Klein v. AT&T Corp.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JENNIFER KLEIN, Plain�ff, 23-CV-11038 (DEH) (RFT) -againstORDER AT&T CORP., Defendant. ROBYN F. TARNOFSKY, United States Magistrate Judge: On April 11, 2024, Defendant AT&T Mobility, LLC, identified as AT&T Corp. in this action (“Defendant”), filed a letter request asking the Court to “stay any addi�onal proceedings and/or mo�on prac�ce un�l a�er the Mo�on to Enforce Setlement is decided.” (ECF 26, Leter.) The scope of the requested stay is unclear, but this request falls within the scope of the referral to me for general pretrial supervision. I held a status conference with the par�es on April 19, 2024, to discuss this issue. Plain�ff Jennifer Klein (“Plain�ff”) took the posi�on that a stay would unfairly delay and complicate resolu�on of her claims against Defendant. The Court has discretion that is “‘incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants’” to grant a stay of proceedings. Makhnevich v. Arrowood Indem. Co., No. 23-CV-1559 (JMF) (VF), 2024 WL 1020577 , at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2024) (quoting UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Regeneron Pharms., Inc., No. 20-CV-10664 (VB), 2021 WL 6137097 , at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2021); see also Adam v. Jacobs, 950 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that the decision whether to grant a stay is left to the court’s discretion). “In deciding whether a stay is appropriate, courts . . . typically consider five factors: (1) the private interests of the plain�ffs in proceeding expedi�ously with the civil li�ga�on as balanced against the prejudice to the plain�ffs if delayed; (2) the private interests of and burden on the defendants; (3) the interests of the courts; (4) the interests of persons not par�es to the civil li�ga�on; and (5) the public interest.” Sikhs for Justice v. Nath, 893 F. Supp. 2d 598, 621-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal quota�on marks and cita�ons omited). Defendant bears the burden of showing that a stay is warranted. See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 97 (2d Cir. 2012). Defendant’s “peremptory letter[ ] seeking a stay did little or nothing to carry that burden.” Makhnevich, 2024 WL 1020577 , at *1. Defendant merely stated that there are currently two dispositive motions pending before the Court, and that “AT&T maintains that this underlying lawsuit has already been setled as the par�es agreed to all material setlement terms, notwithstanding Plain�ff’s later change of heart.” (ECF 26, Leter.) With regard to Defendant’s mo�on to enforce a setlement agreement (ECF 18, 19), Plain�ff disputes that there ever was such an agreement, which raises issues for gran�ng the mo�on to enforce without discovery and therefore cuts against a stay. Nevertheless, at the conference, Defendant focused on its mo�on to compel arbitra�on (ECF 9, 10). I have reviewed that mo�on, and it “do[es] not appear to be without foundation in law.” In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation, No. MDL 1409, M21-95, 2002 WL 88278 , at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (quoting Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp., 137 F.R.D. 209, 209-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)). As a result, I believe that Plaintiff’s interest in proceeding quickly and the prejudice to her of delay are outweighed by Defendant’s interest in not being obligated to litigate in this forum when it is possible that the matter will be sent to arbitration and the interest of courts in not expending resources on matters that may belong in a different forum. Defendant’s application for a stay of proceedings is GRANTED. DATED: April 24, 2024 New York, New York SO ORDERED. ROBYN F. TARNOFSKY United States Magistrate Judge