145798 , at *8. rates ranging from $200 to $450 per hour for Based on the foregoing, the Court partners.” Houston, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 402 calculates the lodestar for Mr. Majid to be (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting $22,600. The Court sees no reason to depart D’Annunzio v. Ayken, Inc., No. 11-CV-3303 from the lodestar figure in this case. See, e.g., (WFK) (WDW), 2015 WL 5308094 , at *4 Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553 (noting that lodestar (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2015)); accord Martinez figure includes “most, if not all,” relevant v. City of New York, 330 F.R.D. 60 , 70 factors in setting reasonable attorney’s fee). (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“Based on a survey of cases in the Eastern District of New York, b. The Brewington Law Firm experienced Section 1983 attorneys receive, The Brewington Law Firm has submitted on average, fees calculated at an hourly rate detailed records and an affidavit attesting to of between $300.00 and $450.00.”). Given their legal experience and work on this Mr. Brewington’s extensive experience matter. litigating and trying civil rights cases (which defendants acknowledge), a rate at the upper The Brewington Law Firm requests the end of this range is appropriate. See, e.g., following rates: Hugee, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 300 . The Court Attorney Role Rate also bases the conclusion to award Mr. Frederick Brewington Partner $500 Brewington a fee on the high end of the range Ira Fogelgaren Partner $300 in this district on its own observations of Mr. Gregory Calliste Jr. Associate $315 Brewington’s excellent performance over the Mili Makhijani Associate $250 course of this entire litigation. Even though G. William Germano Jr. Associate $250 the Court does not view the case as particularly complex, Mr. Brewington did an Valerie M. Cartright Associate $315 impressive job during extensive motions Johanna C. David Associate $225 practice and prevailed at trial. Accordingly, Cathryn Harris Of Counsel $250 for the above reasons, the Court concludes Cory Morris Associate $200 that an hourly rate near the high end of the Precilla Lockett Associate $150 range in this district is warranted. Ulrica Sheridan Paralegal $50 The Court notes that Mr. Brewington’s regularly charged hourly rate is $500. Although defendants generally object to Although that rate “is persuasive evidence of these proposed rates as unreasonable, they reasonableness, compensable attorneys’ fees suggest a reduction of only Mr. Brewington’s must ultimately conform to market rates.” 5 More examples include an entry for December 19, December 22, 2005 that states, “Legal research 2005 that states, “Conf. with client – Legal research (criminal, civil issues) – Redraft and file NOC.” (50-h issues) – Outline Complaint,” and an entry for (Majid Reply Decl. Ex. A at 1-2.) Tatum v. City of New York, No. 06-cv-4290 award here was substantial, and not only (PGG)(GWG), 2010 WL 334975 , at *5 nominal. The cases defendants rely on to (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010). Accordingly, a argue that a reduction is appropriate are district court is “not bound by the rate which therefore inapposite. E.g., Farrar v. Hobby, a lawyer charges his other clients.” McCann 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) (holding that the v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 130 (2d Cir. “technical nature of a nominal damages 1983). Here, the Court concludes, based on award or any judgment . . . bear[s] on the all of the relevant factors, that a rate above propriety of fees awarded under § 1988”). In $450 would be unreasonable under the fact, the Second Circuit noted in Pino v. circumstances of this particular case. Locascio that Farrar’s inquiry applies “whe[re] the plaintiff has won only nominal As to the rates for the other Brewington damages.” 101 F.3d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 1996) Law Firm attorneys and their paralegal, the (emphasis added) (citing Farrar, 506 U.S. at Court concludes that those hourly rates are 103); c.f., Hines v. City of Albany, 613 F. appropriate. In particular, the requested rates App’x 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2015) (“We are are in accord with the prevailing rates in this unpersuaded by Defendants’ attempts to district and are supported by the other factors characterize the $10,000 settlement in this set forth in Arbor Hill and Johnson, including case as meager. Moreover, the success here the attorneys’ legal education, training, and was hardly technical.”). experience as set forth in the declaration supporting the motion for fees. (See Decl. of Second, the Court disagrees with Frederick K. Brewington in Supp. of Mot. for defendants’ argument that the Court should Fees (“Brewington Decl.”) ¶¶ 27-65, ECF deduct time spent on the false arrest and false No. 358-2.) imprisonment claims. Defendants are correct that “[i]n calculating the total number of The Brewington Law Firm has also reasonable hours eligible for attorneys’ fees, submitted a billing summary of work courts should subtract any ‘hours dedicated performed on the case. There is no dispute to severable unsuccessful claims.’” Tatum, here that the submissions satisfy the 2010 WL 334975 , at *10 (quoting contemporaneous records requirement. Quarantino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422 , However, defendants contend that the hours 425 (2d Cir. 1999)). Courts “need not” should be reduced because the Brewington reduce the fee award, however, “where the Law Firm obtained only limited success and ‘successful and the unsuccessful claims were because the hours are excessive, redundant, interrelated and required essentially the same and improperly block billed. proof.’” Id. (quoting Murphy, 118 F.3d at i . Limited Success 952). Thus, if a plaintiff’s claims “involve a common core of facts” or are “based on Defendants argue that a reduction is related legal theories,” so that “[m]uch of appropriate because plaintiff’s “degree of counsel’s time [is] devoted generally to the success was significantly modest in litigation as a whole, making it difficult to comparison with his original complaint and divide the hours expended on a claim-bymonetary request for damages.” (Lemma claim basis,” no reduction based on Opp. at 21-23.) The Court disagrees. unsuccessful claims is warranted. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 . Instead, plaintiff’s First, the Court disagrees with counsel “should be compensated even for defendants’ characterization of plaintiff’s work done in connection with an victory in this case. The $175,000 damages unsuccessful claim if that claim was intertwined with the claim on which force/battery claims against Officer [plaintiff] succeeded.” Gierlinger, 160 F.3d Annarumma (although not extensive) were at 877. factually and legally distinct from the claims against Detective Lemma. In such situations, Here, the Court finds that virtually all of even where the time entries do not delineate plaintiff’s claims—including his successful work on the successful claims as compared to malicious prosecution claims in the form of a the unsuccessful claims, a court can in its $175,000 jury award—arose from the same discretion utilize an across-the-board cut. facts surrounding his arrest and subsequent See, e.g., Todaro v. Siegel Fenchel & Peddy, prosecution. Specifically, there is significant P.C., 697 F. Supp. 2d 395, 401 (E.D.N.Y. overlap in the claims that stem from the same 2010) (applying a 30% fee reduction even facts concerning plaintiff’s arrest, though the unsuccessful claim had a imprisonment, and prosecution. Indeed, significant amount of “overlap” because of although Detective Lemma argues that the “how much time [p]laintiff’s counsel would litigation regarding the facts leading up to the have saved by not litigating [plaintiff]’s arrest were unnecessary to prove the unsuccessful claim”). Although Mr. malicious prosecution claim against him for Brewington suggested at oral argument that a his conduct after the arrest, the Court modest reduction of 5% in the number of disagrees. Plaintiff needed to prove, among hours may be appropriate for work on the other things, that Detective Lemma’s conduct unsuccessful claims, the Court concludes that following the arrest was malicious, and not a 10% reduction is warranted in light of the simply an oversight or mistake. Therefore, it nature of the claims and the nature of the was critical to explore his involvement in the work that was required to pursue the claims investigation (especially as the investigating against Nassau County and Officer officer) from its inception and to gather Annarumma apart from the claims against information from those who interacted with Detective Lemma. him during the investigation, arrest, and prosecution. In sum, although virtually all of the claims stem from the same material facts, an However, notwithstanding the across-the-board 10% reduction in the inextricably intertwined facts, there are some number of hours is appropriate because of the portions of the unsuccessful claims, additional legal work performed litigating the especially the legal work on the Monell claim unsuccessful claims, especially the Monell and the claims against Officer Annarumma, claim and the excessive force/battery claim that the Court concludes are distinct. For against Officer Annarumma. example, the legal research and briefing on the summary judgment motion with respect ii. Excessive, Redundant, to the Monell claim, the jury instructions on and Vague Hours that claim, the trial preparation on that claim, and other related work were not inextricably The Court further finds that the number intertwined with the Section 1983 claim of hours expended by the Brewington Law against Detective Lemma. Moreover, some Firm on the case is unreasonably excessive small amount of the facts (such as the facts for several reasons. First, the matter was relating to Detective Lemma’s supervision overstaffed with nine attorneys, one law and training) were primarily aimed at the school graduate, and one paralegal, who Monell claim. Similarly, the discovery and spent more than one thousand hours on the other legal work on the excessive matter. When evaluating fee applications, a district court has discretion to reduce requested attorneys’ fees where the Harris spent 10 hours on “File Review, prevailing party assigned an inordinate document review.” (Id. at 42.) As explained number of attorneys to litigate the action. above, the Court may, in its discretion, See, e.g., Lochren v. County of Suffolk, 344 F. determine a reduction is appropriate in light App’x 706, 709 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming of such deficient entries. district court’s 25% across-the-board Based on the foregoing, the Court reduction because “plaintiffs overstaffed the concludes that a 20% percent across-thecase, resulting in the needless duplication of board reduction to the Brewington Law work and retention of unnecessary Firm’s hours is warranted. See, e.g., Kirsch, personnel”); Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 109 148 F.3d at 173 (finding no abuse of F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[I]t was within discretion “in the adjustment of the rate to be the purview of the court’s discretion to paid for [counsel]’s time or as to the 20% determine whether or not the actual time reduction for vagueness, inconsistencies, and expended by an additional attorney was other deficiencies in the billing records); reasonable.”). Moreover, the billing records Monette, 2016 WL 4145798 , at *8 (finding indicate duplicative and inefficient efforts. that the court has “discretion simply to deduct For example, from September 10 to 14, 2011, a reasonable percentage of the number of it appears that Mr. Brewington, Ms. hours claimed ‘as a practical means of Cartright, Ms. Lockett, and Ms. Harris spent trimming fat from a fee applications.’” over a hundred hours on the summary (quoting Kirsch, 148 F.3d at 173)). judgment motion. (See Brewington Decl. Ex. A at 43-45, ECF No. 358-3.)6 More broadly, c. Detective Lemma’s Financial none of the legal or factual issues in the case Situation was so complicated or unusual to warrant so many attorneys and hours. See Husain v. Finally, defendants argue that the Court Springer, 579 F. App’x 3, 6 (2d Cir. 2014) should impose a fee reduction in light of (citing DiFillippo, 759 F.2d at 235-36 ) Detective Lemma’s financial situation. The (holding that plaintiffs’ “attorney’s claim of Court disagrees. 2,741.4 hours of attorney time was Detective Lemma cites Faraci v. Hickeyextravagant” in a Section 1983 litigation that Freeman Co., 607 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1979) “established no new principle of law” but to support the argument that the Court should rather “concerned a ‘straightforward’ consider his financial circumstances in application of existing law, calling into determining the fee award here. In Faraci, question their attorney’s enormous the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s expenditure of time”). Title VII complaint as frivolous and awarded Finally, the Court concludes that a the defendant the full amount of fees reduction in hours is appropriate based on requested under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Id. vague and block-billed time entries. For at 1027. On appeal, the Second Circuit instance, there are numerous entries that explained that “successful defendants in Title mention only “Legal Research” or VII actions are entitled to attorneys’ fees only “Research.” (E.g., Brewington Decl. Ex. A where the suit is ‘frivolous, unreasonable, or at 4, 14, 70.) On September 5, 2011, Ms. without foundation.’” Id. at 1028 (quoting 6 Ms. Cartright also spent 16 hours “finaliz[ing] motions and exhibits.” (Id. at 45.) The Court finds that this entry is excessive and vague. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 relevant to the instant fee award U.S. 412, 421 (1978)). In determining the determination. amount of that fee, the Second Circuit stated However, even assuming the Court could that “courts should not hesitate to take the consider the parties’ relative wealth or relative wealth of the parties into account,” Detective Lemma’s financial circumstances, given that “fee awards are at bottom an the Court, in its discretion, concludes that a equitable matter.” Id. Since Faraci, courts reduction is not warranted. Detective in this Circuit have considered the parties’ Lemma’s own submissions demonstrate that relative wealth almost exclusively when he has more than sufficient assets to pay any awarding fees against plaintiffs who bring mandated attorneys’ fees, particularly in light frivolous or sanctionable claims. E.g., of the previously explained reductions and Shangold v. Walt Disney Co., 275 F. App’x his ongoing retirement income. (See ECF 72, 73 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming district court Nos. 392, 401.)7 In fact, Detective Lemma’s consideration of financial status of plaintiffs most recent submission reported that he sold who submitted fraudulent evidence); a home that he owned, and, as a result, his Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. liabilities are significantly diminished. In 00CIV.5780(LAK)(JCF), 2003 WL short, considering all of the equitable factors 22299203, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2003), in this particular case, including Detective adopted by No. 00 CIV. 5780 (LAK), 2003 Lemma’s financial circumstances, the Court WL 22493855 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2003) does not believe a reduction is warranted (reducing award against plaintiffs whose based on those circumstances or for any other claims were frivolous in light of their limited equitable reason. financial resources and defendant’s “enormous” resources). Indeed, defendants Accordingly, the