Council v. Sottile

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION DANIEL W. COUNCIL, CASE NO. 1:22 CV 760 Plaintiff, JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING v. ANTHONY D. SOTTILE, et al., MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Defendants. INTRODUCTION Pro se Plaintiff Daniel W. Council (“Plaintiff”) has filed an in forma pauperis complaint in this case against four Defendants: Anthony D. Sottile, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A., Michael Lubes, and Amourgis & Associates (collectively “Defendants”). (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s brief Complaint is unclear and does not set forth specific factual allegations against any of the Defendants. Instead, Plaintiff merely generally alleges “malpractice . . . in representing a client.” (Id. at PageID #5 ¶ III). It appears the Complaint pertains to a 2014 foreclosure action in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas in which a judgment of foreclosure was entered regarding property in Akron, and, to a 2016 Akron Municipal Court judgment against Plaintiff for forcible entry and detainer, both as to which Plaintiff has submitted various pleadings with his Complaint. See U.S. Bank N.A. v. Barbara Council, et al., No. CV-2014-03-1415 (Summit Cty. Ct. of Comm. Pls.) (referred to at Doc. Nos. 1-4 and 1-6); Wilmington Trust Natl. Assc. MFRA Trust v. Daniel and David Council, No. 15 CV 00219 (Akron Mun. Ct.) (referred to at Doc. No. 1-7). For relief, Plaintiff seeks “recovery of [the] property through transfer of death deed” and damages. (Doc. No. 1 at 6, ¶ IV). STANDARD OF REVIEW AND DISCUSSION Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the lenient treatment accorded pro se plaintiffs has limits. See e.g., Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir.1996). Pro se litigants must still meet basic pleading requirements, and courts are not required to conjure allegations on their behalf. See Erwin v. Edwards, 22 Fed. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001). District courts are expressly required, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B), to screen all in forma pauperis complaints filed in federal court, and to dismiss before service any such complaint that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 (6th Cir. 2010). To survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 470-71 (holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 ). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ). A pleading that offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 . Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557 . Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed. Even according the Complaint the deference to which a pro se pleading is entitled, it fails to meet basic pleading requirements or set forth allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim upon which the Court may grant him relief against any Defendant in the case. It is a basic pleading requirement that a plaintiff must provide specific factual allegations as to particular defendants that are sufficient to provide fair notice of what plaintiff’s claims are and the factual grounds upon which they rest. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 . Merely listing defendants in the caption of a complaint but raising no specific factual allegations as to them, as Plaintiff’s complaint does here, is insufficient to state a plausible claim even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se plaintiffs. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 Fed. Appx. 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 155 -57 (1978)). At best, Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts conclusory defendants-unlawfully-harmed-me allegations without factual enhancement that are insufficient to state any plausible claim for relief in federal court. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 . See also Kafele v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, L.P.A., 161 Fed. Appx. 487, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that plaintiffs’ claims against attorney defendants pertaining a mortgage foreclosure action were properly dismissed for failure to conform to federal pleading requirements). Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff is asking the Court to overturn or reverse a state court judgment (of foreclosure or eviction), the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars his claims. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that “lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts.” See Givens v. Homecomings Financial, 278 Fed Appx. 607, 608 (6th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine to the extent they are “predicated upon a conviction” that a state court judgment was wrong. See Kafele, 161 Fed. Appx. at 490 (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's claims pertaining to a mortgage foreclosure action resting on premise that a state foreclosure judgment was invalid). CONCLUSION Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis in this matter (ECF No. 2) 1s granted, and for the reasons stated above, the action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. IT IS SO ORDERED. Date: August 4, 2022 “nd Him CHARLES E. FLEMING UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE