Heater v. Kijakazi

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _________________________ SCOTT D. H., Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 3:20-CV-0817 (DEP) COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. __________________________ APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL: FOR PLAINTIFF LAW OFFICES OF KENNETH JUSTIN M. GOLDSTEIN, ESQ. HILLER, PLLC 6000 North Bailey Ave, Suite 1A Amherst, NY 14226 FOR DEFENDANT SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. TIMOTHY SEAN BOLEN, ESQ. 625 JFK Building 15 New Sudbury St Boston, MA 02203 DAVID E. PEEBLES U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE ORDER Currently pending before the court in this action, in which plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.1 Oral argument was heard in connection with those motions on October 13, 2021, during a telephone conference conducted on the record. At the close of argument, I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner=s determination resulted from the application of proper legal principles and is supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by the plaintiff in this appeal. After due deliberation, and based upon the court=s oral bench decision, which has been transcribed, is attached to this order, and is incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby ORDERED, as follows: 1) Defendant=s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED. 1 This matter, which is before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(c), has been treated in accordance with the procedures set forth in General Order No. 18. Under that General Order once issue has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally, as if cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings had been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2) |The Commissioner’s determination that the plaintiff was not disabled at the relevant times, and thus is not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act, is AFFIRMED. 3) The clerk is respectfully directed to enter judgment, based upon this determination, DISMISSING plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. U.S. Magistrate Judge Dated: October 21, 2021 Syracuse, NY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ------------------------------------------------------x SCOTT H., Plaintiff, -v- 3:20-CV-817 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. ------------------------------------------------------x TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID E. PEEBLES October 13, 2021 100 South Clinton Street, Syracuse, New York For the Plaintiff: (Appearance by telephone) LAW OFFICE OF KENNETH HILLER 6000 North Bailey Avenue Suite 1A Amherst, New York 14226 BY: JUSTIN M. GOLDSTEIN, ESQ. For the Defendant: (Appearance by telephone) SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION J.F.K. Federal Building, Room 625 15 New Sudbury Street Boston, Massachusetts 02203 BY: TIMOTHY SEAN BOLEN, ESQ. Hannah F. Cavanaugh, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR Official United States Court Reporter 100 South Clinton Street Syracuse, New York 13261-7367 (315) 234-8545 1 (The Court and all parties present by telephone. 2 Time noted: 2:33 p.m.) 3 THE COURT: Plaintiff has commenced this proceeding 4 pursuant to 42, United States Code, Section 405 (g) to challenge 5 an adverse determination by the Commissioner of Social Security 6 finding that he was not disabled at the relevant times and 7 therefore ineligible for the benefits that he sought. 8 The background is as follows: Plaintiff was born in 9 April of 1974. He's currently 47 years old. He was 41 years 10 old at the alleged onset of his disability on September 25, 11 2015. Plaintiff lives in a two-story house in the Binghamton, 12 New York area with his longtime girlfriend of 25 years, at least 13 at the time of the hearing, together with one daughter and three 14 dogs. Plaintiff has two other daughters that do not reside with 15 him. Plaintiff stands 5'9" or 5'10" in height and has weighed 16 at various times between 180 pounds prior to his accident and 17 280 pounds after. Plaintiff has an 11th grade education and 18 secured a GED in 2016. 19 The evidence is equivocal as to whether he was in 20 regular or special education classes. In the function report, 21 he indicated regular classes, but at the hearing at page 613 he 22 claimed that he was labelled and identified as learning 23 disabled. He has also undergone some vocational training and 24 was unsuccessful in attempting online college courses. 25 Plaintiff has a driver's license and can drive. 1 Plaintiff stopped working as a result of a motor 2 vehicle accident sustained in April of 2011, although he did try 3 on two or three occasions between 2012 and 2015 to return to 4 work without success. Plaintiff's work experience is somewhat 5 limited to employment at Frito-Lay where he worked beginning in 6 January of 1998. While there, he has worked as a packer, a 7 kitchen worker, a tester, and a box drop worker in the factory. 8 The plaintiff suffers from degenerative disc disease 9 of the lumbar area with radiculopathy, obesity, hyperlipidemia, 10 and some throat issues. He also was involved in a motor vehicle 11 accident, as I indicated, and sustained a left leg fracture. He 12 also experiences diabetes. As a result of the motor vehicle 13 accident, plaintiff suffered a back injury. The plaintiff has 14 had, since the time of the injury, several magnetic resonance 15 imaging testings and X-rays. 16 On October 20, 2011, he underwent MRI testing, which 17 resulted in an impression as follows: Degenerative endplate 18 changes at L1-L2, posterior disc bulges and small protrusions at 19 L4-L5 and L5-S1, no significant spinal canal or neuroforaminal 20 stenosis, that's at page 376. 21 X-rays of his lumbar area taken on December 7, 2011, 22 revealed some degenerative disc disease of the L5-S1 and L4-L5 23 disc levels and indicated there also appears to be degenerative 24 disc disease at the T12-1 and T11-T12 disc levels. The report 25 of that X-ray is at 380 and 381 of the Administrative 1 Transcript. 2 On October 22, 2012, MRI testing revealed a prominent 3 epidural lipomatosis at L5-S1. The impression given was tiny 4 right paracentral disc protrusion at L1-L2, L4-L5 small central 5 disc protrusion, and L5-S1 small central disc protrusion. 6 That's at page 292. 7 On August 31, 2016, X-rays were again taken of 8 plaintiff's lumbosacral spine. The impression was no 9 significant bony abnormality. It also reflected the height of 10 the vertical bodies and intervertebral disc spaces as relatively 11 well maintained. The pedicles are intact. There is a 12 transitional L5 vertical body. That's at page 403. 13 X-rays taken on October 7, 2017, resulted in the 14 impression of, "normal exam." And this is page 575 of the 15 Administrative Transcript. 16 Mentally, plaintiff suffers from depression and 17 anxiety, but has not undergone any specialized treatment by a 18 psychiatrist or psychologist, no hospitalization, and no 19 medications. 20 Plaintiff's general health concerns are taken care of 21 by UHS Medical Group and various professionals in that group. 22 Plaintiff was also seeing Dr. Douglas Taber, a chiropractor, 23 from January of 2013 to April of 2013, at which time he 24 underwent multiple manipulations under anesthesia, or MUAs. He 25 also has seen Dr. Kamlesh Desai, a back surgeon who he sees as 1 needed, and sees Dr. Desai one time per year for insurance 2 purposes. He also has seen Nurse Practitioner Meghan Laing who 3 works with him for general concerns, as well as the anxiety. He 4 sees Nurse Practitioner Laing also as needed. 5 In terms of medications, plaintiff has been 6 prescribed Venlafaxine or Effexor, Advil, Ibuprofen, Tylenol, 7 and Aleve. He's had relatively conservative treatment, 8 including physical therapy, home exercise, heat, and ice. He 9 declined to receive injections. 10 His activities of daily living include the ability to 11 shower, dress, groom, and shop. Plaintiff watches television, 12 socializes, and tinkers with cars. Plaintiff is not a current 13 smoker. 14 Procedurally, plaintiff applied for Title II benefits 15 on July 5, 2016, alleging an onset date of September 25, 2015. 16 It was noted that a prior application for benefits resulted in 17 an unfavorable Administrative Law Judge decision on 18 September 24, 2015, hence the onset date of September 25, 2015, 19 and the current application. In support of his claim for 20 disability benefits, plaintiff claims disability based on 21 displacement of thoracic or lumbar intervertebral radiculopathy, 22 anxiety, depression, and a broken leg. Administrative Law Judge 23 Robyn Hoffman conducted a hearing on August 24, 2018, to address 24 plaintiff's application for benefits. ALJ Hoffman issued an 25 unfavorable decision on June 12, 2019. That became a final 1 determination of the agency on May 22, 2020, when the Social 2 Security Administration Appeals Council denied plaintiff's 3 application for review. This action was commenced on July 20, 4 2020, and is timely. 5 In her decision, ALJ Hoffman applied the familiar 6 five-step test for determining disability. At step one, she 7 concluded that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 8 activity since September 25, 2015, through December 31, 2018, 9 which was the date on which he was last insured. 