Court calculates the have not cited a single case where a court total lodestar figure to be $298,122.55, based reduced a successful civil rights plaintiff’s on the following: fee award based on a defendant’s relative wealth, and this Court’s research has not Attorney Rate Hours Total Majid $250 90.40 $22,600 uncovered one. Relatedly, courts have considered “the wealth of the losing party, in Brewington $450 316.92 $142,614 cases of real or extreme hardship.” Mariani Fogelgaren $350 14.14 $4,949 v. Banat Realty, No. 86 CV 2895, 1993 WL Calliste $315 93.55 $29,468.25 86530, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1993); see Makhijani $250 0.21 $52.50 also Cohen v. W. Haven Bd. of Police Germano $250 4.63 $1,157.50 Comm’rs, 638 F.2d 496 , 506 (2d Cir. 1980) Cartright $315 204.02 $64,266.30 (“Ordinarily the court would not focus David $225 0.70 $157.50 exclusively on the financial condition of one Harris $250 96.60 $24,150 party unless that party appeared to be in extremis.”). Because this case does not Morris $225 1.40 $315 involve either scenario, it is not clear that Lockett $150 55.44 $8,316 Detective Lemma’s financial condition is Sheridan $50 1.53 $76.50 7 The Court notes that it considers Detective Lemma’s Deferred Compensation Plan as part of his net assets even with the potential tax penalty if the funds are accessed before Detective Lemma turns 59 years and six months old. Finally, the Court sees no reason to depart 5431034, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2012) from the lodestar figure in this case. See, e.g., (quoting Local Civ. R. 54.1{a)), adopted by Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553 (noting that lodestar 2012 WL 5429521 (S.D.N_Y. Nov. 7, 2012). figure includes “most, if not ail,” relevant . . factors in setting reasonable attorney’s fee). . Both Mr, Majid and the Brewington Law Firm attempted to rectify documentary C. Costs deficiencies relating to their requests for i ies. Brewington Ri As noted, Mr. Majid requests $2,351.97 Deel Ba A Mai 1 Reply Deal tx. BY in costs and the Brewington Law Firm However, the exhibits attached to those reply requests $19,357.60 in costs. Defendants declarations do not support the full amount of object on the ground that many asserted costs costs sought by either Mr. Majid or the have not been appropriately documented and Brewington Law Firm. After reviewing are EXCESSIVE. those exhibits, the Court finds that Mr. Majid “([A] court will generally award ‘those has provided support for an award of reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred $1,200.14, that the Brewington Law Firm has by attorneys and ordinarily charged to their provided support for an award of $8,177.30, clients.’” Pennacchio v. Powers, No. 05-CV- and that none of those costs are excessive. 985 (RRM)(RML), 2011 WL 2945825 , at *2 Accordingly, the Court awards $1,200.14 and (E.D.N.Y, July 21, 2011) (quoting LeBlanc— $8,177.30 in costs to Mr. Majid and the Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 763 (2d Brewington Law Firm, respectively. The Cir. 1998)). “Such reimbursable costs Court denies plaintiff's other requests for ‘include filing fees, process servers, postage, costs without prejudice, and will afford travel, and photocopying,’ as well as legal plaintiff's counsel the opportunity to submit research costs.” Tis. of the Pavers & Rd. further supporting documentation for their Builders Dist. Council Welfare v. M.C. cost requests. Landscape Grp., Inc., No, 12 CIV 00834 (CBA) (VMS), 2016 WL 6998640 , at *8 HL. CONCLUSION (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2016), adopted by 2016 For the reasons set forth herein, the Court WL 7017336 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2016) awards Arshad Majid $22,600 in fees and (quoting Capone v. Patchogue-Medford $1,200.14 in costs and awards the Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 04 Civ. 2947 (JS) Brewington Law Firm $275,522.55 in fees (MLO), 2011 WL 743573 , at *5 (E.D.NLY. and $8,177.30 in costs. Detective Lemma’s Feb, 23, 2011)). The moving party “bears the crossclaim for indemnification is dismissed. burden of adequately documenting and itemizing the costs requested.” Jd; accord SO ORDERED. First Keystone Consultants, Inc. _ v. alee Schlesinger Elec, Contractors, Inc., No. 10- ee CV-696 (KAM\SMG), 2013 WL 950573 , at JOSEPH F. BIANCO) \_.. *10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2013). In particular, United States Circuit Judge “the party must include as part of the request (Sitting by designation) ‘an affidavit that the costs claimed are allowable by law, are correctly stated and Dated: December 18, 2019 were necessarily incurred,”” and “[b]ills for Central Islip, NY the costs claimed must be attached as exhibits.” D.J. ex rel. Roberts v. City af New York, No. 11-CV-5458 (IGK)(DF), 2012 WL 16 * * * Plaintiff was formerly represented by Arshad Majid, Majid & Associates, P.C., 300 Rabro Drive, Hauppauge, NY 11788, and is currently represented by Frederick K. Brewington, the Law Offices of Frederick K. Brewington, 556 Peninsula Boulevard, Hempstead, NY 11550. Nassau County is represented by Matthew A. Cuomo, Cuomo LLC, 9 East 38th Street, New York, NY 10016, and Detective Lemma is represented by Mitchell Garber, Worth, Longworth & London, LLP, 111 John Street, New York, NY 10038.