10 At step two, she concluded that the plaintiff does 11 suffer from severe impairments that impose more than minimal 12 limitations on his ability to perform basic work activities, and 13 specifically lumbar spine degenerative disc disease with 14 radiculopathy. 15 At step three, ALJ Hoffman concluded that plaintiff's 16 conditions do not meet or medically equal any of the listed 17 presumptively disabling conditions set forth in the 18 Commissioner's regulations, focusing on listing 1.04. She noted 19 in rejecting that listing that the mere presence of evidence of 20 epidermal lipomatosis does not necessarily demonstrate nerve 21 compression. The Administrative Law Judge next determined that 22 plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity 23 notwithstanding his conditions to perform less than a full range 24 of light work, and specifically lifting/carrying up to 25 pounds 25 occasionally, lift or carry up to 10 pounds frequently, stand or 1 walk for approximately seven hours total, and sit for up to five 2 hours total in an eight-hour workday with normal breaks. There 3 were other postural limitations and no mental-related 4 limitations set forth in the RFC. 5 At step four, Administrative Law Judge Hoffman 6 concluded that plaintiff could not perform his past relevant 7 work as a warehouse worker. She therefore went on to step five. 8 At step five, she noted initially that if plaintiff 9 could perform a full range of light work, a finding of no 10 disability would be required by the Medical-Vocational 11 Guidelines, or the so-called grids, and specifically Grid Rule 12 202.20. Because of the additional limitations that were found 13 in the RFC, she concluded based on the testimony of a vocational 14 expert that plaintiff nonetheless can perform available work in 15 the national economy, citing three representative jobs of 16 classifier, router, and assembler/production. 17 As you know, the Court's function in this case is 18 limited and extremely deferential. I must determine whether 19 correct legal principles were applied and the resulting 20 determination is supported by substantial evidence, defined as 21 such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would find 22 sufficient to support a conclusion. As the Second Circuit noted 23 in Brault v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, 683 24 F.3d 443 from 2012, the standard is demanding, more so than the 25 clearly erroneous standard. The Court noted in Brault that once 1 there is a finding of fact, that fact can be rejected only if a 2 reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise. 3 The plaintiff raises several contentions, some of 4 which are intertwined. In his brief, he contends that improper 5 weight was given to medical opinions in the record, and 6 particularly the treating source opinion of Dr. Desai. 7 Secondly, he contends that he carried his burden of establishing 8 that his condition meets or medically equals, at step three, 9 listing 1.04. He argues that the residual functional capacity 10 finding is unsupported and that the Administrative Law Judge 11 erred in evaluating his subjective complaints. Plaintiff 12 believes there is sufficient evidence in the record to firmly 13 establish disability and therefore seeks remand with a directed 14 finding for purely a calculation of benefits. 15 In terms of medical opinions, when there are 16 conflicting medical opinions in the record, as is the case here, 17 in the first instance it is for the Administrative Law Judge to 18 weigh and determine the weight to be given on those, Veino v. 19 Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578 , Second Circuit, 2002. In this case, the 20 focus, of course, is on the physical components of plaintiff's 21 condition. Speaking to that, Dr. Desai, plaintiff's treating 22 orthopedic surgeon, has given multiple opinions in the case. 23 On September 16, 2015 -- and this is at pages 489 and 24 490 of the Administrative Transcript -- he notes the current 25 diagnosis of lumbar radiculopathy and states no heavy lifting, 1 avoid repetitive bending, lifting, twisting, pushing, pulling, 2 frequent position change. He also answers the question, is 3 plaintiff now able to work with reasonable -- I can't read my 4 own writing. Well, essentially continuity, and the answer 5 stated is no. And if so -- the question is, if so, when do you 6 think patient will be able to resume work. The answer is, 7 "disabled." Of course, those latter two are opinions on matters 8 reserved to the Commissioner. 9 On October 4, 2015, at pages 473 and 474, similarly 10 Dr. Desai opines no heavy lifting, avoid repetitive bending, 11 lifting, twisting, pushing, pulling, frequent position change. 12 He also indicates that plaintiff cannot return to either his 13 regular occupation or any occupation and that he is totally 14 disabled. Significantly, when asked what is the patient's 15 current treatment program, the response is, "home exercises." 16 On July 10, 2018, at pages 518 through 520, Dr. Desai 17 responds in a primarily checkbox form with opinions that are 18 basically extremely debilitating to the plaintiff. How many 19 city blocks can your patient walk or rest without severe pain, 20 zero. How many hours can your patient sit at one time before 21 needing to get up, zero. How many hours or minutes can the 22 plaintiff stand at one time before needing to sit down, zero. 23 In an eight-hour workday, the indication was plaintiff can sit 24 and stand/walk for less than two hours. On page 519, a 25 statement is made, "unable to work," in response to two of the 1 questions. When asked about lifting and carrying, Dr. Desai 2 said never for less than ten pounds. Look down, never. Turn 3 head left or right, never. Look up, never. Hold head in static 4 position, never. Twist, stoop, crouch, climb ladders, climb 5 stairs, never, in contrast to the earlier two opinions. And 6 hands: Grasp, turn, twist objects, never. Fingers: Fine 7 manipulation, never. Arms: Reaching, overhead, never. 8 The Administrative Law Judge addressed these opinions 9 at page 27 of the Administrative Transcript and gave Dr. Desai's 10 opinions no weight. Dr. Desai is a treating source and, of 11 course, because of when this application was filed, the former 12 regulations, and specifically 20 C.F.R. Section 404.1527 13 applies. And under the former regulations, it would narrow the 14 opinion of a treating physician regarding the nature and 15 severity of an impairment as entitled to considerable deference 16 provided it is supported by medically acceptable clinical and 17 laboratory diagnostic tests and techniques, and is not 18 inconsistent with other substantial evidence, Veino, 312 F.3d at 19 588. Such opinions are not controlling, however, if they are 20 contrary to other substantial evidence in the record, including 21 the opinions of other medical experts. If more conflicts arise 22 in the form of contradictorily medical evidence, as I indicated 23 earlier, the resolution is properly entrusted to the 24 Commissioner. 25 The regulation does go on to say that if controlling 1 weight is not accorded to a treating source, the ALJ must apply 2 several factors to determine the degree of weight, if any, to be 3 assigned to the opinion, and those factors are spelled out in 20 4 C.F.R. Section 404.1527, and the Second Circuit will sometimes 5 refer to those loosely as the Burgess factors. By the way, I do 6 not agree with plaintiff's assertion, to the extent that 7 assertion is made in the brief, that if the opinion of a 8 treating source -- it is improper to give zero weight to the 9 opinions of Dr. Desai. I think it is within the ALJ's realm and 10 prerogative to give it no weight if the weight is properly 11 explained and is supported by substantial evidence. In this -- 12 and I also agree with the Commissioner that to the extent -- and 13 I'm not sure this is the case here, but to the extent that the 14 Burgess factors -- the regulatory factors are not specifically 15 all addressed per sé, if the Court makes a searching record 16 review and determines that the treating source opinion was 17 handled properly, then there's no need to remand, Estrella v. 18 Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90 , Second Circuit, 2019. 19 In this case, Dr. Desai's opinions are given on a 20 checkbox form with little or no discussion, historically viewed 21 as fairly weak evidence. It is extreme and although maybe 22 standing alone, the fact that an opinion is extreme might not 23 suffice under the cases cited by the plaintiff as a reason for 24 rejecting the opinion. It is fair to say that it is 25 inconsistent with not only Dr. Desai's earlier opinions, his 1 treatment notes, and his prescription of home exercise, and so I 2 think that's a proper consideration. As I said before, opinions 3 regarding disability is a matter reserved to the Commissioner. 4 The opinion is inconsistent with the interrogatory 5 responses from Dr. Chandrasekhar and to a degree with Dr. 6 Jenouri's findings. I think it is not improper -- I understand 7 what plaintiff is saying, that Dr. Chandrasekhar did not examine 8 the plaintiff, but he had available to him every one of the 9 medical records associated with plaintiff's treatment and I 10 think it is proper to elevate the opinion of Dr. Chandrasekhar 11 over Dr. Desai, Netter v. Astrue, 272 F. App'x 54 from the 12 Second Circuit, 2008. 13 The test, as the Commissioner correctly argues, is 14 whether the treating source opinion is well supported and not 15 inconsistent with other substantial evidence. Here, I find that 16 neither prong is met. It is inconsistent with the treatment 17 notes, plaintiff's attempted work attempts, the fact that he is 18 engaged in some sort of home exercise program, and the fact that 19 he is receiving extremely conservative treatment consisting 20 primarily of over-the-counter medications, and did in fact 21 decline to undergo injections. I think those are all proper 22 considerations. Tricarico v. Colvin, 681 F. App'x 98 from the 23 Second Circuit, 2017, and Ganoe v. Commissioner of Social 24 Security, 2015 WL 9267442 from the Northern District of New York 25 on November 23, 2015. 1 So I believe that when the decision is read as a 2 whole, the treating source rule was not violated and that it was 3 proper to give no weight to Dr. Desai's extremely limiting 4 opinion. Dr. Jenouri examined the plaintiff and provided a 5 medical opinion. His report is at 399 to 402 of the 6 Administrative Transcript. He opines moderate to marked 7 restriction in walking, standing, and sitting long periods, 8 bending, stair climbing, lifting, and carrying. Clearly, 9 somewhat more restrictive than the residual functional capacity 10 finding, but less restrictive than Dr. Desai's opinions. The 11 opinion of Dr. Jenouri is discussed at page 27 by the 12 Administrative Law Judge and given little weight. There was no 13 direct -- I didn't see any direct challenge in plaintiff's brief 14 to the weight given. It's folded into the step three argument 15 to some extent. I think the Administrative Law Judge's 16 discussion of Dr. Jenouri's opinion could be more fulsome, but 17 when considering the record as a whole, including the ALJ's 18 discussion of the medical evidence which appears earlier, 19 including at page 26, I don't find any error. 20 Turning to the interrogatory responses of Dr. 21 Chandrasekhar, she gave interrogatory responses which appear at 22 pages 564 to 572 of the Administrative Transcript. In many 23 respects it supports the residual functional capacity finding, 24 although the doctor in some respects found less limitation than 25 the residual functional capacity finding and, of course, under 1 Matta, the Second Circuit's decision, there's -- it is not 2 required that the residual functional capacity finding track any 3 one single medical opinion. Dr. Chandrasekhar reviewed all of 4 the available records and appeared to testify and was cross 5 examined. The opinion was discussed at page 27 of the 6 Administrative Law Judge's decision and given great weight. The 7 ALJ, when faced with conflicting medical evidence, properly 8 exercised her discretion to afford more weight to Dr. 9 Chandrasekhar's opinions under Veino and I find no error in 10 weighing that opinion. 11 Turning to the step three argument, the focus is on 12 listing 1.04A. That listing is met or equal with evidence of 13 nerve root compression characterized by neuro-anatomic 14 distribution of pain, limitation of motion of the spine, motor 15 loss (atrophy with associated muscle weakness or muscle 16 weakness) accompanied by sensory or reflex loss, and, if there 17 is involvement of the lower back, positive straight leg raising 18 test (sitting and supine). The listing is discussed by 19 Administrative Law Judge Hoffman at page 25 of the transcript. 20 The burden, of course, of establishing that his condition meets 21 or equals any listing falls on the plaintiff and to satisfy a 22 listing, he must meet all of the criteria. Dr. Chandrasekhar 23 made it clear that the mere presence of a prominent epidermal 24 lipomatosis without clinical studies and EMG or nerve root 25 conduction studies does not alone provide evidence of nerve 1 compromise. I think it was proper to rely on that opinion. I 2 also agree with the Commissioner that it's unclear that the 3 straight leg raising from both sitting and seated position -- 4 I'm sorry, seated and supine positions can be met and certainly 5 over the durational requirement necessary, so I think rejection 6 of equivalence or equalling or meeting listing 1.04A is properly 7 explained and supported by substantial evidence. 8 The next issue is whether the residual functional 9 capacity is supported by substantial evidence. An RFC 10 represents a range of tasks the plaintiff is capable of 11 performing notwithstanding his impairments, and ordinarily 12 represents the maximum ability to perform sustained work 13 activities in an ordinary setting on a regular and continuing 14 basis, meaning eight hours a day for five days a week or an 15 equivalent schedule. An RFC, of course, is informed by 16 consideration of all relevant medical and other evidence and, to 17 be proper, must be supported by substantial evidence. In this 18 case, the RFC is supported by Dr. Chandrasekhar's interrogatory 19 responses and we've already discussed why I believe the weight 20 given to those interrogatory responses was proper. It is 21 sufficient to provide substantial evidence to support the RFC 22 finding. 23 The last issue raised is what we used to call 24 credibility, the analysis of the plaintiff's subjective 25 complaints. Those complaints must be taken into account, of 1 course. When examining the issue, though, an ALJ is not 2 required to blindly accept the subjective testimony of a 3 claimant, but instead retains the discretion to weigh the 4 credibility of the claimant's testimony in light of the other 5 evidence in the record, Grenier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46 , Second 6 Circuit, 2010. 7 When analyzing the subjective claims of a plaintiff, 8 the ALJ must follow SSR 16-3p, which details factors to be 9 considered including daily activities, the location, duration, 10 frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms, and factors 11 that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; the type, dosage, 12 effectiveness, and side effects of any medication an individual 13 takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; 14 treatment other than the medication an individual receives or 15 has received for relief for pain or other symptoms; any measures 16 other than treatment an individual uses or has used to relieve 17 the pain or other symptoms; and any other factors concerning an 18 individual's functional limitations/restrictions due to pain or 19 other symptoms. 20 In this case, the Administrative Law Judge applied 21 the so-called two-step analysis to address the plaintiff's 22 subjective claims. The analysis appears at page 26 and 27 of 23 the Administrative Transcript. The ALJ explained her reasoning 24 and she based it on conservative treatment, Dr. Desai's 25 treatment notes, many of which show that he was stable and can 1 do most activities, at page 283, for example. Treatment notes 2 also revealed little or no evidence of motor weakness. They 3 revealed normal gait in many, if not most, instances and the 4 ability to walk on heels and toes. She also relied on the 5 vocational assessment from December 14, 2014 -- that appears at 6 497 to 500 of the Administrative Transcript -- by Jacqueline 7 Oberman, a Senior Rehabilitation Specialist. 8 I agree with plaintiff's counsel that she is not an 9 acceptable medical source, but under 20 C.F.R. Section 404.1527, 10 subsection F, the opinion is still entitled to some 11 consideration. In that opinion, it reports that Mr. H took 12 part in a functional capacity evaluation that occurred on 13 September 26, 2014, revealing he was able to sit for 30 minutes 14 maximum, stand for 30 minutes maximum, walk for one mile 15 continuously, lift 50 pounds maximum occasionally, 25 pounds 16 maximum frequently, and 10 pounds maximum continuously. He was 17 able to carry a maximum of 40 pounds occasionally. He had a 18 pushing/pulling capacity of 60 pounds. He had difficulty 19 bending at the waist, but could climb down and up one flight of 20 stairs, kneel, crouch, crawl slowly, and reach in all directions 21 with both arms. He was found able to work in a medium-strength 22 category. He was restricted from pushing or pulling more than 23 60 pounds, balancing activities that require crouching and 24 stooping. That provided a proper basis, as well as the other 25 factors just mentioned, for the Administrative Law Judge to 1 reject plaintiff's claim of debilitating pain. 2 So I find no error in the Administrative Law Judge's 3 analysis of plaintiff's subjective complaints. In conclusion, I 4 find that correct legal principles were applied and substantial 5 evidence supports the Administrative Law Judge's determination 6 and will therefore grant judgment on the pleadings to the 7 defendant and order dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. 8 Thank you both. Have a good afternoon. 9 MR. GOLDSTEIN: Thank you, your Honor. 10 MR. BOLEN: Thank you. 11 (Time noted: 3:08 p.m.) [3] 4 CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER [6] 7 I, HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, 8 NYRCR, Official U.S. Court Reporter, in and for the United 9 States District Court for the Northern District of New York, DO 10 HEREBY CERTIFY that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United 11 States Code, that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript 12 of the stenographically reported proceedings held in the 13 above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is in 14 conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of 15 the United States. [16] 17 Dated this 18th day of October, 2021. [18] 19 s/ Hannah F. Cavanaugh______________________ 20 HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR 21 Official U.S. Court Reporter